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Abstract
Militancy inspired by Islamists is escalating globally, and government action is necessary
to protect vulnerable populations. Security professionals generally agree that governance
may complement the use of force to defeat militants; however, current doctrine does not
address the concurrent integration of governance in a comprehensive strategy. This
interpretive case study explored Pakistan’s application of governance during the 2009
Khyber operation in Swat Valley, code-named Operation Rah-e-Rast. The central
research question focused on how governance activities were integrated with military
operations to subdue militancy. Data were collected through interviews with 6 planners,
Pakistani secondary source survey data, and government artifacts. Data were inductively
coded using a progressive axial coding process and validated through methodological
triangulation. Data were then analyzed using a case study analytical model, grounded in
neo-Clausewitzian theoretical principles, to derive key themes. Key findings indicate that
an interministry collaborative approach to regain the public trust was more effective in
placating violence than was solely using military action. Sound governance, enabled by
strategic communications and intelligence, fostered tribal relationships that promoted
confidence and undermined the militant support base. The civil-military planning
protocols were successful, but mainly ad-hoc and suboptimized. Formal training,
standing civil-military planning forums, and planning process improvements stemming
from the Pakistan experience could instill social change by assisting national leaders in
developing a cogent countermilitancy strategy to defeat the global Islamist movement.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Introduction
Top Pakistan government officials conceded that the Islamist militancy problem
within their borders was an imminent threat to the nation. In an address to a joint session
of Parliament in June 2013, Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari remarked, “Militancy,
extremism, and terrorism pose the greatest threat to our national security. The nation is
united against militants” (Gul, 2013, para.4). The Pakistani Taliban led a conglomeration
of Islamist extremists who sought to undermine the Islamabad government and gain the
right of autonomous governance based in Sharia law. They attempted to establish a firm
political base among the Pashtun in their Northwest Provinces to expand their radical
worldview (Cordesman & Vira, 2011). Due to a weakness of governance, the militants
had the initiative and the government effort to deter the violence through a reliance on
military force was faltering (Fair, 2011). Thus, policymakers and planners need to
understand how governance and military operations may be integrated into a
comprehensive countermilitancy strategy.
Pakistan is at the epicenter of the violent Islamist militancy phenomenon. The
escalation of global militancy is a significant social problem that warrants international
attention and aggressive multinational action. The Institute for Conflict Management
(2014) estimated that violence against innocent civilians will grow significantly in
Pakistan and may then spread to other regions creating a worldwide crisis. The Pashtun
are anchored at a geo-political fault zone where there is a constant political and social
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struggle between Islam, the global super powers, and the national government (Khan,
2007). Khan suggests that the Pashtun perceived the government attempts to protect them
as reluctant and only symbolic rather than a determined effort. Furthermore, Pakistan’s
failure to address the escalating violence in their highlands has had global implications.
The Pakistan government is a fragile parliamentary republic that loosely governs.
For the most part, the government has failed to achieve the trust and confidence of the
Pashtun (Cohen, 2007; Panwar, 2010). Cordesman and Vira (2011) assessed that Pakistan
is plagued by a semidysfunctional political system that is paralyzed with infighting
between the politicians, military, and the mullahs. The government’s lack of
understanding of cultural and social relations has perpetuated a fractured society.
Humphrey (2012) asserted that the Pashtun were disenfranchised from the mainstream
political processes and an Islamist shadow governance filled the leadership void. The
Pashtun did not recognize Pakistan’s military or the government as their guardian or
protectors, and the Islamists had the initiative (Nawaz & Borchgrave, 2009).
In this research, I explored Pakistan’s struggle to coordinate their government
ministries with the military to mollify the destructive brutality of the Islamists and
reinstitute the writ (authority) of government under the Malakand Division political agent
of the Khyber Provincial Government. The 2009 Swat Valley operation conducted within
the Malakand, codenamed Rah-e-Rast, was Pakistan’s first committed attempt to
integrate governance with military operations to subdue Islamist militancy using a
doctrinal countermilitancy approach. Haq and Malik (2009) and Khattak (2010) provided
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convincing evidence that the operation effectively defeated the Islamic shadow
government and brought calm to the valley. In this scientific study, I examined the
planning and implementation processes during the Swat campaign. International
terrorism experts are closely monitoring the Pakistani experience as a bellwether of the
global Islamist movement.
The research promotes social change by recommending improvements to
Pakistani government planning and implementation protocols that influence Islamist
social behavior. After a decade of conflict with Islamists, there is a lack of evidence that
the increased lethality of radical militants through military action alone will change social
behavior or achieve an enduring peace. The problem is that contemporary
countermilitancy doctrine does not adequately address the concurrent integration of
governance with military operations into a comprehensive strategy. Governance and
military activity were typically planned and implemented in different phases of an
operation separated by time and location, depending upon the security situation. Current
strategy focuses primarily defeating the militants through a force of arms. It largely
discounts the potential synergy of integrating governance with military action to
reestablish a peaceful social order. In short, planning doctrine does not adequately
address the simultaneous integration of governance using all instruments of national
power (Jones & Fair, 2010). The study findings and planning process implications may
assist planners in achieving a more effective countermilitancy campaign design.

4
The purpose of this case study was to determine the successes and failures of
integrating governance and military activities during the Swat operation conducted in the
heart of Pakistan’s Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province. The Swati-Pashtun endured the
brutality of militants bent on instituting their radical Islamic worldview based in strict
compliance of Sharia law and they sought protection from their government (Fair, 2011).
During Operation Rah-e-Rast, the Pakistani authorities—for the first time—pursued an
aggressive population-centered approach by connecting to the people through governance
while conducting an aggressive military maneuver against the Taliban (Haq & Malik,
2009). Pakistan’s approach emphasized the importance of a whole-of-government effort
to defeat the Islamists. However, identifying the most effective amalgamation of
governance and military activity was elusive. The Pakistanis made significant progress in
subduing militancy, but their methods were neither well understood nor codified in
doctrinal planning processes. In this study, I explored the operational successes of Rah-eRast to improve the doctrinal foundation for future global contingencies.
The nature of the research is qualitative, using a single case to assess the unique
application of governance in a hostile militancy environment. The theoretical foundation
for the study is an emerging adaptation of social conflict theory, referred to as neoClausewitzian theory by military strategists, to explore the relationships between the
people, the military, and their government that influence the implementation of
governance under limited warfare circumstances. A qualitative approach was appropriate
to assess the human dimension of the complex social environment by empowering
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selected planners to share their personal stories (Creswell, 2013). This single case study
includes an analysis bounded in time and location. Data analysis consisted of merging
information from official government documents, interview data from a select cadre of
planners, and credible survey data that captured the Swati perspectives.
Neo-Clausewitzian warfare theory provided a theoretical foundation for this
research. The theory approaches society from a macrosociological viewpoint, described
as a severe imbalance within the social system that makes it dysfunctional (Henslin,
2007). In this paradigm, the social imbalance is caused by a power struggle between a
government and unconventional fighters (Islamist militants) who seek political and social
change by collapsing the government and replacing it with their own authority founded in
Sharia law. The neo-Clausewitzian school of thought emphasizes relationship building
between the national government, the military, and the people as a counterbalance to
stabilize the social situation (Clausewitz, 1832/1976).
In neo-Clausewitzian design, strong and enduring social and political
relationships are vital to counter the destabilizing militant activity. Governance policy
then becomes a key instrument of national authority to connect with the people politically
and socially—and promotes a public trust and confidence that will strengthen
government legitimacy. According to neo-Clausewitzian theorists, the two instruments,
governance and the use of force, working in mutual support are the essence of a
counterinsurgency strategy. This study is an analysis of Pakistan’s implementation of this
strategic approach during Operation Rah-e-Rast.
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The study is based upon an ontological philosophical assumption that the nature
of the social reality relied upon the epistemic and contextual values and experiences of
the subjects and the views of the Swatis at large. The study was designed to analyze their
subjective meanings through their views on the Islamist militancy phenomenon and their
social interpretations of the Swati-Pashtun dilemma. Life truths were revealed by the
analysis of the subjects’ beliefs in the social dynamics contrasted with empirical evidence
concerning the diminution of the militant threat. In essence, new knowledge was gained
by adjudicating the participants’ beliefs in governance with the social realities.
This study was significant and unique because I examined the Islamist problem
from the viewpoint of Pakistani citizens rather than through a Western lens. The scientific
approach to study this critical operation discerned a unique implementation of
governance from those who planned the campaign, those who implemented the strategy,
and those who endured the violence. There is a literature gap in attending to the root
motivations of Islamic extremism and the implementation of competent governance to
prevent it. Previous research has focused primarily on the overwhelming use of military
force to defeat militancy. On the contrary, and perhaps more importantly, in this study, I
focused on the integration of all instruments of national power to counter Islamist
inspired violence. The Pakistan experience reflects the global Islamist movement, and
this study yielded findings and recommendations that may be applied on a macroscale.
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Major Sections of Chapter 1
Chapter1 provides a summary of the research including the geo-political context
of the global Islamist problem. In the chapter, I present a qualitative research design of a
single case study. Assumptions and delimitations are explained and a lexicon of relevant
terms is included. Emerging doctrine, based in neo-Clausewitzian theoretical thought,
formed the basis for an analytical assessment model to explore potential doctrinal
adjustments that better address the current global threat. Design strengths and weaknesses
are identified and steps to mitigate weaknesses are presented.
Problem Statement
Contemporary countermilitancy doctrine does not adequately address the
concurrent integration of governance with military operations into a comprehensive
strategy. Militancy inspired by Islamists is on the rise, and the international effort to
counter the emerging threat is failing (Cordesman & Vira, 2011). Modern
counterinsurgency doctrine describes a whole-of-government (interministry) approach to
defeat the enemy, but the integration of governance in support of military operations is
largely unproven. Most insurgency practitioners agree that a cogent governance strategy
and improved planning doctrine are needed to develop an effective strategy.
Current doctrine highlights the importance of military action to defeat militants
and promotes an interagency approach but does not address the synergy that may be
achieved by integrating governance simultaneously with military action. Nawaz (2011)
asserted that doctrine emphasizes the importance of the military to deal with the
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radicalization problem; however, doctrine ignores the role of governance to address the
Islamist movement. Therefore, research is needed to fully explore the idea of fostering
constructive relationships with the people to undermine the Islamists’ political and social
base.
A military strategy without governance proved to be unsuccessful in the current
Pakistani sociopolitical environment. Bommakanti (2012) argued that Pakistan’s alliance
with the United States and their aggressive operations are making the situation worse and
will not achieve an enduring peace. However, others have suggested that the Army
should take a more assertive role to crush the threat (Fair, 2011; Nawaz, 2011). A
growing number of experts maintain that uncompromising military operations only serve
to alienate the Pashtun and escalate the violence. Some experts argued that protecting the
people to gain their unwavering support through improved governance is the right path to
achieve positive social change (Imam, 2011; Siddiqa, 2011). Determining the correct
balance between military operations and the application of governance is the challenge.
The application of governance is at least part of the countermilitancy solution. In
this context, governance refers to Pakistani national policy, rules, processes, and
decisions that define government sociopolitical activity or confer national authority.
Governance describes the behavior by which national interests are articulated, and the
instruments of national power are exercised. Governance may be perceived by Pakistani
citizens as certain, predictable, and legitimate. For this research, governance is assessed
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in principles that are valued by the Pashtun as confirmed in the literature review,
including security, rule of law, and general services such as health and education.
Pakistan’s experience in the remote and war torn highlands of Khyber Province
provided an excellent opportunity to study governance during actual countermilitancy
operations. Understanding the complex Islamic extremism phenomenon requires an indepth study of the Swati social environment to unravel the connection between
governance and militancy. The study reveals new knowledge of the Islamist movement
and redefines how a government and the military may work in harmony to build a public
trust to disable the Islamists’ capacity to wage war. This research promotes positive
social change by offering new approaches to synchronize the international effort and
strike a decisive blow against the global Islamist support network.
There is a clear gap in the literature concerning the implementation of governance
to counter the Islamist threat. Neo-Clausewitzian thought places a high degree of
importance on understanding the cultural and social values of a vulnerable population—
and the government’s ability to protect the people. The right balance between military
operations and governance remains unclear. Doctrine calls for isolating the insurgents
without explaining how isolation is defined and accomplished. Doctrine also calls for
enhancing government legitimacy, but assessing the trust and confidence of the governed
is difficult. Furthermore, there is no methodology to ascertain the most important
governance attributes for a given insurgency case.
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Policymakers and planners may benefit from this research that addresses doctrinal
gaps. I suggest that supported governance initiatives will reduce the need for military
action and subsequently reduce the risk of violence escalation. The call for nations to
respond to militancy through governance has historically been overwhelming and largely
unsatisfied. Enhancing governance capacity through improved information, diplomacy,
economic development, and private-sector engagement in places where vulnerable
populations are at risk would likely lessen the dependence on military intervention.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this research study was to determine how Pakistani government
planners integrated governance and military activities during the 2009 Swat Valley
operation in Khyber Province. The study promotes social change by providing a better
understanding of the nexus between governance and Islamist inspired violence. The
research design applies a neo-Clausewitzian warfare theoretical lens to assess the
complex sociopolitical environment and evaluate Pakistan’s governance implementation.
The new knowledge obtained in the study, codified in doctrine, may lead to a better
strategic approach in addressing the escalating global militancy threat.
The central social phenomenon is defined as an escalation of militancy in Pakistan
notwithstanding an aggressive military campaign to suppress the violence. The militancy
phenomenon is complex, characterized by nefarious political, social, and ideological
motivations. Lahoud (2010) listed three central themes that motivate the militants: a
fervent pledge to a righteous Islamic cause, egoism in interpreting the Islamic faith, and
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general defense of Muslims instilling violence as a moral obligation, often referred to as
jihad. Islamists challenge government authorities and target institutions at all levels.
Despite a concerted effort by the Pakistani government to address root grievances and
neutralize the militants, the region has suffered an escalation of violence and reduction in
national influence (Cordesman & Vira, 2011). Islamists usurped the government in
Khyber Province, and the implementation of governance to counter the militancy was in
question. Henslin (2007) asserted that people are influenced by norms and beliefs in their
culture and society and develop a social construction of reality based in life experiences.
Understanding the Swati life experiences may lead to key insights into the proper
application of governance in subduing the growing Islamist threat in their homeland.
This study was necessary to explore the real world contextual situation in the
region and how the government approached the militancy problem. The study exposes a
correlation between an investment in governance and the effectiveness of military actions
that generated an operational synergy to achieve success. In an unusual showing of
solidarity, the Pakistani Parliament passed a consensus resolution that unanimously
backed the Swat countermilitancy operation and resolved to unite the nation in the face of
a determined Islamist insurgency. The study includes an analysis of the implementation
of rehabilitation, reintegration, and reconciliation activities with military operations to
defeat the Islamists, reassert governmental control, and stabilize the social environment.
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Research Question
During the implementation of Pakistan’s countermilitancy campaign in Swat
Valley in the Malakand Division of Khyber Province, how were governance activities
integrated with military operations to subdue Islamist militancy?
The research question was pursued by conducting a qualitative study with a single
case design in assessing the Rah-e-Rast operation. The study is a planning process
analysis that explored how operational success was linked to specific government actions.
Theoretical Framework
Neo-Clausewitzian tenets are a contemporary derivative of social conflict theory.
The theory is a modern adaptation of Clausewitz's 18th century approach to war that
attempts to address the complex nature of limited and total warfare (Clausewitz,
1832/1976). As with conflict theory, neo-Clausewitzian thought approaches society from
a macrosociological viewpoint, described as a severe imbalance within the social system
that makes it dysfunctional (Henslin, 2007). In this paradigm, the imbalance is caused by
a power struggle between a government and unconventional fighters (insurgents) who
seek political and social change by collapsing the government with a force of arms.
Ashcraft (1991) reiterated the social tenet of the Enlightenment-era British social theorist
Locke who asserted that political legitimacy emanates from the consent of the governed.
In the context of an insurgency, both the government and the insurgents are caught in a
desperate competition for the allegiance of the people.
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Galula (1964) avowed that the insurgent power base emanates from the people,
and a successful counterinsurgency strategy may isolate the people from the militant and
connect the people to a legitimate governing authority. Galula embraced the neoClausewitzian school of thought that emphasizes relationship building between the
national government, the military, and the people as a balance to stabilize the social
situation. When a government properly exercises control of the military to achieve
policy ends—and the military enjoys the trust and confidence of the people—and the
people perceive the government to be legitimate, the nation becomes resilient to
militancy. The study data were analyzed through the neo-Clausewitzian theoretical lens
to determine the strengths and weaknesses of a population-centered theory in contrast to
a military-dominant theory.
The research question is focused on the concurrent integration of governance
with military operations to strengthen the relationships defined by the neo-Clausewitzian
trinity. Galula (1964) hypothesized that governance supported by military operations
may be applied to restabilize a social environment stressed by insurgent violence. Galula
explained that the government may weaken the insurgents through a force of arms and
then isolate them politically and socially through governance. In this construct, military
actions become the enforcement tool to isolate and protect a vulnerable population.
Governance policy then becomes a key instrument of national power to reconnect the
people to their government. According to Galula, the two instruments working in mutual
support are the essence of a well-conceived counterinsurgency strategy.
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Neo-Clausewitzian theory, inspired by Galula (1964), significantly influences
contemporary thinking and doctrine related to today's global militancy threat. According
to U.S. doctrine, counterinsurgency strategy requires a comprehensive analysis of the
sociopolitical environment to protect the people by isolating them from adverse insurgent
influences (U. S. Department of Defense, 2013). The Pakistani campaign focused on
subduing militancy (through security operations) and dealing with its root causes (by
promoting legitimacy through governance)—the key tenets of neo-Clausewitzian
thought. According to Galula, protecting the population requires a balanced application
of all instruments of national power—military, informational, diplomatic, and
economic—to gain favor with the people. Then, a concerted effort to break the bond
between the insurgents and their popular support base is possible.
Modern warfare theorists and military planners at large believe that the neoClausewitzian model is applicable to the contemporary Islamist threat. Conflict in
Pakistan is best described as a postcolonial regional destabilization. Ethnic subgroups,
most notably the Pashtun, seek order and security by reestablishing the rule of law and
education inspired by the Islamic tradition. The Western worldview of democratic
governance is in direct conflict with the Islamists who seek to reestablish a
fundamentalist governing structure and legal system based in Sharia law. The situation is
further complicated by the traditional governing structure and norms of the Pashtun tribe,
called Paktunwali, which evolved as a hybrid between modern and ancient tribal customs
that existed even before Islam. Neo-Clausewitzian theory suggests that strong
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interrelationships and balance between government, military, and the people serves as an
inoculation against insurgents who attempt to radicalize the population.
Neo-Clausewitzian thought influenced Pakistan’s countermilitancy campaign that
shifted to a population-centered strategy. The diversity of the ethnic populations and the
multiplicity of shifting motivations among the Islamists depict the complexity of
Pakistan’s escalating militancy problem. Local militants are fighting alongside foreign
fighters that have found sanctuary within the Pashtun homelands of Khyber Province
(Mehboob, 2011). Therefore, the complex sociopolitical environment warrants an indepth analysis of the relationships within the Clausewitzian trinity.
Nature of the Study
The nature of the research is qualitative: applying a single case study
methodology in assessing the implementation of governance during Operation Rah-eRast. The Swat operation defined a critical case that occurred during a decisive juncture
in Pakistan’s countermilitancy campaign. For the first time, the Pakistanis employed
military forces in mass working alongside government civilians to implement a
counterinsurgency campaign. The campaign successes are adequately documented;
however, the challenges of the government planners who designed the campaign were not
fully assessed. Their personal experiences yielded valuable information pertaining to
important planning principles.
A qualitative case study was appropriate to explore the human dimension
inherent in assessing complex social behavior (Creswell, 2013). The operation is bounded
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by time and space that made it an ideal single case study (Yin, 2014). Gaining a
comprehensive understanding of the social relationships required the collection and
analysis of multiple qualitative data sources. The study includes a myriad of data sets
related to government actions, popular support, and militant responses. A qualitative
single-case study was an appropriate methodology to identify the essential attributes of
governance. The study reveals answers to the "how and why" questions relevant to
governance in the Swat campaign. A case study was well suited to assimilate actual
events on the ground with the shared experiences of participants through interpretative,
rather than deterministic, data analysis (Castellan, 2010; Fernandez-Cano & FernandezGuerrero, 2011).
The study incorporated the planners’ perspectives as part of a continuing series of
deliberations between U. S. and Pakistan representatives conducted annually at the Joint
Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia. The college maintains a strong partnership
with the Pakistan National Defense University in Islamabad, and the study benefited from
that partnership by openly sharing ideas germane to the research topic. Conducting the
research in conjunction with a series of annual conferences offered a measure of
neutrality that promoted an open dialogue and unfettered information sharing without the
barriers of political influence. The case study linear analytical model that follows
contemporary planning doctrine, annotated in Appendix B, provided a systemic
framework to analyze the planning of governance actions. The model promoted
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credibility and transferability by codifying the data analysis methodology and organizing
the data in an auditable and replicable format.
Definitions of Terms
The following section lists the unique or special terminology that is used
throughout the remainder of the study.
Counterinsurgency operations (COIN): COIN describes a sociopolitical struggle
that applies all national power instruments–military, political, economic, psychological,
and informational—to defeat or contain an insurgency (U. S. Department of Defense,
2013).
Countermilitancy operations (CMO): A collective term used to describe the
government military and governance activities to disable or defeat Islamist militants who
are engaged in the full spectrum of warfare (COIN and CT) independent of political
motivations.
Counterterrorism operations (CT): CT describes government preventative
measures to deter or respond to terrorist activities, terrorism further defined as the use or
threat of coercion to instill fear against civilians to advance political objectives (U. S.
Department of Defense, 2013). Terrorism is an insurgent tactic.
Governance: Governing body policy, rules, processes, and decisions that define
government activities or confer national power. In the context of this research, it is the
behavior by which Pakistan’s national interests are articulated, and instruments of
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national power are exercised. Governance is certain and predictable and is assessed in
these governmental functions: security, rule of law, and life quality (general welfare).
Insurgency: An extended political-military struggle aimed at lessening the writ
and legitimacy of government by using violence and subversion to challenge, neutralize,
or supplant governmental authority (U. S. Department of Defense, 2013). Insurgents are
militants bent on subverting the current government authority.
Islamist militant: Groups or individuals pursuing political goals through violence
inspired by Islamic radical ideology. An Islamist describes a religious activist on the
radical ideological fringe of the Islamic world at large. A militant is an all-inclusive term
to describe insurgents seeking to undermine existing government institutions or terrorists
seeking social or political change by instilling fear among noncombatants. The Islamist is
inspired by a Salafist worldview and is predominately characterized as intolerant of nonMuslims and adherent to strict compliance of Sharia (Islamic) law. The term Islamist or
militant refers to all violent activists in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province.
Mullah (Imam): Interchangeable terms to describe the local Islamic spiritual
leader who is generally accepted as having knowledge of the Quran and teaches Sharia
law. Mullah/Imam leads Islamic prayer and provides religious advice to tribal leaders.
Assumptions
The implementation of governance in countering the adverse effects of Islamist
militancy may be explored by interpreting the meaning of the Swati-Pashtun social
reality. This includes the tribe’s historical conflict with government, their sociopolitical
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struggle with the Taliban, and their dilemma of reconciling Pashtunwali with Sharia. The
research was designed to explore the social dynamics during the Swat operation. Hence,
the study was an orientational qualitative inquiry that assessed the concurrent integration
of governance with military activities to subdue the militant threat from the perspectives
of those who planned it and those who endured it.
The study is based upon an ontological philosophical assumption that the nature
of the social reality relied upon the epistemic and contextual values and experiences of
the participants and the views of the Swatis at large (Creswell, 2013). Participant
perspectives were varied and complex, and the study was designed to analyze their
subjective meanings through their views on the Islamist militancy phenomenon and their
social interpretations of the Swati-Pashtun dilemma. The participant testimony was
triangulated with government archival data and Pakistani survey data, processed through
the application of a program-level analytical model to bolster credibility and
confirmability. Life truths were revealed by the analysis of the subjects’ beliefs in the
social dynamics contrasted with empirical evidence concerning the diminution of the
militant threat. In essence, new knowledge was gained by adjudicating the participants’
beliefs in governance with the social realities on the ground.
Characteristic of critical theory interpretive analysis, I explored the militancy
phenomenon through a neo-Clausewitzian theoretical lens to illuminate social action that
empowered the Swatis to undermine the militant support base. A scientific study of
Pakistani social institutions was intended to illuminate transformational approaches and
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key governance attributes that subdue militancy. Hence, I explored the role of governance
through an interpretive inquiry of the subjects’ planning actions, influenced by social and
cultural norms and guided by a doctrinal planning process based in neo-Clausewitzian
theoretical principles. In the study, I focused on governance actions that empowered the
Swatis to transcend social constraints and pursue their traditional way of life, absent the
Taliban threat.
The interpretative analysis supposes that an objective view of the operational
planning process could be achieved through a faithfulness to facts provided by a cadre of
Pakistani security professionals who are protected by a stringent interview protocol. Strict
adherence to the protocol counteracted the inherent nature of qualitative study
subjectivity (Stake, 2010). Anonymity of the subjects promoted objectivity, although
total objectivity cannot be achieved from national professionals who are employed by the
Pakistani government. However, I did not rely solely on individual objectivity.
Qualitative interpretation was applied to identify suboptimizations in the planning
process—the essence of the research question. The planning process is codified and
structured, subject to inter alia, or explications in terms of measurement procedures,
individual reasoning processes, and institutional or social dimensions (Reiss & Sprenger,
2014). Reiss and Sprenger (2014) argued that process objectivity is achievable from
subjective views because doctrinal processes do not depend upon individual social or
ethical values.
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My role as the researcher was to mediate the meaning of the participants’
experiences through personal interpretations, but the phenomenon is presented from a
Pakistani perspective, not personal perspectives. My military planning background and
experiences influenced my analysis and interpretation of the campaign, but I
compensated for personal biases by suspending value judgments while conducting
interviews and gathering information. Personal experience was applied to frame the
questions and develop an analysis methodology, not sway the discussion. The research
was conducted within a neutral environment that was conducive to the free flow of
information without the undue influence of personal prejudices or political interference.
To achieve a complete and balanced view, the participant pool was culturally diverse and
included all the skill sets necessary for planning a complex contingency. Conducting
research upon neutral ground within academia afforded an opportunity to share views
without prejudice—protected by academic freedom and sheltered from political tensions.
Research Scope
In this study, I used a single-case design to explore the integration of governance
with military operations during Operation Rah-e-Rast. Yin (2014) avowed that a singlecase design is appropriate under longitudinal, revelatory, unusual, or critical conditions.
The operation occurred during a pivotal shift in elected governments from a military to
civilian authority, and a swing in national policy from a military-dominant to a
population-centered strategy. The Pakistan authorities—for the first time—pursued
governance as an enabler to military operations. The operation was a key milestone in the
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continuum of countermilitancy efforts that showcases government decision points and
unprecedented civilian collaboration with the military.
Qualitative data analysis included a program-level linear analytical model
(Appendix B) to organize data for interpretation. Patton (2002) described data analysis as
clarifying what is most important to the study if we had only understood the data
beforehand. The model followed the doctrinal process and provided a repeatable data
collection framework to facilitate and validate the operational assessment. Yin (2014)
recommended a model to operationalize a complex chain of events over a period of time.
The model incorporated real-world contextual conditions that described the inherent
problem of Islamic militancy and the rival interventions that challenged the theoretical
construct. The modeling technique was a valuable research tool to match empirically
derived activities with theoretically predicted events (Chenail, 2011). The analytical
model, coupled with the strict adherence to an interview protocol defined in Chapter 3,
provided a framework that promoted transferability, credibility, and confirmability.
Limitations and Delimitations
The study was delimited to a single case design bounded by time and location—
the District of Swat within the Malakand Division of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province
between October 2008 and August 2009. I focused the theoretical lens on a relevant point
in Pakistan’s countermilitancy campaign absent the bias of short term political instability.
The Swat operation was an ideal case because it successfully integrated elements of both
governance and military activities to defeat the Islamists (Haq & Malik, 2009; Kumar,
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2009). The study included the Pashtun experience, although other subcultures reside
throughout the region. Nawaz (2011) argued that the militancy problem centers on the
political aspirations of the Pashtun—the social conditions, culture, and language. Islamist
motivations were analyzed through their written proclamations and activities.
The purposive sampling of six security professionals limited the scope of the
qualitative inquiry. Purposive sampling is appropriate to represent the requisite expertise
found in a typical joint planning group. All the skill sets of a planning cell were present in
the participant pool. The small sampling was mitigated by selecting expert informants
with a detailed knowledge of the Swat operation. Purposive sampling efficiently acquired
the necessary research data despite a limited access to Pakistani civil-military planners.
Although access to trusted planners was available, there was no direct access to the
Pashtun or the Islamists. The study relied on secondary source surveys to gain the SwatiPashtun perspective. To mollify the limitations of a single case with few subjects, data
triangulation was applied to merge the participant testimony, official government
documentation, and Pakistani survey data.
Transferability (external validity) is a significant limitation of a single case
design. Transferability relies on a strong correlation between the empirical data and
associated themes, the research question, and the theoretical construct (Chenail, 2011).
The study applied a linear analytical model to highlight the facts and reduce
unsubstantiated innuendo and opinion that is inherent in a qualitative method. The model
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promoted external validity by organizing the data and analysis along global themes and
internationally recognized doctrinal tenets (Yin, 2014).
Given the time and adequate resources, a multiple case study approach may
mitigate the aforementioned limitations. Scientific research of multiple cases would
promote transferability and data validity by comparing different approaches in a myriad
of sociopolitical environments, and the study design provides a methodology to conduct
further research. Differing situations may require alternate governance strategies, and
those distinctions may be determined with an analysis of multiple cases. The study
findings are not absolute, but this case—albeit limited in scope—contributed to the social
science discipline by highlighting an important case in the continuum of research.
Significance of the Study
The escalation of Islamist militancy is a global social problem that warrants
international attention and aggressive multinational action. There was a literature gap in
attending to the root motivations of the conflict and the implementation of competent
governance to prevent it. The study reveals insights into the radical Islamic movement
and offers an improved universal planning processes to subdue militant violence. The
study includes a repeatable methodology to analyze the complex social relations between
the people and their government and the effect of that relationship on militant social
behavior. The research was unique by exploring the Islamist extremist problem from the
viewpoint of an Islamic Republic—the State of Pakistan—rather than a Western
perspective. The study exposes the synergy that can achieved by integrating governance
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with military action. Policymakers and planners have new tools to design comprehensive
countermilitancy campaigns and promote peace for the greater good of society.
Summary
In this qualitative study, I explored the concurrent integration of governance with
military operations to counter the rising Islamist threat in Pakistan’s Khyber province.
The successful Rah-e-Rast operation was significant and was planned with both
governance and military elements. The operation offered a unique opportunity to
compare and contrast the implementation of both theoretical constructs. The study
includes a synopsis of the complex social phenomena to reveal the nexus of governance
and military activity that made a difference in subduing Islamic extremism. The study
includes a repeatable study methodology and a universal data analysis model to guide
future countermilitancy research.
The study engenders a significant social change for the millions of people
suffering from the devastation of Islamic inspired violence. Understanding the modern
way of sectarian conflict is relevant to our national security and of great concern to the
global society. Militant violence may be suppressed and the Islamist cause undermined if
policymakers understand and apply governance activities that promote social stability.
The study findings and conclusions empower government planners with new knowledge
to defeat militancy and protect vulnerable populations. Chapter 2 provides a
comprehensive literature review that describes the Pakistani social environment and the
evolution of neo-Clausewitzian theoretical concepts.

26
Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
Chapter 2 is a comprehensive literature synopsis that fully describes the evolution
of neo-Clausewitzian warfare theory. The study includes a theoretical construct to assess
the current sociopolitical environment in Pakistan. The review links the Clausewitzian
trinity model to the relationships between the government, military, and people of Khyber
Province—primarily the Pashtun. The chapter ties the theory to the practical application
of governance in a complex and hostile militancy situation. Neo-Clausewitzian thought
provides a theoretical foundation to fully assess the integration of governance with
military actions during the 2009 Swat Valley operation.
The Research Problem
Contemporary countermilitancy doctrine does not adequately address the
integration of governance with military operations into a comprehensive strategy to
subdue Islamist militancy. Modern counterinsurgency doctrine describes a whole of
government (all-agency or all-ministry) approach to defeat the enemy, yet the process to
integrate governance in support of military operations was uncodified and unproven in
the contemporary environment. Most policymakers and strategists involved with global
militancy agree that improved planning doctrine to integrate military and civilian efforts
was needed to development of a comprehensive strategy. Current literature and
established doctrine promotes the implementation of governance to subdue militancy;
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however, it does not adequately address the simultaneous integration of governance with
military action as an enabler for social change.
The Research Purpose
The purpose of the study was to explore the concurrent integration of governance
and military activities to subdue Islamist militancy. The research objective is to promote
social change by contributing to the understanding of Islamist militancy and reveal
findings that impact countermilitancy planning and policymaking implementation
processes. This may be accomplished by researching the implementation of governance
during the 2009 Swat Valley military operation to better understand the nexus between
governance and military activity. The knowledge obtained in the study, codified in
doctrine, may lead to better strategic approach and a net positive social change by
addressing the escalating global Islamist militancy problem. The research design
incorporates a neo-Clausewitzian warfare theoretical lens to assess the complex
sociopolitical environment and evaluate Pakistan’s implementation of governance. There
is a lack of evidence that increased lethality of insurgents or terrorists through military
action alone will succeed in subduing the violence in the long run. In this scientific study,
I explored the sociopolitical dynamic between the people, the military, and their
government to determine the most effective integration of governance to counter the
Islamist movement.
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Literature Review Content
The review integrated the works of scholarly experts to describe the complex and
tumultuous relationships within Pakistan and to provide a clear view of the sociopolitical
environment. Both United States and Pakistan military doctrine promote this type of
analysis in the first steps of military planning, referred to as gaining an understanding of
the current operational environment (U.S. Department of Defense, 2013). Since
governance reflects the intimate relationship between the people and their government,
the literature review was designed to present the strengths, weaknesses, and
vulnerabilities of those relationships. Literature sources include research by scholar
practitioners and operational experts in global Islamist militancy. The literature review
explored the root causes of how and why a segment of Pashtun society embraced and
supported the militant cause at the detriment of their elected government.
Literature Review Strategy
The strategy of the literature review was to present an impartial view of the
militancy problem from leading experts in Pakistani sociopolitical and civil-military
dynamics. In the review, I summarized what is known about the nature of Islamist
militancy and the key government attributes that may be applied to counter the threat. I
cited international experts and theorists from academic, government, and military
disciplines. The review includes previous research by Pakistani scholar-practitioners to
promote a balanced and ethical approach.
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In the literature review, I explored the contemporary application of warfare theory
as it applies to the specific Islamist militancy problem in Pakistan. The review identified
the origins the Islamic radicalization movement and the motivations of the Islamists.
Because of the diversity in Islamic sects pursuing a variety of tactics to attain different
political goals, Pakistan refers to the whole-of-government effort to subdue the violence
as countermilitancy, derived from discrete counterterrorism and counterinsurgent
elements. The series of operations is commonly referred to as a countermilitancy
campaign. These terms are referenced in this context throughout the study.
Review of Related Research
To understand the diverse sociopolitical dynamic in Pakistan, the literature review
referenced ethnographic studies related to the Pashtun. The numerous subcultures within
the Pashtun tribe make it impossible to satisfactorily illustrate every domestic conflict;
however, the general militancy problem may be explored by examining the Pashtun at
large. The study reveals the predicament of the tribe in the context of Islamic based
militancy. The study also includes a synopsis of the Pashtun culture.
I explored qualitative studies and analysis associated with Pashtun life
experiences, especially focused on perspectives and facts related to the Islamist militancy
phenomenon. This revealed governance activities that promote, deter, or influence
Islamist motivations. While mainstream Islamic values, in general, do not suggest a
violent tendency, the religious extremist elements entrenched among the Pashtun may be
thoroughly examined. Therefore, the research was focused on the Pashtun who reside in
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the Malakand Division of Khyber Province and the Islamist militants who sought
sanctuary among them.
Literature Search Strategy
Understanding the regional social dynamics required a thorough examination the
nature of Islamist militancy. The journals were found in databases accessed through the
Homeland Security Digital Library, Sage Publications and Journals, and EBSCO host
search engine including subdatabases: International Security and Counterterrorism
Reference Center, Military and Government Collection, and Political Science Complete.
Key words or phrases used in the literature search included Islamist, extremist, militancy,
terrorism, insurgency, governance, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, and Pashtun.
Counterinsurgency and counterterrorism theories were derived largely from military
doctrinal publications that form the basis of strategy and joint operational planning.
The literature review included sources from the archives of sociopolitical research
groups that have specific subject matter expertise in Pakistan’s affairs such as the
Islamabad Strategic Studies Institute (ISIS), Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS), Rand Corporation (RAND), United States Institute of Peace (USIP), and National
Defense University’s Institute for Strategic Studies (INSS). Secondary source survey
databases provided unique perspectives not available by primary contact. Secondary
sources included Government of Pakistan Statistical Databases, Gallup Polls, New
America Foundation Survey Databases, and Pew Research Center Survey Databases. The
study includes open source information concerning Pakistan’s government strategy and
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policy as it relates to the sociopolitical landscape. Several of the literature resources were
derived from scholarly journal articles that are based in countermilitancy strategy.
Theoretical Foundation
Neo-Clausewitzian Warfare Theory
Neo-Clausewitzian warfare theory is a derivative of social conflict theory and
serves as a foundation to assess the contemporary Islamist militancy problem. The 19th
century military theorist Clausewitz concluded that the inspiration for warfare is a unique
phenomenon, influenced by a “paradoxical trinity composed of primordial violence,
hatred, and enmity” (Clausewitz, 1832/1976, p. 89). Clausewitz asserted that pervasive
violence disquiets the people, hatred motivates the Army and its commander, and enmity
creates apprehension within the government. Clausewitz stated that a warfare paradigm
that “ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them
would conflict with reality” (p. 89) and would render the theory useless. The military
planner may understand and “maintain a balance between these three tendencies, like an
object suspended between three magnets” (p. 89). Clausewitz described the employment
of professional militaries against militants as the dominant instrument of politics by
“other means.” Success in warfare depended upon a strict civil control of the military in
the pursuit of well-defined national objectives. In Clausewitz’s paradigm, the power of
government and the military is fueled by the “passion inherent in the people” (p. 89)—
but the implementation of governance to foster that passion is not specifically addressed.
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Theorists revisited the relevance of the Clausewitzian trinity during the Cold-War
era of warfare. In the aftermath of total warfare experienced in WWII, modern theorists
adapted Clausewitz’s conventional warfare model to the more complex sociopolitical
dynamic of small conflict by irregular forces focused on limited political objectives. The
theorist, Trinquier, adapted Clausewitzian dogma to the growing French insurgency
conflicts in Algeria and Indochina. Trinquier (1961) asserted that insurgents are often
supported by external foreign influences to subvert the population against their
government. To counter the subversion, an aggressive use of military force—even
torture—is acceptable to gain intelligence and isolate the population from the insurgent
influence. Trinquier suggested disconnecting the enemy from external foreign support,
undermining their internal popular support, and then methodically destroying the enemy
directly with overwhelming military force. In Trinquier’s assessment, the aggressive use
of the military, or quadrillage, must be integrated with other instruments of power such
as diplomacy, information, and psychological operations to defeat the enemy and gain a
popular allegiance—a shift to a population-centered strategy.
Emergence of Neo-Clausewitzian Warfare Theory
Neo-Clausewitzian theory is a new adaptation to the complex nature of today’s
global insurgency and terrorism threat. As with conflict theory, neo-Clausewitzian
thought approaches society from a macrosociological viewpoint, described as a severe
imbalance within the social system that makes it dysfunctional (Henslin, 2007). David
Galula, a colleague of Trinquier, emphasized the importance of analyzing the social
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system to understand the militancy phenomenon (Galula, 1964). After gaining knowledge
of the culture and perspectives of a vulnerable population, Galula proposed a balanced
application of all methods of national power—military, diplomatic, informational, and
economic—to gain favor with the people and break the bond between the insurgents and
their popular support base. Galula inspired a neo-Clausewitzian school of thought that
shifted counterinsurgency dogma from a military-centric use of arms to a people-centric
quest for popular confidence in governance as the dominate national instrument.
Neo-Clausewitzian counterinsurgency doctrine gained momentum in the
postconflict study of the Vietnam experience. Summers (1982) explained that in
insurgency warfare, there is a natural tension between the state, military, and the people
(Clausewitzian trinity)—and they may remain united to achieve a successful political
outcome. To Summers, weaknesses within the trinity relationships create strategic
vulnerabilities, but solidarity fosters a formidable capacity to advance the national
interest. Summers concluded that the lack of American public support for the Vietnam
war effort coupled with the inability of the corrupt Saigon government to connect with
their people doomed the counterinsurgency campaign. The lack of popular support
ultimately led to undermining the military effort and losing the war.
Gray (1999) believed that a contemporary military strategy should provide an
organization of violence to force a political connection between the people, the
government, and the militants. Governance plays a large role in forming this connection;
however, the nature of the conflict and the relationships may change depending upon the
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motivations and desires of the participants. Gray avowed that understanding the logic and
reason behind the motivations of the belligerents may unlock the secrets of a successful
strategy. Gray argued that building a warfare strategy is not just about disciplined
problem-solving, but also a function of morality, culture, politics, geography, technology,
and the enemy. A comprehensive analysis of all elements is warranted—and warfare in
itself does not represent the optimal way of solving a political problem.
These aforementioned neo-Clausewitizians stressed the importance of gaining
popular support when pursuing the use of force; however, they advocated caution when
attempting to apply generic counterinsurgency principles to all situations. Clausewitz
contended that warfare is unpredictable, equating war to a “true chameleon that slightly
adapts its characteristics to a given case” (Clausewitz, 1832/1976, p. 89). Doctrinal
experts, O’Neill (2005) and Fitzsimmons (2013) cautioned us that developing a
counterinsurgency plan to fit all sociopolitical situations is unlikely. Conversely, Islamist
inspired militancy has common characteristics and the solution can always be found in
the government’s connection to their people. General Sir Gerard Templar, in reference to
the Malayan insurgency of 1960, first referred to this concept as “winning the hearts and
minds” of the people—a phrase coined by his chief advisor, Sir Robert Thompson
(Thompson, 1966). To secure the hearts and minds of the people, the war may be founded
in a just cause and the government may convince the people that it holds the moral high
ground. Thompson asserted that it is crucial for the citizenry to have confidence in both
the national government to govern and the armed forces to protect.
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Neo-Clausewitzian warfare theory greatly influences current international military
doctrine and modern theorists believe that the theory is applicable to militancy inspired
by Islamists. General David Petraeus, former U.S. Commander in Iraq, is the primary
author of current U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. Kilcullen (2013)—his principal
advisor—stressed the importance of winning popular support by establishing security,
and using noncoercive means (governance) to connect with the people. According to
doctrine, counterinsurgency requires a detailed analysis of the sociopolitical environment
that encompasses social, cultural, economic, and political factors (U.S. Department of
Defense, 2013). Doctrine refers to a campaign as a comprehensive civil-military
endeavor to check the insurgency (through security operations) and deals with its root
causes (through improved governance)—the key elements of neo-Clausewitzian thought.
Doctrine emphasizes the importance of understanding the nature of the conflict, then
developing a plan to disrupt the militants and reduce their popular influence.
Many scholars and military planners debunk Clausewitz’s original tenets—and
his trinity—as not applicable to the world’s complex geo-political situations. Melton
(2013) referred to the failures in Iraq and Afghanistan as convincing evidence that the
complexity of the environment renders Clausewitzian thought obsolete. Olson (2013)
insisted that Clausewitz was not relevant and the phenomenon of Islamist militancy is too
complex to calculate political outcomes from the application of force. Rineheart (2010)
characterized counterterrorism as inherently police centered and advocated using law
enforcement to disrupt terrorists by legal means, not through military action.

36
Scholars agree that the contemporary militant environment is unpredictable.
Kilcullen (2013) advocated that the application of force against Islamist militancy may
not succeed if the militants do not have a coherent political strategy and are simply driven
by a rapacious faith-based motivation. According to Kilcullen, the sporadic actions of the
Islamists render them more unpredictable than any time in history, and their sporadic
behavior undermines traditional counterinsurgency approaches. Kilcullen described a
new phenomenon where the relationships between the insurgent, the population, and
government are diametrically opposed. In his view, the counterinsurgent (government),
not the insurgent (Taliban), may prolong the conflict with inept governance and
aggressive military action in itself represents the forces of revolutionary change.
Neo-Clausewitzian Theory and the Role of Governance
Contemporary doctrine reflects the neo-Clausewitzian school of thought. The
United States interagency guidebook described counterinsurgency as a blend of
comprehensive interagency activities designed to simultaneously "contain insurgency and
address its root causes” (U. S. Department of State, 2009, p. 2). This suggests that the use
of soft power is the most effective element of an insurgent contingency, with security
forces playing a secondary enabling role. The military’s counterinsurgency manual
prescribed a similar population-centered strategy to promote government legitimacy and
undermine the insurgent support base, while simultaneously isolating militant influence
(U. S. Department of Defense, 2013). Both doctrinal directives caution planners that
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success depends on the eagerness of the affected government to embark on the necessary
political and social reforms to regain the public trust.
Strength in the Clausewitzian trinity relationships promotes national stability.
Clausewitz (1832/1976) professed that when the government properly exercises its civil
control of the military, and the military has the trust and confidence of the people to
protect them, and the people perceive the government to be legitimate: The nation is
strong and stable. In social conflict theory, political and social stability is vital to counter
the subverting influences of insurgents—and if the stability is threatened, then
governance and military operations are necessary to restore order. Galula (1964) asserted
that the insurgent power base emanates from the people, and a successful strategy must
focus on protecting the people from the insurgent influence. Governance then becomes a
key instrument of national power to connect with the people, and military operations
become the enforcement tool to protect the people.
Security forces working hand in hand with government institutions to address the
militancy problem is better policy. Melton (2013) argued that an all-out military
dominant approach is fundamentally flawed and a “fool’s errand” (p. 1). Melton cited
several successful counterinsurgency campaigns from the last century where small
military groups—often called security force assistance teams—worked hand in hand with
the host governments to conduct economic development. Melton cautioned policymakers
that complex foreign entanglements and aggressive coalition operations may undermine
host government legitimacy rather than promote it. Allied doctrine does not adequately
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distinguish between garrisoning with indigenous national troops or with foreign troops
(Department of Defense, 2013). Galula (1964) reaffirmed the importance of using local
troops that are culturally sensitive to the needs of the people and well connected to the
national government. To Galula, deploying indigenous security forces rather than foreign
troops avoids undermining sovereign authority and government legitimacy.
The prominence and strength of the relationship of the people to their government
is the underpinning of neo-Clausewitzian theory. Samdani (2011) argued that economic
development is the key to gaining popular support. He suggested a concerted
multinational effort to drive away militants, then pursue economic development and
political reforms to build relationships through government partnerships. Ahmad (2010)
concluded that and enduring success requires Pashtun assistance—and popular support
may be cultivated with effective community development and governance. Ahmad
supported the Clausewitzian principle that popular participation in government is integral
to achieving a durable peace through political reconciliation. Khan (2007) further
suggested that achieving confidence in governance requires a peaceful approach that
includes an information campaign, a smart strategy to improve basic life services, and a
strong economy. To these scholars, military action only plays a supporting role.
Many experts disagree on the sequencing of military force and governance.
General McChrystal, as the International Security Assistance Force Commander,
assessed that many forces on the ground were needed first to stabilize and secure the
people before governance reform is pursued (Brand, 2011). However, many strategists,

39
most notably Cohen (2007), Cordesman and Vira (2011), and Melton (2013) proposed a
balanced whole-of-government approach with a small specialized military elements
working closely with government to establish security in parallel—rather than in
sequence—with achieving a public trust. Despite the sequencing disagreements,
insurgency experts generally agree that public confidence may be fostered through
government reform and nationally sponsored economic development projects. In military
doctrine, this is referred to as a “clear, hold, and build” strategy, first introduced by Sir
Robert Thompson (1966), and currently the fundamental tenet of a counterinsurgency
campaign (U. S. Department of Defense, 2013).
As a counterpoint; new thinking among some warfare strategist suggests that
good governance does not necessarily promote legitimacy or enable security. Lamb and
Shawn (2012) argued that improving the host-nation’s capacity to provide life services
may not necessarily drive the people closer to the government. Government legitimacy
requires a focused attention on politics as well as the social environment. Lamb and
Shawn contended gaining legitimacy may be futile if government officials are perceived
as apathetic to social injustices or sympathetic to foreign interest. The counterinsurgency
effort may fail if the government is too fragmented to embrace meaningful political
reform, and the use of force may be the only viable option.
Altering the way the people think about the conflict is the only path to achieving a
lasting peace. U. S. Department of Defense (2013) doctrine advised planners that most of
a population may remain neutral during an insurgency, and the support of the multitude
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may be promoted with the assistance of an energetic and welcoming minority.
Governance, in this context, may then be focused on gaining favor with the Pashtun
leaders who would defuse militancy by distancing themselves from the militant factions.
Lamb and Hameed (2012) concluded that the role of governance is to convince the
people that the government is preferred over any rebellious militant faction. The
countermilitancy challenge then, is to know when to engage the enemy with weapons and
when to contest the enemy with good governance (United States Marine Corps, 2006).
Neo-Clausewitzian Theory Applied in the Pakistan Case
The Pakistan government characterizes the Islamist inspired violence on their
frontier as illicit militant activity; however, some experts contend that the situation
signals a mature insurgency. Siddiqa (2011) explained that the Pakistan government lacks
clarity in defining the nature of the threat, but the extensive violence was a clear indicator
of the Islamists’ intent to dominate the region. Over the last decade, the government
struggled with developing the right strategic approach. The strategy vacillated between a
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency effort. President Musharraf aligned with the
United States in support of the “war on terror” and a strict counterterrorism effort against
discrete leadership and logistics nodes; however, the limited attacks against al-Qaeda had
significant consequences. Musharraf fell from public favor as the overall violence level
escalated and Pakistan’s economy collapsed as the security situation degraded (Ali,
2010). A new administration under President Zardari and the Pakistan People’s Party
emerged and vowed to crush the rising militant threat.
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The Pakistan insurgency became more acute when large and organized Islamist
militant groups emerged from the frontier provinces. In 2008, the militants bombed the
Army Headquarters in Rawalpindi and the Marriott hotel in Islamabad demonstrating a
direct and immediate threat to the new Zardari government and the Pakistani people. The
militants escalated violence and created political instability by undermining the newly
elected governing authority. Immediately after the Islamabad bombings, the Pakistani
government initiated a new campaign against the militants in the closest region to the
nation’s capital: the Swat Valley. However, a new strategic approach was needed.
A forceful military approach without governance proved to be unsuccessful in the
current Pakistani sociopolitical environment. This view reflects the lessons of more than
a decade of war in Pakistan where an escalation of military action only seemed to
intensify insurgent activity. Bommakanti (2012) suggested that the military apply armed
conflict to suppress the Islamists, but not defeat them. After violence is subdued, popular
support may be pursued. Yet, Melton (2013) and Siddiqa (2011) asserted that governance
activities may begin before military operations and extend long after operations are
complete. These theorists avowed that governance is a long term solution and military
operations are merely a near term enabler.
Neo-Clausewitzian theory has a direct application to Pakistan’s new
countermilitancy campaign. Mehboob (2011) argued that the diversity of the political
objectives and the multiplicity of shifting motivations among the Islamists demands a
new strategic approach. Pakistan’s complex sociopolitical environment warranted a
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comprehensive analysis of the relationships within the Clausewitzian trinity with
emphasis on the militant influence upon the people. According to Bommakanti (2012),
the Pakistani planners believed that an enduring peace through military action alone
would not work. Bommakanti asserted that the Swati-Pashtun were cynical toward the
government, and the military had a track record of failing to achieve a durable peace. To
Bommakanti, it was clear that the government must attain popular support in pursuing the
use of force against the enemy. The incursion of militants into the Swat Valley in 2009
prompted a strategic review emphasizing the application of neo-Clausewitzian thought.
The neo-Clausewitzian paradigm promotes the importance of governance and its
impact upon the Swati-Pashtun as an instrument of national policy. Cordesman & Vira
(2011) concluded that Pakistani policymakers may apply logic and reason to properly
apply all elements of national authority to counter the chaotic nature of the Islamists.
Clausewitz's trinity relationships consisting of the Pashtun, government, and the military
is complex and dynamic. Therefore, the key to a successful countermilitancy strategy
resides in a thorough examination and understanding of those relationships. This requires
a holistic assessment of the trinity and the influence of the militants upon it. NeoClausewitzian theorists contended that the implementation of governance is linked to the
ability of government to connect with the people, foster trust, and achieve legitimacy.
The study’s theoretical foundation is based in understanding how governance is
integrated with military operations to build meaningful relationships within the neoClausewitzian paradigm. The complex socio-political relationships within Pakistan may
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be fully analyzed to understand the nature of the militancy. The literature review
continues with a comprehensive analysis of the neo-Clausewitzian trinity to explore the
nature of the existing relationships between the government, the military, and the
Pakistanis—with a special focus on the Pashtun who are engrossed in the violence.
Review of the Literature
Neo-Clausewitzian Trinity Analysis: The Pashtun
To gain the hearts and minds of the Pashtun tribesmen, Pakistani policymakers
may strive to understand their tribal way of life. The Pashtun respect the traditional tribal
hierarchy that functioned autonomously of national governing authorities (Kuhn, 2010).
Estimated at about 50 million, the Pashtun reside along both sides of the AfghanistanPakistan border and are the largest tribal influence in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province.
Kuhn asserts that the tribes were subject to brutal summary punishment under British
colonial rule having very little interaction politically and are extremely cynical of ruling
authority. According to Panwar (2010), the Pashtun tend to exhibit a conservative
religious orientation that embraces the more moderate Sufi-Hanfi Islamic worldview
which ideologically binds the tribe together.
The Pashtun way of life. Pashtun life is centered on the extended family. Kfir
(2010) described the tribe’s preference to gather in small family groups, known as khol,
and congregate to form extended family lineages or clans, known as khel, that congregate
into a tribal quam, led by a leader called the malik. The malik governs a group of elders
known as a jirga that dictates tribal policies, enforces traditional laws, and institutes

44
taxes. The imam or mullah as part of the greater unified ulema or clergy is the religious
leader who advises and guides the jirga on religious matters. For centuries, these tribes
existed as a tight community socially and a loose confederation politically. Kfir explained
that during the inception of the state in 1947, a loya jirga or grand council of Pashtun
elders agreed to join with Pakistan in exchange for a degree of autonomy, which they
have always exercised.
The Pashtun traditional tribal hierarchy of leadership shifted from the maliks to
the mullahs. Buneri (2011) contended that the tribal hierarchy has been in a continual
state of decline for the last several years. The malik traditionally served as the de facto
arbiter in domestic disputes, interlocutors in national decision-making, tax revenue
collectors, village leaders, and representatives to provincial jirgas. The Taliban
marginalized the malik and emboldened the radical mullahs resulting in a diffusion of the
traditional Pashtun culture. Cordesman and Vira (2011) reported that Wahhabist
petrodollars have empowered the mullahs to break off from the protection of the maliks,
and they have grown increasingly more independent. This enabled some mullahs to
advance extremist policies that were far removed from mainstream moderate positions.
Now, there is widespread Taliban domination of the ulema that trumps the traditional
malik in Pashtu tribal life and decision-making. Mufti (2012) asserted that a portion of
the older, more conservative generation, continues to honor and support the malik and the
traditional Pashtun ways, but the mullahs are rising to prominence by championing the
minds of the next generation of Pashtun.
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The Pashtun are anchored at a geo-political fault zone where there is a constant
political and social struggle between Islam and the global super powers. Rudyard Kipling
referred to the unresolved imperial struggle between Russia and Great Britain as the
“great game” (Kipling in Kuhn, 2011, p. 66) that relegated the Pashtun tribal areas to a
mere buffer zone between India and foreign intruders. Since colonial times, the Pashtun
lands were situated to block undesirable raiders along the lucrative spice road into India.
Akhtar (2008) confirmed the tragic plight of millions of Pashtun refugees who embraced
a culture of arms as a result of centuries of warring imperial powers. The great game
culminated with the tragic fracturing of Pashtun clans divided between Afghanistan and
British India, later becoming the state of Pakistan, across a clumsily drawn international
border called the Durand line of 1893—ill-conceived by a British bureaucrat. Kuhn
(2011) argued that the Durand line is a de facto border that failed to establish political
identities, create legal jurisdiction, or regulate commerce along mountain trails that have
existed since time immemorial. The Pashtun never recognized the Durand line, and they
maintain family connections by crossing the line with impunity (Milhalka, 2008).
Pashtun cultural and social values. The Pashtun value their autonomy and are
self-governed by their own tribal code called Paktunwali. Government control of the
tribal areas has been ineffective and, in essence, only symbolic (Kfir, 2009). In the
absence of governance, the Pashtun relied on Paktunwali to govern and resolve disputes
(Ahmad, 2010). Paktunwali dominates the Pashtun way of life and at its core are the
principles of badal (justice), ghayat (respect and courage), sabat (loyalty), melmastia
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(hospitality), badragga (safe conduct), nanawatai (asylum), nang (defending the weak,),
and naamus (protection of women). The tribes vowed to defend and protect guests as a
matter of honor—and an attack against them was considered an assault on the tribe.
The Pashtun became isolated and sought to preserve family connections and
cultural traditions in the midst of strained geo-political tensions. The tribes claim a legal
right to cross national boundaries based on easement concessions guaranteed by the
original British arrangement. This enables a freedom of maneuver for Pashtun families to
communicate and preserve ancestral ties. According to Milhaka (2008), the government
was not prepared for the voracious determination of the Pashtun to preserve their tribal
heritage and traditional customs. The Pashtun contest Western democracy initiatives
because these foreign intrusions threaten their traditional livelihood. Ahmad (2010)
characterized the Pashtun as victims of the American war that was not of their making.
Javaid (2011) asserted that a series of devastating wars created severe negative economic,
political, and social repercussions and fostered an intense hatred for foreign intervention.
The Pashtun value family, security, health, and education. A New America
Foundation survey analysis by Bergen and Doherty (2010) found that the Pashtun place a
far greater priority on the health and education of their children than defeating foreign
intruders. Dealing with an insecure environment has been a way life for generations, but
an investment in the Pashtun children is considered essential for a prosperous society.
Pashtun value security to the extent that it affords an opportunity for education.
According to Bergen and Doherty, the Pashtun view education as an escape from
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poverty, a way for women to gain equality to men, and a means to achieve recognition
from the affluent Punjabi majority. This is contrary to Salafist fundamentalism that
discourages female education. A ultraconservative view among Islamists considers
naamus, or the protection of women, as a prohibition of female exposure within the
public domain, including the pursuit of education. Although the Quran promotes
education, Islamists prohibit female education under Sharia law.
Neo-Clausewitzian Trinity Analysis: The Islamic Republic of Pakistan
The Pakistan government is a weak parliamentary democratic republic that
loosely governs a confederation of four provinces and lesser territories. Since the
inception of the State and the partition from India, political infighting within dozens of
political parties, rampant ethno-nationalism, and friction with the military inhibited the
power, reach, and effectiveness of the government (Panwar, 2010). Most Pakistan experts
would not dispute the weakness of the state. Ali (2010) identified significant government
deficiencies that include the inability to provide basic services, escalating poverty,
illiteracy, poor healthcare, and corrupt policymaking. The government has a history of
political instability, a poor human rights record, and a notable lack of authority presence
in the remote provinces. Pakistan’s security situation is unstable, ranking 13th in the Fund
for Peace Failed States Index for nations likely to collapse or lose control of internal
security (Global Fund for Peace, 2013). Many scholars contend that the Pakistanis have
lost faith in government. In 2010, Pew Polls cited in Cordesman and Vira (2011) declared
that only 14% of the population was satisfied with their government’s performance.
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Throughout the tribe’s existence, the Pashtun have been at odds with their
government. Ahmad (2010) and Panwar (2010) described the phenomenon of “neoTalibanism” that emerged from the politics of ethnic nationalism after a government
inspired jihadist force designed to protect Pakistan against the Soviets backfired—and the
militants turned against their own government. Panwar asserts that internal tribal
tensions, and a pervasive disrespect for tribal sovereignty, undermined Pashtun support
for Islamabad. Panwar asserted that building enduring relationships with the Pashtun
requires a respect for tribal traditions and sovereignty. Ahmad further concluded that the
use economic assistance (carrots) and punitive measures (sticks) to control tribal activity
is faltering. Today, the Pashtun remain fiercely independent and will defend their
families, and their foreign militant guests, against all threats external to the tribe, even if
the threat is their own government.
Pakistan’s semidysfunctional political system. Some scholars assert that the
government neglect of social services perpetuated a fractured society. Farooq (2012)
reported that a class divide is evident with 60% of the Pashtun below the poverty line.
Cohen (2007) argued that weak government institutions created a social gap because of
an unequal distribution of water, lack of fertile lands, and lack of a fair energy allocation.
Cordesman and Vira (2011) characterized Pakistan’s governance systems as
semidysfunctional and attributed Pashtun dissatisfaction to economic stagnation that
created a political “systemic malaise” (p. XIII). The malaise created a vulnerability that
threatens a complete social destabilization and a fracturing of Pakistani society. Some

49
scholarly experts disagree. Aktar (2010) asserted that the class divide is not directly
linked to weak governance, but rather it is a function of the historical salience of an
Islamic jihadist idiom in Pashtun society that promotes a distinct and natural separation
of cultures. Aktar asserted that the radical Islamic ideological agenda in itself is
fracturing the society.
Lack of civil-sector development, investment, and security in the Pashtun regions
is perceived as discrimination by the Punjabi-Mohajir dominated government. Panwar
(2010) avowed that the Pashtun were never integrated into mainstream governance. He
stated that a culture of ethno-nationalism, legacy hatred, and mutual suspicion,
superimposed on a “democratically unconsolidated polity” (p. 8) encouraged ethnic fault
lines that create instability and inspire sectarian violence. According to Nawaz and
Borchgrave (2009), the Pashtun are excluded from the legal and bureaucratic systems that
are afforded to the Pakistan majority. The Pashtun contend that government bureaucrats
wield an inordinate judicial power that infuriates the tribal elders, and they resent outside
intrusion into their internal affairs (Cordesman and Vira, 2011). The Islamist militants
have taken full advantage of this prejudice by harnessing the narrative that pits kashers
(poor young tribesmen) against mashers (Pakistani elite and privileged).
Pakistan is plagued by a fragile political system that is paralyzed with infighting
between the politicians, military, and the mullahs. Cordesman and Vira (2011)
characterized the civilian governance as impotent with self-serving politics, internal
squabbling, and an eagerness to exploit ethnic tensions for political gain. Humphrey
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(2012) goes further and postulated that Pakistan is an incomplete nation with competing
religious and secular components caught between an unstable Democratic State and
ineffective Islamic Republic. Humphrey concluded that the weak government “franchised
its sovereignty” (p. 145) by ceding security to para-military militias and the rule of law to
the local mullahs. Humphrey asserted that the parallel existence of two forms of “hyper
governance,” one local and one centered in Islamabad, have created a contemporary crisis
that is being played out in a frontier war where violence is used as a basis for political
legitimacy.
Pakistan’s political corruption and nepotism. Political ineptness and social
injustice have alienated a large segment of the Pashtun population. Fair (2011) postulated
that the dysfunctional government pushes away the Pashtun who have become cynical of
government corruption and nepotism. Top down decision-making from Islamabad rarely
considers the voice of the tribal elders and fosters patronage networks instead. Political
parties are legally banned in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province, and there are no delegates at
the provincial level. Representation at the national level is merely symbolic since
Parliamentary acts are not recognized without presidential endorsement (Haider, 2009).
Cohen (2007) stated that the major source of Pakistan’s instability and rising extremism
stems from a culture of governmental injustice, misguided impunity, and nepotism.
Cohen also asserted that the government deliberately leveraged ethnic tensions among
former tribal allies to maintain the Pashtun in a weakened political posture. Hussain and
Khan (2012) recommended a different approach. They suggested that the government
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leverage nationalism to rally the diverse ethnic factions against the rising Islamist threat
rather than weaken the Pashtun into a submissive position.
The Pashtun were disenfranchised from the mainstream political processes and
Islamist shadow governance filled the leadership void. In the absence of a national level
presence, the Pashtun formed a religious alliance of Islamist sectarian parties, the
Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA). The coalition evolved into a shadow government that
applied strict Sharia law and governance practices that restricted civil liberties. Though
not directly affiliated with the Taliban, the MMA provided maneuverability for the
Islamists as the jirgas ignored the growing militant threat. At first, many elders tacitly
condoned strict Sharia adherence. However, as the Taliban created a foothold among the
tribes, any resistance to the adoption of Sharia was met harshly with severe
repercussions. Sial (2009) asserted that the maliks are caught in the middle of the
government and the warring Islamists, and many are killed if they fail to support the
Taliban. Others are set-aside if they have acquiesced to Taliban demands. The ability of
Islamabad to protect the progovernment maliks has been grossly ineffective. Sial reported
that over 600 dissenting maliks were killed and many others forced into hiding.
Weak government institutions in Pakistan. Provincial judicial processes are not
recognized as legitimate by the Pashtun. The antiquated British Federal Crimes
Regulations (FCR) of 1901, applied inequitably and only to the frontier provinces, were
instituted as a tool of imperialist subjugation. The regulations deny basic rights to the
Pashtun—basic rights that are afforded to Pakistan’s majority. The existing courts poorly
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execute the rule of law as a hybrid between Sharia law and the legacy statutes. Jones and
Fair (2010) argued that the outdated and idiosyncratic FCR may be reformed to comply
with the Sharia based Paktunwali code. The court system rarely challenges the authority
of magistrates who are not bound to follow the recommendations of the tribal jirgas.
Senior civilian bureaucrats wield unlimited judicial authority and corruption is rampant
(Cordesman & Vira, 2011). Cohen (2007) reported that the militant lawbreakers operate
with impunity and citizens doubt the capacity of Pakistan’s law enforcement to arrest and
imprison criminals. Pashtun frequently explore extrajudicial means to solve legal
problems rather than pursue the official system. Cohen further asserted that there is an
absence of rule of law, and concluded that government officials are “viewed by most as
predators, not protectors” (p. 29) and the region is simply “a lawless society” (p. 30).
The Pakistan government neglected the public education system and significant
reform is needed. A large disparity in education across Pakistan created a demand for
private madrassas (increase from 12,448 in 2008 to 19,104 in 2010) to fill the education
gap (Cordesman & Vira, 2011). Cordesman and Vira avowed that the rapid growth in
madrassas was a sign of the dissatisfaction with the federal education system and a clear
symptom of a failed state. They provided convincing evidence that the poor educational
system is a significant cause of social stagnation, but not necessarily a breeding ground
for militancy. Although evidence for the direct correlation of Islamic teaching to
militancy is not clear, there is little doubt that the madrassa education system
significantly promotes Islamic nationalism and anti-Western sentiment.
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The madrassa religious schools are known to profess fundamentalist views;
however, their linkage to militancy is widely debated. Madrassas represent only about
10% of Pakistan’s education sector, but have a significant impact on societal perceptions
(Cordesman & Vira, 2011). According to Mufti (2012), the radical Deobandis control
two-thirds of the madrassas although they represent only 15% of the population. Mufti
asserted that a segment of Pakistan’s children, mostly those in poverty, attend madrassas
to recite the Quran and promote the Islamic worldview rather than learn how to read or
write. Imams profess a highly potent and extremely dangerous ideology to the Pashtun
youth. On the contrary, Bergen (as cited in Cordesman & Vira, 2011) concluded that the
madrassas are theological and do not teach the technical skills necessary to wage
violence. Bergen’s study included 75 active militants and found that only a few attended
a madrassa, implying that there is no direct correlation between graduates and militancy.
Call for a greater Pashtun Nation. Militarization and escalating violence have
driven the Pashtun away from their government. Kuhn (2011) contended that the level of
violence reached intolerable levels and obstructed reconciliation. Scholars disagree on the
causes of the rising violence. Cordesman and Vira (2011) concluded that the growing
Islamist shadow government inspired the youth to engage in an antistate violence
campaign. Lamb and Hameed (2012) disputed this assertion by suggesting that the
Islamist shadow governance is widespread and welcomed by the Pashtun. They
concluded that Islamabad—not the Taliban—promotes violence by implementing policy
that does not resonate with the tribe.
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Islamic nationalism is on the rise. Despite the differing views on the causes of
militancy, Kuhn (2011) found that the devastation of the tribal structure severed the last
remaining channels of communication between the elders and Islamabad. Panwar (2010)
confirmed that a social disconnect created a rise in Pashtun nationalism. The nationalism
encouraged a self-determination movement and inspired calls for the formation of a
greater “Pashtunistan.” Panwar concluded that uncontrollable violence is promoting
“autonomy, unity, and identity” (p. 11) that inspires the creation of a separate state.
Neo-Clausewitzian Trinity Analysis: Civil-Military Relationships
The Pakistan Government and their military have a tumultuous relationship. The
Army ruled over half of Pakistan’s existence and has a tendency to overtake a civilian
government by coup when the military elite loses confidence in the civilian
administration. Government authorities and their associated political parties rarely
challenge the military and they often seek the “military’s good graces” (Cordesman &
Vira, 2011, p. 3). The military is headquartered in Rawalpindi, near the government
center in Islamabad, and is the most professional and efficient institution in Pakistan.
According to Cordesman and Vira, the military controls about 10 % of Pakistan’s
economy including managing extensive landholdings and controlling many large
businesses—and, in essence, the military is the only glue holding Pakistan together.
Pakistan’s military is popular despite a history of overwhelming defeats with
India. Fair (2011) asserted that Pakistan’s military is dedicated to more than the security;
the military advocates for the overall welfare of the people and may intervene politically
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and economically to promote nation-building. Military leaders are much more popular
than the sitting civilian president, with 79% of Pakistanis responding that the military has
a good influence on the country and only 14% have confidence in the president (Pew
Research Global Attitudes Project, 2011). Military leaders, many still in uniform, were
appointed to prominent ministry positions and oversee important government institutions.
Fair concluded that the military is the true political authority in Pakistan, not the civilians.
Fair postulated that the Army offers the best solution to the nation’s political dysfunction;
however, he argued that civil control of the military is preferred and both institutions
need to conduct policymaking with solidarity.
Senior Pakistani leaders recognize the vulnerability and instability that is inherent
with a dominant military. According to Fair (2011), the military created a secretive
decision-making process that mislead the national security debate. The government
recognized the danger of an overbearing military—particularly in the provinces—and
attempted to promote civilian influence by passing the 18th Amendment to the
constitution. The amendment vested more power in Parliament and the Prime Minister
and limited military and judicial powers. Fair (2011) concluded that the new legislation
promoted popular confidence in government and healed some ingrained political wounds.
Fair argued that policymakers should refrain from pandering to military leaders, and may
divert financial allocations from the military to the people. Despite these reforms, it is
clear that the military remains the main instrument in the conflict. Connable and Libicki
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(2010) and Jones and Fair (2010) recommended that the Army collaborate with the
civilian administration to achieve enduring social solutions.
Pakistan tends to resolve its political conflicts with the aggressive application of
the use of arms that destabilizes the fragile civil-military relationship. Bommakanti
(2012) asserted that the Pakistanis prefer armed conflict over diplomacy despite the lack
of clear progress in the war against the militants. Ahmad (2010) concluded that the
government is over-reliant on warfare as an instrument of national policy. Ahmad found
that the inadequacy of sound policy coupled with the inability of the military to
successfully implement policy is unsettling to the people. Exum, Fick, Hummayun, and
Kilcullen (2009) agreed that the aggressive military campaign induced instability that
resulted in a periodic confidence crisis for both the military and the government. Brand
(2011) argued that a renewed civil-military collaboration would regain public confidence
and stabilize the popular unrest. Brand argued that military operations may be used as a
strategic communication campaign to win a popular allegiance.
The Pashtun do not recognize the military as their guardian or protector. This is in
stark contrast to the support that the military enjoys from the Pakistani majority.
Pickering and Rubin (2009) asserted that the military relied upon a scorched earth policy
to undermine the enemy support base rather than protecting the population from the
militants—and this exacerbated the trust problem. Brand (2011) explained that gaining
popular support is problematic for a Punjabi dominated military that many Pashtun
consider to be a foreign force within their own borders. The people’s confidence in the
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military is a key component of neo-Clausewitzian theory, and confidence in government
cannot be achieved without a trust in the military.
Neo-Clausewitzian Trinity Analysis: The Islamist Militants
The Taliban rose to prominence after the Soviet exodus from Afghanistan. The
Taliban were primarily a Pashtun politico-religious movement focused on reestablishing
the Afghan state under Sharia law (Dorronsoro, 2009). When the Soviets withdrew in
1989 and the United States disengaged, several mujahedeen alliances splintered to pursue
their own vision and political objectives. After 5 years of devastating civil war, from
1989-1994, it became clear that a single legitimate governing authority would not
emerge. Instability on the northwest border threatened national sovereignty, and the
Pakistan government was anxious to seize the initiative. According to Kfir (2009) and
Panwar (2010), the Pakistanis shifted financial and equipment support to a new leader, a
relatively unknown, albeit charismatic, Afghan cleric, named Mullah Muhammad Omar
who inspired the Taliban movement. According to N. Akhtar (2008), the followers of
Mullah Omar’s movement, many recruited from refugee camps in Pakistan, became
known as the Taliban, referring to students of ultraconservative Saudi-Wahhabist
financed madrassas.
The Pakistan government exploited the religious affiliations between the Pashtun
and the Islamists to form a formidable jihadist force to advance their national interests.
Fair, Malhotra, and Shapiro (2010) asserted that Pakistan employed Islamists as tools of
foreign policy. Ahmad (2010) further maintained that the government leveraged the
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tribe’s strong adherence of Paktunwali to bond them with the foreign fighters called
mujahedeen who sought sanctuary in the tribal lands. Ahmad explained how the
mujahedeen were afforded safe conduct throughout the region, and once accepted into the
clans, the Pashtun were loyal to their guests. The government leveraged Paktunwali to
gain a political advantage with the Islamists who were postured to defend the border
against foreign intrusion. The Taliban, however, were never successfully subordinated to
the government and became violent toward all external authorities (Kfir, 2009).
The Taliban influence with the Pashtun expanded far beyond the government’s
intent and expectation. Fair (2011) postulated that the military considers most Taliban to
be their strategic reserve in the event of an Indian incursion. Government support of
sympathetic Islamists is founded in strategic interests that ensure the survival of the state.
Fair maintained that it is unlikely that Pakistan would abandon their long-standing
relationship with dangerous militant proxies. Ahmad (2010) attributed Islamist inspired
violence to the policy of recruiting militants to hedge against India—and the policy
backfired. The escalating level of violence in the Khyber Province reaffirms that discrete
militant factions are undoubtedly out of the political control of the government. Ahmad
asserted that these extremist groups are dangerous—bent on destabilizing the region to
advance a radical Islamic political agenda.
The Taliban made clever use of social tensions to gain influence with the Pashtun.
The Taliban subscribe to the Barelvi, Deobandi, or Ahl-e-Hadith neo-fundamentalist
worldview that professes a return to traditional Islamic principles. These principles
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resonated with the Pashtun yearning for moral guidance and justice (Mufti, 2012). Neofundamentalism has two main features: a strict interpretation of Sharia that dominates
politics, and a vehement opposition to Western influence. Mufti explained that the
Taliban's belief in a simple, messianic, and puritan Islamic worldview resonated with the
village mullahs. In keeping with Paktunwali, the mullahs offered sanctuary to the
Islamists who embraced their worldview. For the Pashtun, it became a matter of tribal
honor to extend hospitality and safe conduct to the Taliban who professed a righteous
conflict for the greater good of the Pashtun. Kfir (2009) explained that the Taliban
influence had a second order effect; it weakened the traditional tribal hierarchy and began
shifting the political powerbase to the mullahs who professed a more radical worldview.
The ascendency of the Taliban movement emanated from the growing influence
of the political mullahs who became arbitrators and enforced a more righteous legal
system. The Taliban and their mullahs gained the respect of the “common people” by
providing an alternate means of governance that afforded safety and order. An Asian
Indigenous and Tribal People Network study attributed the strong Pashtun-Taliban
alliance to a complete breakdown of Pakistan’s legal system (Editorial: The Dark Region
of Pakistan, 2014). According to the study and reaffirmed by Kfir (2009), the Taliban
succeeded in marginalizing the Pakistan authorities by subverting the ineffective and
antiquated British legal system. Kfir explained that the implementation of Sharia was
astute but ruthless, described as an innovative form of Islamic fundamentalism combined
with Paktunwali. To the Pashtun, Sharia law was brutal, yet just, and in keeping with
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their Islamic faith. Kuhn (2011) found that the atrocious Taliban enforcement of Sharia
law was far more appealing to the Pashtun than corrupt Pakistani magistrates enforcing
the archaic and unjust British system.
Islamist influence gains an enduring foothold. The Taliban were adept at
altering their social structure to assimilate within society and promote themselves as the
preferred governing authority. Mufti (2012) reported that today’s Taliban—often called
neo-Taliban—have evolved into a network of fundamentalist affiliates that are
sophisticated in their use of propaganda and adept in coercing the Pashtun to support
them. Mufti (2012) found that acerting control of the media is normally their first order of
business. The Islamists effectively use propaganda to communicate azadi which means
freedom or self-determination. Azadi became a political rallying cry that inspires the
Pashtun to fight against non-Muslims and corrupt authorities (Fair, Malhotra, & Shapiro,
2010). Mufti explained that the Taliban network is flexible with decentralized command
relationships that are capable of initiating operations quickly and resilient to military
action against it.
There is disagreement to whether the Pashtun-Taliban alliance is inspired by the
higher calling of radical ideology, or simply influenced by local politics. According to A.
Akhtar (2010), Islamists replace the tribal malik with a “political mullah” (p. 600) who
takes full advantage of the tribe’s Islamic identity and fills the moral void left by the
elders who were corrupted by the government. Scholars disagree on the Taliban's
primary motivation. N. Akhtar (2008) postulated that radical ideology in itself forms the
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support base for the mullahs. According to N. Akhtar, the Taliban reflected a common
religious zeal that resounded with the Pashtun and the tribe rallied to their cause. Mufti
(2012), however, concluded that Taliban support is inspired by both a religious call for
Islamic fundamentalism and a political correction of social injustices. A. Aktar agreed
with Mufti, and explained that the militants have not been inspired by a revolutionary
upheaval. They are primarily motivated by social injustices rather than by the religious
call for “jihad.” A. Akhtar concluded that the Islamists have rearranged the tribal social
fabric to gain influence by hijacking the Pashtun dispute resolution process. Despite the
disagreement on motivations, most scholars agree that the voracity of Islamist factions
creates a social weakness and political vulnerability that may be exploited.
The Taliban offer a better quality of life for the Pashtun, although they often use
coercion to institute reform. Khan (2007) postulated that the government’s helplessness
in providing any substantial level of social services delegitimizes the state and its
capacity to maintain good order. Lamb and Hameed (2012) reported that the Islamists
have effectively filled the void by providing life quality and security to the Pashtun, but
the tribesmen pay a huge cost. Tribesmen are forced into obedience through intimidation
or threat of assassination. In a terror campaign, tribal elders were intimidated to comply
with a stringent enforcement of Sharia law or be killed. Kfir (2009) reported that some
Pashtun leaders fled and many were slaughtered, yet a majority conformed to Taliban
rule. Jones and Fair (2010) characterized the Taliban as extremely dangerous and capable
of terrorizing the population into total submission.
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An Islamic fundamentalist network of opposition. Taliban enforced SalafistDeobandi radical ideology supplanted the more tolerant Sufi–Hanfi doctrine that united
extremist factions into a network of opposition. The Taliban movement transcended tribal
structures across the mountain regions to create an expansive sphere of influence (Mufti,
2012). The Taliban foothold spread across Pakistan by creating alliances with other
jihadist groups who professed radical ideology and promoted violence. They shared
common objectives with other Salafist sects that included the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
(TTP), often referred to as the “Pakistani Taliban,” based in Waziristan. Mufti explained
that the Taliban cannot match force-to-force with a competent military, so they have
adopted a defensive stance by attacking vulnerable civilian targets such as aid workers or
government officials.
Though skeptical of their long-term political intentions, the Taliban found a
formidable ally in al-Qaeda, comprised of mostly foreign fighters who found sanctuary
among them. The TTP considered the rugged terrain of the Khyber region to be a perfect
sanctuary due to the close cultural and religious ties to the sympathetic Pashtun. Mufti
(2012) postulated that a synergistic relationship developed within these Islamist groups
who became competent in militant activity against the government. The result was a
resilient and united Islamist adversary, able to engage in strategic planning and
coordinated attacks to achieve common goals while remaining autonomous to pursue
local political objectives. Javaid (2011) assessed that many Pashtun entered into a grand
alliance of convenience with al-Qaeda foreign fighters to protect their families from
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unwarranted foreign aggression. Javaid explained that al-Qaeda fighters sought refuge
from intense military operations and gained influence with the TTP and local Pashtun
tribesmen who were sympathetic to their cause. The Taliban and Pashtun sympathizers,
seeking spiritual guidance and the rule of law in an era of incessant violence, turned to
the al-Qaeda for leadership, logistical support, military prowess, and political stability
(Dorronsoro, 2009).
The Western pursuit of the global war on terror encouraged violent extremism and
enabled the uncontested authority of the Taliban mullahs. This view discounts the idea of
a common strategic or ideological objective between the Pashtun and Taliban, and
suggests that the violence brought on by the West itself. Hence, many Pashtun consider
Allied aggression as the root cause of the swelling radical opposition—referred to as
Talibanization. Javaid (2011) asserted that Western military raids have pushed the
Pashtun to the Islamist militants for protection and security. Javaid (2011) cited drone
attacks and persistent raids by special military forces that killed innocents and conducted
unlawful search and seizure as the primary reason for Talibanization. Javaid postulated
that Islamist militants are enabled by cash-flushed fundamentalist groups aimed at
ousting the corrupt Western influence that brought war upon them, not of their own
choosing.
The Islamist strategy. The Pakistan Taliban seeks to undermine the government
and exercise the right of autonomous governance based in Sharia law. According to
Cordesman and Vira (2011), the TTP strategy aligns with the Maoist insurgency
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approach of a protracted popular war. The militants are capable of operational planning
and coordinated attacks with sophisticated networks that reach beyond the national
borders. The local networks often compete with each other, resulting in violence
manifested in different ways: intertribal warfare, antistate violence, sectarian violence,
global jihad, and criminal activity. According to Cordesman and Vira, the militants
sought to replace traditional tribal values with its own form of Islamic extremist ideology
by destroying the traditional Jirga system. They asserted that the Islamist strategy
emphasizes patience in an attempt to gain influence with the Pashtun and exhaust
Pakistan’s political will and resources over time—for years if necessary.
The Taliban established a firm political base among the Pashtun as a foundation
for militancy. Nawaz and Borchgrave (2009) reported that the Taliban operate
clandestinely through propaganda, subversion, and intimidation to supplant the traditional
tribal leadership and foster support among the Pashtun, especially the vulnerable youth.
Cordesman and Vira (2011) explained that the Taliban effectively disseminate a strategic
narrative that connects tribal grievances to a governance platform that invigorates the
tribesmen. Taliban accomplish this by either co-opting existing ethnic identities or
fashioning new identities based on religious extremism rather than traditional Pashtun
culture. After achieving a firm political base, the Taliban pursue coercion and
intimidation to recruit young warriors, collect intelligence, and acquire logistical support
for guerrilla or terrorist operations against the military and police constabulary.
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Islamist inspired militancy and political action generated gaps in state control
that the Taliban filled with “shadow” governance. According to Cordesman and Vira, the
Taliban sought to inspire and mobilize the people—known as Focoism—to collapse the
government through civil disobedience rather than outright military defeat. Focoists
pursue limited military operations supported by a sustained tempo of strategic
propaganda to inspire the people into rallying against the government. It remains unclear
whether the militants seek to collapse the government or merely wound it enough to settle
for some limited political objectives such as the right of self-determination,
independence, or simply equal representation in government.
The Pakistan countermilitancy campaign is irresolute. The national strategy to
counter Islamist militancy is marked by indecision and limited success. Pickering and
Rubin (2009) and Nawaz (2011) assessed that the military has been ineffective in
clearing and holding territory because of an incoherent strategy. Mohammad (2009)
further explained that the government does not understand the dynamic between a
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency situation. The counterterrorism strategy,
conceived to disempower the worldwide terrorist network by eliminating support nodes
may be counterproductive in achieving the Pashtun trust and confidence. Mohammad
reported that hundreds of innocents were hurt or killed in the process to annihilate the
Islamist support networks. The radical movement is emboldened by the anger exuded by
the families of those killed. Cohen (2007) affirmed that military operations have not only
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failed to reduce violence, but caused additional civil unrest stemming from the
lawlessness left by the exodus of competent governing bodies.
The Islamists move throughout the region with impunity and the lethality of
insurgents is not a valid indicator of success. Cordesman and Vira (2011) concluded that
constant military pressure on the Taliban tends to displace them to other provinces,
merely transferring the militancy problem to other locations. They describe the freedom
of maneuver as a “balloon” where the militants pressured by intensive military action in
one sector were pushed into another by seeking refuge in benign provinces where they
could reconstitute and receive local support. In order to maneuver more effectively, the
militants cleverly modified the cultural diversity of their forces to mirror the population
and thus became more accepted. As the militants moved through tribal regions, they
acculturated and assumed many young fighters into their ranks. The new diversity in
tribal makeup bound by a common religious ideology promoted the concept of a united
Islamic front and pushed moderate Muslims closer to the radical factions.
The Pashtun were not convinced that it is better to be a Pakistan citizen rather
than a Taliban subject. Khan (2007) contended that governance steadily deteriorated at
the very time when it is needed to gain the confidence of the people. Khan asserted that
the government demonstrated little interest or ability to engage in economic development
or correct social disparities that would foster enduring relationships. Aslam and Yilaz
(2011) studied the impact of decentralized reforms on service delivery in Pakistan’s
remote provinces and concluded that bringing inclusive decision-making to the Pashtun
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people would improve life services and promote trust that is clearly absent. N. Akhtar
(2008) concluded that peace cannot be achieved with weapons. Peace may only be
achieved with harmony—and good governance is the key to achieving that end.
The current countermilitancy strategy lacks a coordinated whole-of-government
effort and is over reliant on military operational success. Overwhelming military activity
has completely overshadowed the government’s effort to intervene politically, socially
and economically. The neo-Clausewitzian approach is hampered by political instability
and turmoil. A healthy dialogue and mutual understanding between the Pashtun and their
government is clearly lacking.
Conclusion
The militancy problem in Pakistan is an imminent threat to their national security
and has global security implications. The Islamist phenomenon is complex and violent,
and a solution requires a comprehensive analysis of the Pashtun social and political
environment. A scientific study of the Pashtun and the government operations in their
lands is need to discern the right balance of governance and military actions to subdue the
militancy threat. The cynicism and distrust between the Pashtun, their government, and
the military destabilized the sociopolitical environment and created vulnerabilities for the
Islamists to exploit. Due to a weakness of Pakistan’s governance, the militants have the
initiative; however, the Pakistani government achieved significant success during the
Swat operations in Khyber Province. This study explored the reasons for that success.
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Current doctrine and the application of classic insurgency and terrorism theory
have significant gaps that require additional scientific research to determine the true role
of governance in a countermilitancy campaign. Current strategies remain military
dominant rather than population focused. Neo-Clausewitizians stress the importance of
earning the allegiance of the people to undermine the enemy support base. However, the
planning process to identify and implement the right governance services to promote
public trust is lacking. An aggressive military approach has proven to be problematic in
the current sociopolitical environment, and most scholars agree that military forces
working hand-in-hand with the government institutions is more effective. Still, there is
disagreement on the best methods to integrate governance with the military effort.
Altering the way the Pakistan government and the Pashtun think about the conflict
is the only path to achieving a lasting peace. To gain the confidence and trust of the
tribesmen, the government may study the Pashtun way of life that was centered on the
extended Pashtun family and governed by a traditional tribal hierarchy. The Pashtun are
anchored at a geo-political fault zone where there is a constant social struggle between
Islam, the global super powers, and their own government. The Taliban, created and
supported by the government as a strategic reserve, made astute use of ethnic tensions to
gain favor with the Pashtun seeking justice and moral guidance founded in Islam. The
Taliban were skilled at altering their communal fabric to assimilate with the people and
promote themselves as the chosen governing authority, thereby supplanting the Pakistani
authority. The Pashtun are not convinced that it is better to be a Pakistani citizen than a
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Taliban subject. The Taliban do not have the capacity to openly confront the military in
large conventional formations, so they resort to irregular warfare and terror tactics. The
national strategy to counter the threat lacks a coordinated whole-of-government effort
and is marked by an over reliance on military operational success.
The Pakistan government has experienced limited success in the conflict. Pakistan
is plagued by a dysfunctional political system that is paralyzed with infighting between
the politicians, military, and the mullahs. It is a fragile parliamentary democratic republic
that loosely governs and failed to achieve the trust of the Pashtun. Lack of development
in infrastructure and social services perpetuated a fractured society. The Pashtun are
disenfranchised from the mainstream political processes and the Islamists have filled the
leadership void. Militarization and escalating violence further alienated the Pashtun from
their government which is at odds with their own military. As a result, the Pashtun do not
recognize the military or the government as their guardian or protectors. The tribe may be
reconnected to their government to achieve an enduring peace.
There is a clear gap in the literature concerning the specific implementation of
governance and the potential for a whole-of-government approach to counter Islamist
militancy. Current doctrine focuses on military operations as the primary instrument to
defeat the militants. Governance plays only a secondary role. Neo-Clausewitzian thought
clearly places a higher degree of importance on understanding cultural values, and the
application of governance throughout the campaign. Determining the right balance
between military operations and governance is the challenge.
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Chapter 3 describes a qualitative design that applies a neo-Clausewitzian
theoretical lens to analyze the successes of Pakistan’s 2009 Swat Valley operation.
Conducting scientific research to gain an understanding of the relationships between the
participants in the conflict may provide a baseline of knowledge of how governance may
be integrated with military operations to subdue Islamist inspired violence. Clearly,
promoting a trust in government provides a promising method to counteract militant
influence upon a vulnerable people. The research methodology explored the best
processes and methods to promote government legitimacy and disable the Islamists’
capacity to wage war.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
In this chapter, I describe the qualitative study research design and the rationale
for a case study strategy of inquiry. The single case design methodology and tradition are
primarily based upon the approach developed by the recognized leader in the field, Yin
(2014). In this chapter, my role as a researcher is defined, and the process for recruiting
and protecting the participant pool in an appropriate and ethical manner is described in
detail. The specified design elements of the Yin-inspired methodology are illustrated. The
data collection plan includes a description of the desired instruments and the methods of
collection are provided. To facilitate data analysis, the application of a linear analytical
model and manual coding scheme are depicted. The specific steps to promote study
trustworthiness are expressed in the final section.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this study was to determine the most effective integration of
governance and military activities to subdue Islamist militancy. The study results and
conclusions promote social change by gaining a better understanding of Islamist inspired
violence and recommending planning improvements to subdue it. The new knowledge
obtained in the study, potentially codified in planning doctrine, may lead to a better
strategic approach in addressing the escalating global Islamist militancy problem. The
research design applies a neo-Clausewitzian warfare theoretical lens to assess the
complex sociopolitical environment and evaluate Pakistan’s implementation of
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governance. A qualitative approach to explore the relationships between the people, the
military, and their government may facilitate the integration of governance and militarism
to subdue violent extremism.
Research Design Summary
In the study, I explored the sociopolitical phenomenon of Islamist militancy and
deteriorating writ of government in Pakistan’s Khyber Province. The nature of the
research is qualitative, focusing on a single case in assessing the integration of
governance with civil-military operations. I focused on the practical problem that
contemporary countermilitancy doctrine does not adequately address the concurrent
integration of governance with military operations into a comprehensive strategy. The
study contributes to the social science discipline by addressing the broader problem of
escalating militancy inspired by Islamists spread around the world.
The Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, VA, hosted Pakistani policymakers and
operational planners involved with the Swat Valley campaign. My role as a professor at
the college and researcher was to create a neutral environment that is conducive to the
free flow of information without the undue influence of personal prejudices or political
barriers. To achieve a balanced view, six Pakistani planners with a breadth of planning
experience were selected to participate in the study. Primary data were merged with
Pakistani secondary source survey data to include the perspectives of the Swatis.
The study includes qualitative data from official government records and other
source documents that record the facts of the operation. The qualitative data analysis flow
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included a program-level linear analytical model (Appendix B) to analyze the
implementation of governance. The model was useful in analyzing the impact of
government policy, planning, and governance actions that directly supported the military
effort. The model incorporated real-world contextual conditions that describe the inherent
problem of Islamic militancy and the rival interventions that challenge the neoClausewitzian theoretical construct. The analysis technique proved to be a valuable
research tool to match empirically observed activities to theoretically predicted events.
Trustworthiness, confirmability, and transferability remain a significant concern
and weakness of a single case study in comparison to a multicase approach. Small data
sampling sizes may produce subjective results (Stake, 2010). To address this concern, the
participant pool included key Pakistani subject matter experts across the breadth of
required planning skill sets that were directly involved in the Swat operation. Moreover,
the case leveraged the strength of triangulating data from a myriad of official sources
(Yin, 2014). Data triangulation between the testimony of trustworthy participants,
reliable surveys of the affected population, and official documentation upholds
credibility. The analytical model promotes transferability by organizing the data analysis
along global militancy themes and internationally recognized doctrinal tenets. Stringent
compliance with the data collection methodology and development of a transparent audit
trail for other researchers to follow enhances confirmability.
The participants were protected by safeguarding their identities in a nonattribution
forum to foster a forthright dialogue. The political situation in Pakistan is tenuous and the
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United States-Pakistan relationship is volatile, so the Pakistanis who participated were
vulnerable to political pressure and their employment security could be at risk. In
accordance with National Research Council (2013) guidelines, informed consent
procedures were strictly applied and subject confidentiality guarded while exercising the
research methodology. The study does not contain personal information or subject
identities: No names are included.
My profession as a professor of military studies at the Joint Forces Staff College
in Norfolk, VA placed me in a unique position to gain access to Pakistani planners. The
study provides these planners with a standard for researching additional countermilitancy
cases. Study conclusions and recommendations may be used to formulate improved
doctrine as codified in Joint Publication 3-24, Counterinsurgency Manual (U. S.
Department of Defense, 2013). New countermilitancy doctrine based on real-world
operations could provide a valuable tool to address the escalating global militancy
problem. By researching the Rah-e-Rast operation, policymakers and planners may better
understand how to design and implement governance activities that undermine the
Islamist support base and subdue their violent activity.
Research Design and Rationale
Research Question
During the implementation of Pakistan’s countermilitancy campaign in Swat
District in the Malakand Division of Khyber Province, how were governance activities
integrated with military operations to subdue Islamist militancy?
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The Islamist Militancy Phenomenon
The research revealed the sociopolitical phenomena of escalating Islamist
militancy and deteriorating writ of government in Pakistan’s Khyber Province. Despite a
concerted government effort to neutralize the militants, the region experienced an
escalation of violence and reduction in governmental authority (Cordesman & Vira,
2011). However, there was a marked reduction in violence after the Swat Valley
operation (Khattak, 2010). Khattak (2010) reported that the sociopolitical activities and
military operations restored national confidence and brought calm to the valley. This
study exposes the reasons behind the operational success by analyzing the complex
relationships between the Islamists, the Swati-Pashtun, and the government security
forces—all from the Pakistani perspective. Understanding the social dynamics may
provide insights into an effective application of governance in a hostile militancy
situation. Improved governance might enhance or supplant the execution of costly and
often counterproductive military activity in the overall effort to subdue violence.
Research Tradition
The nature of the research was qualitative, using a single case study to assess the
integration of governance during the Swat campaign. This design was appropriate to
examine the wide variety of available information, the complexity of the sociopolitical
environment, the subjectivity of Pakistani perspectives, and the inductive nature of the
analysis. Yin (2014) explained that the strength of the case study methodology is the
ability to triangulate multiple qualitative data sources on a complex research problem.
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Case Study Design
In the study, I examined the integration of governance during Operation Rah-eRast using a single case study design. Yin (2014) contended that a single case design is
appropriate under longitudinal, revelatory, unusual, or critical conditions. The operation
was conceived during a critical juncture in Pakistan’s countermilitancy campaign. Rah-eRast occurred during a pivotal shift from a military to civilian administration and a swing
in national policy from executing a military dominant strategy to an interministry strategy
focused on governance. The operation defined a key milestone in the continuum of
countermilitancy efforts that showcased government decision points and an
unprecedented civilian collaboration with the military. The operation directly challenged
the neo-Clausewitzian theory of social conflict.
Rationale for Qualitative Research
A qualitative case study methodology was the most appropriate design. Morse
(1991) recommended a qualitative approach in complex sociopolitical situations where
existing social theories fall short. The qualitative approach was founded in a paradigm of
subjectivity and emphasized the importance of interpretation and popular perspective
(McLafferty, Slate, & Onwuegbuzie, 2010). The subjectivity of governance and
complexity of the militancy phenomenon lends itself to a qualitative inquiry. Birkinshaw,
Brannen, and Tung (2011) suggested that the analysis of sociopolitical phenomena within
the human domain be described qualitatively rather than measured quantitatively. A
qualitative design was well suited to assess the implementation of governance in
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countering the adverse effects of Islamist militancy by interpreting the meanings of
Swati-Pashtun social realities. This includes their historical problems with government,
their social struggle with the Taliban, and a vision of what positive social change could
occur with the proper application of governance.
The study is based upon an ontological philosophical assumption that the
understanding the nature of the social reality relies upon the contextual values and
experiences of the subjects, and the views of the Swatis at large (Creswell, 2013).
Participant perspectives were varied and complex, and subjective meanings were
assessed through their views on the Islamist militancy phenomenon. Life truths were
revealed by the analysis of the subjects’ beliefs in the social dynamics contrasted with
empirical evidence concerning the diminution of the militant threat. In essence, new
knowledge was gained by adjudicating the participants’ beliefs in governance with the
social realities in the region.
Characteristic of critical theory analysis, I explored the militancy phenomenon
through a neo-Clausewitzian theoretical lens to illuminate social action that empowered
the Swatis to undermine the militant support base. A scientific study of Pakistani social
institutions was designed to illuminate transformational approaches and key governance
attributes that subdue militancy and then improve planning processes to leverage the
government’s social actions. Hence, I explored the role of governance through an
interpretive inquiry of the subjects’ planning action, influenced by social and cultural
norms and guided by a doctrinal planning process based in neo-Clausewitzian theoretical
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principles. I focused on governance actions that empowered the Swatis to transcend
social constraints and pursue their traditional way of life, absent the Taliban threat.
Rationale for the Case Study Design
The case design complements the qualitative methodology and critical theory
interpretative analysis. Kapoulas and Mitic (2012) directly linked the methodology to the
research purpose, knowledge being sought, and the inquiry strategy. The case offered a
pragmatic inquiry of the complex phenomenon with precision. Yin (2014) asserted that
case studies are useful in explaining causal links between variables that may be overly
complex for experimental or survey designs. Yin recommended the case methodology for
a real-world context, especially when the seam between the context and the phenomenon
are not clearly defined: a direct application to the social dynamics in Pakistan.
The study was designed to explore the concurrent integration of governance with
military operations in a countermilitancy campaign. Yin (2014) explained that research
questions that pursue the “how and why some social phenomenon works” (p. 4) are
germane to a case study method. How and why governance was integrated with military
operations in the Swat case is the essence of the research question. There were many
governance activities of interest, and the case study methodology was particularly
effective in analyzing the approach to deal with such a socially complex situation.
Selection of the Swat Valley Operation for the Case
The selection of the Rah-e-Rast operation had several advantages. First, it was a
critical case that defined a decisive event in Pakistan’s countermilitancy campaign. The
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Pakistani authorities—for the first time—pursued an aggressive population-centered
approach to conducting military operations. The militant violence at that time created a
level of public desperation previously unseen, and the government intervention was
unprecedented. Second, the operation provided elements of both a governance and a
military approach. More so than any time in the past, governance and military operations
were planned and conducted in a mutually supporting way. In this context, the case was a
revelatory where the phenomenon was previously approached in a different way and
inaccessible to a social science inquiry.
Role of the Researcher
Creswell (2009) referred to qualitative study as interpretive research where the
inquirer is the key instrument and is involved in an intensive experience with the
respondents as an observer-participant. As the director of a Department of Defense
endorsed U.S.–Pakistan Senior Officer Program, I developed longstanding relationships
with Pakistani military officers and government civilians involved with ongoing
countermilitancy operations. The program included a series of important strategy
conferences over the last several years between U.S. and Pakistani planners who were
engaged in actual operations. The study subjects were selected from former conference
participants. I had the privilege to engage in frank and open discussions concerning
ongoing countermilitancy operations in the Pakistani tribal areas. The conferences also
afforded access to planning discussions and operational documents not available to the
general public.
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Avoiding Bias in the Research
Moustakas (1994) emphasized the importance of establishing a comfortable
interview environment in a neutral venue to foster a candid and frank sharing of thoughts
and experiences. Conducting the research on secure military academic networks within
academia at the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia had many advantages.
Academia provided a neutral venue that promotes an open dialogue without the biases or
political constraints found within a national embassy, military operational headquarters,
or government ministry. Academia offered an environment that was conducive to the free
flow of information absent external political or military influence. The study includes
Pakistani perspectives with a measure of discretion and autonomy to protect the
participants from potential government retribution. The study was conducted within
academia that is protected by the principles of nonattribution and academic freedom.
Yin (2014) stressed the importance of maintaining an open mind to rival theories
and contrary evidence. As a researcher conducting a qualitative study, my role was to
suspend preconceived ideas or doctrinal tenets with respect to militancy. The study does
not favor a particular political stance between the Islamists and their government,
although a research objective was to reveal findings that may impact the social behavior
of violent Islamist militants. The study includes evidence that supports alternate theories
or opposes the mainstream narrative concerning countermilitancy operations. The risk of
partiality was minimized by suspending personal value judgments while gathering
information. Qu and Dumay (2011) cautioned researchers to guard against
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preconceptions and concentrate on the participants’ life experiences absent leading
questions. The study was designed with an open-ended questioning methodology that
afforded an opportunity to present contrary views.
Ensuring an Ethical Approach
Presenting perspectives of the predominantly Muslim Pakistanis through a
Christian or Western lens may be unjust and even unethical. To ensure an ethical and
moral approach, the study embodies the Pakistani view irrespective of politics or religion
by including a culturally diverse participant pool. The subjects represent an equitable
sampling of planning professionals from a religiously and tribally diverse cross-section of
Pakistani society. A diverse cadre interviewed on neutral ground within academia
minimized the likelihood of misrepresenting views in an unethical manner.
Methodology – Case Study Protocol
Participant Selection Logic
Garza (2011) suggested that the participants must have more than casual
knowledge or limited involvement with the phenomenon to fully benefit from their
experience; therefore, purposeful sampling was utilized. The participant pool included
Pakistani planners, both civilian and military, who actively participated in the planning of
Swat operations, for the expressed purpose of determining the most effective integration
of governance and military activities to subdue Islamist militancy. The participants were
selected based on their operational experiences, diversity in culture and military
background, and the government permission to access them.
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Sampling Strategy
A critical case sampling strategy within the purposive sampling construct
efficiently gathered information directly related to the operation. Patton (2002) asserted
that critical case sampling targets participants who are intimately familiar with the
phenomenon and are capable of providing the most detailed information on the research
topic. Patton also contends that the audience is an important factor in determining the
best sampling approach. The participant selection focused on a small cadre of Pakistani
professionals who were formerly engaged in the countermilitancy effort, and were
directly involved with the Swat campaign.
Creswell (2013) contended that a critical case typology facilitates a logical
generalization of a specific event that may be directly compared to other cases. Creswell
recommends sampling at least four or five “cases,” referring to individuals in this
context, for any given case study. Creswell also prefers diverse perspectives within the
small sample to employ some variation in data that upholds credibility and ensures that
contrary perspectives are represented. For these reasons, a sampling size of six
experienced Pakistani security professionals were interviewed. The comprehensive
knowledge, judgment, and experiences of this small selected sampling created an
information rich source of qualitative information.
Criterion for the Participant Pool
To include all the desired operational planning skill sets, the selectees included
one government civilian familiar with policy, two Pakistani military planners (one
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familiar with military operations and one with civil-military coordination), and three
military operators (one intelligence officer, one air operations officer, and one doctrine
expert) to gain a balanced perspective on how the operations were planned and executed.
The selection provided a balanced view of government policymaking, military planning,
and all-government execution, including civil-military collaboration. Since all
participants worked on the same operational plan, the balanced skill sets reached
saturation by assimilating their extensive operational experiences.
Procedure for Participant Recruitment and Assignment
To select the most qualified participants, the United States Office of Defense
Representative Pakistan (ODRP) in Islamabad was consulted. The office is a subordinate
military command to the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) and affiliated
with the United States Embassy in Pakistan. The ODRP addresses Pakistan’s militancy
issues with a cadre of security professionals to synchronize United States and Pakistan
operations, facilitate military sales, and coordinate humanitarian support. Access to the
participants was arranged as part of a USCENTCOM sponsored conference to promote a
collaborative dialogue among the joint planners. Within the pool of approximately 60
conference attendees within a three year range, six qualified respondents were screened
and selected.
Due to the political sensitivities between Pakistan and the United States,
interaction with the participants was structured by military liaison officers assigned to the
National Defense University. This approach had some distinct advantages. First, the
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conferences offered an efficient and convenient way to gain access to vetted participants
who have been officially sanctioned by the United States and Pakistan. Second, the Joint
Forces Staff College, as an academic institution, offers a neutral venue with adequate
communication equipment to provide a secure environment that promotes academic
freedom and an open exchange of ideas. Third, the researcher was an active participant in
the conferences, and therefore developed personal relationships with the Pakistani
contingent. Connecting with the Pakistanis over an extending period of time fostered a
more comfortable interview environment and promoted a frank exchange of ideas.
Qualitative Interview Protocol
A comfortable and neutral interview climate within academia maximized the free
exchange of ideas. The questions were predetermined and consistent with the research
themes and propositions while maintaining the option for additional questions to take full
advantage of their experiences (Oyegoke, 2011; Petty, Thomson, & Stew, 2012). The
semistructured interviews were conducted via secure audio-teleconference channels.
Testimony verification and follow-up questions were addressed by secure email. The
questions are presented in Appendix A. The interview duration was between 60 and 90
minutes consistent with interview protocol standards (Petty et al., 2012).
Subjects were briefed on the purpose and objectives of the study prior to
conducting the interviews. Subject credentials and experience were verified at the onset.
All participants were assured of nonattribution and provided an opportunity to either
consent or opt-out. Interviews were recorded (with interviewee permission) and verbatim
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transcripts produced for verification and analysis. The recordings were password
protected and secured under Department of Defense security protocols. To promote an
ethical approach, the participants were afforded an opportunity to review the transcripts
for accuracy of translation and intent (Osborne, 1994). All interview recordings,
transcripts, and correspondence are secured under lock and key.
Theoretical Propositions
Yin (2014) stated that theoretical propositions are derived from the theoretical
framework and will help define the appropriate data collection to assess the existing
theory. The study includes three theoretical propositions that are derived from the
theoretical framework. First, positive governance interactions integrated with protective
military activities create stability and trust between the government, the people, and the
military. Stability and trust, in turn, fosters government legitimacy. Second, trust in
government undermines the Islamist militant support base and empowers the mainstream
Islamabad government. Third, governance may enable or partially supplant military
operations in subduing the Islamist militancy. These propositions guided the
methodology design and shaped the data collection plan.
Data Collection Plan
Creswell (2013) described four main forms of information: survey or observation
information, public open source documents, interview transcripts, and multimedia
materials. The collection was comprised of three units of observation: interviews,
secondary source survey data to gain the perspectives of the Pashtun people, and official
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government artifacts of the operation. The design included analysis elements
characterized by the total system, intermediate units, and individuals (Yin, 2014). The
following sections describe the specific embedded units.
Embedded Unit of Analysis 1: The Swat Valley Operational Construct
The key chain of evidence for this embedded unit was linked to the strategic
planning of the operation in the context of the neo-Clausewitzian theoretical construct.
The total system for this embedded unit was the actual operational plan and associated
artifacts that are releasable to the public domain. The intermediate units include the
associated information plan and economic development plan. Documents are available in
the public record at http://www.pakistan.gov.pk. This internet source is the official
authoritative archive for the Pakistani government. The main instrument includes
researcher produced individual interviews by those who conducted the different facets of
governmental planning, both military and civilian.
Embedded Unit of Analysis 2: Government Policy and Activities
The key chain of evidence for this embedded unit was the implementation of the
operational plan and the compliance with elements of the neo-Clausewitzian theoretical
framework. The total system for this embedded unit was the executive decision-making
chain to execute the plan and the facts surrounding the activities on the ground. The
intermediate units include government archival directives and documentation, public
declarations, and open forum speeches. The documentation instruments for this
embedded unit were published official government memos, documents, minutes, and
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multimedia materials that describe the relevant policy actions and activities of the
Pakistan government. Government policy resources for a broad spectrum of governance
services were readily available on http://www.pakistan.gov.pk. Documents associated
with defense policy, strategic communications, Pashtun culture, and rule of law were
particularly insightful. The website represents the best information available from a
reputable open-source. The study includes additional operational source materials
obtained directly from the planners, and are not releasable to the public.
Additional demographic survey instruments were available on official
government open-source websites. The Government of Pakistan official population
census website provides germane demographic data at http://www.census.gov.pk. The
survey information was provided by the Population Census Organization, a department of
Pakistan’s government Statistics Division. This division is the official agency that is
chartered to plan and implement the population census and provide access to the
information for public use. The organization processes and disseminates data in the form
of regular census reports based on analysis of demographic information.
Embedded Unit of Analysis 3: Pakistani Perspectives
The key chain of evidence for this embedded unit were the popular perceptions of
governance. The study revealed the popular support for the mainstream government and
the linkage to militant freedom of maneuver. The total system for this unit includes
Swati-Pashtun perspectives of the government plan and associated activities. Direct
access to the Pashtun or the militants was problematic, but survey information was
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readily available. The intermediate units were restricted to secondary source survey data.
Reputable survey instruments employed by internationally recognized survey
organizations were available on open source websites.
Secondary source survey instrument: Pashtun popular sentiment. The New
American Foundation (NAF) provided comprehensive survey data and agency-specific
analysis from regional experts with interview data from Khyber residents conducted
before, during, and after the Swat operations. New America monitored the effect of drone
strikes and conducted extensive research on Islamist militancy, written by recognized
regional experts. The surveys were conducted by the NAF, with field support provided by
the Community Appraisal & Motivation Program (CAMP). Respondents were selected
using a multistage random stratified sampling methodology. The surveys involved over
1,000 Pakistanis, conducted by professional interviewers and field supervisors.
Secondary source survey instrument: Swati perspectives. Popular perspectives
on the Swat Valley conflict, compiled into survey information, was available at the
World Public Opinion (WPO) website. WPO was a collaborative project comprised of a
consortium of reputable international research centers that voice public views from across
the globe. The surveys revealed popular sentiments during the Swat Valley operations
(Fair, 2009; Ramsay, Kull, Weber, & Lewis, 2009). Professional survey experts from
Socioeconomic Development Consultants, Islamabad, conducted numerous surveys in the
native languages. The surveys were oversampled, and the results were weighted to reflect
actual religious and cultural proportions.

89
Secondary source survey instrument: Pakistani public opinion at large. The
International Republican Institute (IRI) provided public perspectives and surveys on the
Swat Valley conflict. Two surveys of special interest were conducted, one before and one
after the Swat Valley operation. These surveys were particularly useful in analyzing the
real impact of the government actions. The IRI methodology consisted of interviews
conducted by professional consultants. To establish content validity, a multistage
probability sample was used and the Kish selection method was applied. In addition,
Gallup conducted a study through their Abu Dhabi Gallup Center that included 10,139
Pakistani adults from diverse cultural and religious backgrounds. This survey provided
insights into popular in government confidence during the Swat campaign.
Secondary source survey instrument: Islamist militant perspectives. The Pew
Research Center provided information on Pashtun surveys conducted on the topic of Swat
operations. The Center’s Global Attitudes project explored international public opinion
on a broad range of topics from individual assessments of their own lives to views about
governance and the geopolitics. Pew used Crimson Hexagon statistics technology and
computer coding to establish content validity.
Data Analysis and Interpretation Plan
My qualitative information analysis included a content analysis flow and
program-level linear analytical model (Appendix B) to assess the relevant data. Patton
(2002) described data analysis as clarifying what is most important to the study if we had
only understood the information beforehand. The model provided a precise analysis
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framework that directly follows the planning process. Yin (2014) explained how a
modeling technique operationalizes a complex chain of events over a period of time: a
perfect tool to assess the Swat case. The model is designed to assess real world contextual
conditions that describe the inherent problem of Islamic militancy, and the rival
interventions that challenge the theoretical construct. The model was a useful research
tool to match empirically observed activities to theoretically predicted events.
Application of Manual Coding
Babbie (2004) asserted that the fundamental process for analyzing qualitative
research is categorizing and coding the plethora of information in a logical and useful
way. To accomplish this, the data were organized and coded manually using Microsoft
Excel to bin the information within the modeling construct. Axial coding was applied to
deductively determine content identifiers based upon the neo-Clausewitzian theoretical
tenets. The interviews were coded with respect to the political, social, or operational
attributes relevant to the case. Additional codes were derived inductively through
selective coding to identify preeminent codes relevant to civil-military planning. Data
analysis revealed correlations between governance, military operations, and militancy.
Quality of Research Design and Trustworthiness
Credibility (Construct and Internal Validity)
Data triangulation from the testimony of knowledgeable participants, official
documentation, and secondary source survey data were my primary method to achieve
credibility. Patton (2002) asserted that triangulation may be used to discover a deeper
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meaning of the information and may uncover discrepant information. Thurmond (2001)
explained that, “the benefits of triangulation include increasing confidence in research
data, creating innovative ways of understanding a phenomenon, revealing unique
findings, challenging or integrating theories, and providing a clearer understanding of the
problem” (p. 254). The case method inherently applies methodological triangulation to
merge multiple sources data into coherent chains of evidence (Yin, 2014). Chains of
evidence based on upon an operational set of measures within a linear logic model dispels
the critique that a qualitative approach tends to reflect a researcher’s opinion.
Achieving data saturation enhanced credibility. Saturation defines the point at
which additional information collection was not anticipated to provide additional
evidence or insights (Suri, 2011). The saturation level for this study was linked to a
purposive sampling of planners with a detailed knowledge of the operation. With
semistructured interviews, Suri explains that data saturation is achievable with a small
sampling. My interview sample size of six knowledgeable and reputable participants,
who worked on the integrated plan, reached data saturation. The study explored all
aspects of the theory, with no known gaps or unexplained parts of the militancy
phenomenon.
Transferability (External Validity)
The implementation of governance in the Pakistan case is transferable to the
global militancy problem. Transferability relies on a strong correlation between the
empirical data and associated themes, the research question, and the theoretical construct
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(Chenail, 2011). The study includes a linear logic analysis model derived from the
theoretical construct. The model promotes external validity by organizing the data along
global militancy themes and internationally recognized doctrinal tenets. Also, the
literature review was pursued within a global context that merged the testimony of
Pakistani regional experts with global experts.
Confirmability and Dependability (Reliability)
Stringent compliance with the information collection methodology and
development of a transparent audit trail enhanced confirmability (Petty et al., 2012).
Reliability was further enhanced by the strict adherence to the interview protocol. The
protocol leveraged the strength of a semistructured questioning methodology that
promoted information consistency (Hanson, Balmer, & Giardino, 2011). The structured
protocol combined with a model analysis framework allows researchers to replicate my
analysis processes and procedures. Dependability was strengthened by a secure data
collection protocol that is auditable by researchers in the field (Hanson et al., 2011; Petty
et al., 2012). These measures combined fostered a data collection process that is
transparent and verifiable.
Ethical Considerations and Human Subject Protection
The subjects were protected by safeguarding their identities in a nonattribution
forum. Israel and Hay (2006) emphasized the importance of developing a trust by
guarding against misconduct and impropriety that would impugn the integrity of the
research or reflect poorly upon the institution. The political situation in Pakistan was
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tenuous and their relationship with the United States was volatile, so the Pakistanis who
participated were vulnerable to political pressure. To mitigate undue influence, informed
consent was obtained and confidentiality guarded in accordance with National Research
Council (2013) guidelines. Study participation was voluntary and interviewees could optout at any point. All participants were informed of the study objective and there was no
obligation to complete the interview after commencement. The identities and information
provided by the respondents is nonattribution and is safeguarded. Personal information
was not directly or indirectly attributable to a specific participant. In addition, names and
personal information are not included in the study.
Authority to access Pakistani participants was obtained from the appropriate
United States and Pakistan government officials. Furthermore, Walden University’s
Institutional Review Board (IRB) granted study approval; reference number 03-18-150225369. A letter of cooperation from the Office of the Defense Representative in
Pakistan authorized access to United States and Pakistan government representatives in
direct support of this specific study. USCENTCOM delegated the authority to conduct
the U.S.-Pakistan Senior Officers program to the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk,
VA. The charter of the program is to build relationships, and this study was a natural
extension of the program charter to codify the operational lessons.
Due to the political nature of the topic, the identity of the participants will not be
published. The subjects’ identities will remain confidential and their privacy will be
protected. The Joint Forces Staff College is located on a secure military installation that
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provides a safe and secure environment, protected by the Norfolk Naval Support Activity
security infrastructure. Since the study was authorized in conjunction with a government
sanctioned conference, there was little risk of a political influence. Interview data were
personally transcribed and secured in a safe that restricts access to only the researcher. To
ensure confidentiality, the raw data will be destroyed by shredding after a period of 10
years following the study.
Summary
The study exposed the facts and realities concerning the implementation of
governance to subdue Islamist militancy in Pakistan’s Khyber Province. The single-case
design was bounded by time and space, focusing on the successful 2009 Swat operation
codenamed Rah-e-Rast. The research design applies a neo-Clausewitzian warfare
theoretical lens to assess the social environment and evaluate the implementation of
governance to counter Islamist inspired violence. Islamic extremism is multifaceted, so
multiple qualitative data sources were needed to validate the theoretical construct.
Stringent adherence to the case study methodology promoted transferability to the
macro militancy problem. The interpretive inquiry of six Pakistani planners was
supported by empirical evidence derived from official documents that included
operational metrics. A strict data collection protocol protected the participants, avoided
the injection of biases, and built an auditable data trail that other researchers may easily
access and review. The study includes a program-level linear analytical model to
determine the nexus between governance and military activity in the countermilitancy
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campaign. The study promotes social change by offering improved processes to integrate
governance in a real-world countermilitancy operations. The new knowledge obtained,
potentially codified in doctrine, may lead to a better strategy in addressing the global
Islamist phenomenon. The lessons from the Pakistan experience in Swat may have a
direct impact on how modern nations approach the global militancy threat.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
This qualitative research revealed the facts and circumstances related to the
implementation of governance during the 2009 countermilitancy operations within
Khyber Province. In this chapter, I present the testimony of six operational planners using
a critical case sampling construct to assess the impacts of governance on Islamist inspired
militancy in the Swat Valley. The participants were familiar with the design of the
Pakistani countermilitancy campaign and were selected for the sole purpose of providing
descriptive information concerning the planning effort.
Data collection and analysis included three units of observation: semistructured
interviews of selected respondents, secondary source survey data to gain Pakistani
perspectives, and official government artifacts of the Swat operation. Progressive axial
and selective coding schemes organized and validated the data through methodological
triangulation. The study includes a qualitative content analysis flow model to
conceptualize themes and analyze the data through a countermilitancy theoretical lens.
The findings are organized by themes, germane to the research question and the
theoretical propositions.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of the study was to determine the most effective integration of
governance and military activities to subdue Islamist militancy. The research objective is
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to promote social change by contributing to the understanding of Islamist militancy and
reveal findings that impact countermilitancy planning and policymaking processes.
Research Question
During the implementation of Pakistan’s countermilitancy campaign in Swat
Valley in the Malakand Division of Khyber Province, how were governance activities
integrated with military operations to subdue Islamist militancy?
Setting
The study includes interviews from six Pakistani countermilitancy professionals
who met the study selection criteria. All respondents were familiar with the planning and
implementation of the 2009 Swat operation, codenamed Rah-e-Rast. The participants
were involved in an ongoing dialogue with U.S. military planners concerning operations
in the South Asia region. A stringent participant verification process and interview
protocol was applied. The testimony revealed diverse perspectives concerning Pakistani
national policy objectives, leadership guidance, operational planning processes and
barriers, and civil-military coordination successes and failures.
Participants were informed about the purpose and objective of the study and its
intended use. Each respondent was afforded an opportunity to verify the data and review
the preliminary study results. Informed consent was achieved with each participant.
Semistructured interviews were conducted using protected audio teleconferencing
capability to maximize privacy and security and government security protocols were
applied to protect information storage. Interviews were conducted on encrypted audio
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networks, and the recordings are kept in a secure location with limited distribution. The
transcripts are available for review without restrictions. Archived transcripts are not
attributed to any named participant and may be publicly released. None of the
respondents expressed a concern about the release of information or their participation.
Demographics
The participants consisted of knowledgeable experts familiar with Rah-e-Rast.
They possessed the desired operational planning skill sets typical of a joint civil-military
planning group. Each respondent was assigned a code based on the person’s occupation
and experience, and the rest of the report refers to each of them by the assigned code. The
participant codes are as follows:
MILA1 – Pakistani military air operations officer
MILO2 – Pakistani military operational planner
MILI3 – Pakistani military intelligence expert
MILN4 – Pakistani military civil-military coordination expert
MILO5 – Pakistani military educator and countermilitancy doctrinal expert
CIV6 – Pakistani civilian national security professional and policy advisor
The participant pool was reflective of the religious and tribal diversity of the
general Pakistani population. The pool included three respondents from the Punjab
province, one from Karachi in the province Sindh, one from the Kashmir region, and one
Pashtun from the Malakand Division. The diversity in representation provided a balanced
view of government policymaking, military planning, and the interministry execution.
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The balance and breadth of skill sets in the participant pool was representative of
practitioners in the field who plan civil-military operations.
Data Collection and Flow
The study includes data relevant to the Rah-e-Rast operational case. The interview
protocol was consistently applied with no exceptions, and there were no unusual
circumstances or deviations from the plan presented in Chapter 3. Data were analyzed
using the qualitative content analysis flow model shown in Figure 1. The flow provided a
directed comparative analysis to link theory and the research question directly to results.
Krippendorff (2013) asserted that a qualitative content analysis flow is a valid and
replicable method for making inferences from qualitative source information.
Research Question
Based on Neo-Clausewitzian Theoretical Foundation
Development of Conceptual Themes
Based on Theoretical Propositions
Develop Linear Analytical Model (Appendix B)
Based on Current Joint Operational Planning Process
Organize Data by Themes Embedded in the Model
Coded Transcripts and Survey Data
Verification of the Qualitative Data
Triangulation of Data between Transcripts, Government Artifacts, and
Surveys
Interpretations of the Qualitative Data
Assess Governance Integration with Military Operations
Interpretations of the Results
Determine Process Impact Findings Relevant to Civil-Military
Integration
Interpretations of the Findings
Findings Linked to the Research Question
Conclusions
Civil-Military Planning Process Improvement Recommendations

Figure 1. Qualitative content flow model.
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Development of Conceptual Themes
The conceptual themes were derived from the theoretical propositions that follow
the civil-military planning process. Pakistan’s planning process was aligned with military
decision making, called the joint operational planning process in military doctrine (U.S.
Department of Defense, 2013). A progressive coding process was applied: axial coding,
to inductively formulate conceptual themes and selective coding to determine the most
important content identifiers germane to the integration of governance and military
operations. Pakistani perspectives were additionally role-time matrixed to assess shifting
views over time. The conceptual themes and content identifiers are shown in Table 1.
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Table 1
Conceptual Themes and Content Identifiers
Conceptual theme

Content identifiers in the scripts

National policy objectives

Cultural values, social justice, end-state, effects,
objectives, and reform.

Strategy and doctrine

Strategy, doctrine, governance, writ, rights, legitimacy,
and root causes.

Military operational
planning

Defense, militancy, security, sovereignty, threat, and
internally displaced persons.

Information planning

Information, public affairs, messaging, media,
dialogue, reconciliation, and madrassa.

Civil-military planning

Social reform, culture, root grievances, education, rule
of law, and civil-military.

Rival interventions

Culture, foreigners, United States, immigrants, and AlQaeda

Pakistani perspectives

Militant support, Government support, Army support,
trust, confidence

Data Analysis and Interpretation
The linear analytical model shown in Appendix B provided a prestructured
sequential analysis framework (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The model proved valuable in
coding the data logically and sequentially through the planning process. The framework
facilitated the data analysis from a naturalistic approach to validate the countermilitancy
approach. The analytical model enabled the development of assessment standards for
replication and application to other contingencies (Stake, 2010). Data collection and
interpretation included only the civil-military aspects of the planning process that dealt
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directly with the research question and did not fully explore all military operational
planning aspects.
The analytical model provided a coherent and repeatable means to assess the
effectiveness of the planning process. The results closely follow the thoughts and actions
of the six planners who translated national policy guidance into a multiministry action
plan that was synchronized with the military effort. The analysis started with an
assessment of the national policy guidance, including the planner’s interpretation of
national policy and their analysis of the social environment. The analysis then shifted to
the staff estimates of the threat situation and the associated civil-military activities. This
phase of analysis focused on the integration of governance with military activities.
Evidence of Trustworthiness
Use and validation of the analytical model framework and the naturalistic
generalization analysis approach promoted trustworthiness.
Credibility (Construct and Internal Validity)
The case study method inherently applies methodological triangulation to merge
multiple sources of evidence into coherent chains of evidence (Yin, 2014). Data
triangulation from the testimony of knowledgeable participants, official government
documentation, and Pakistani secondary source surveys was accomplished through the
coding and modeling flow shown in Figure 1. A linear analytical model (Appendix B) is
embedded in the flow to enhance credibility by providing a systematic framework that is
repeatable and verifiable.
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Data saturation further reassured the reliability of the data. The saturation level
was linked to a representative and purposive sampling of planners with an in-depth
knowledge of the operation and who were immersed in the same planning effort. With
purposive sampling and comprehensive interviews, data saturation was achieved with a
small sampling of six planners who were directly involved in the integrated plan.
Transferability (External Validity)
The analytical model promotes transferability to the global Islamist problem by
organizing the data and conducting analysis along international militancy themes and
universal doctrinal tenets. The model focuses on process rather than content or actions, so
the model methodology may be readily applied to other countermilitancy planning
contingencies. The literature review was written within a global context and the model
provides a framework that facilitates a worldwide peer review.
Confirmability and Dependability (Reliability)
The participants were vetted and selected in a collaborative effort between the
Pakistan Embassy in Washington, the Pakistani military, Office of the U.S. Defense
Representative in Pakistan, and me. Their reputations are impeccable and the reliability
of their testimony was enhanced by a strict adherence to the interview protocol. The
protocol leveraged the strength of a semistructured questioning methodology that
promoted data consistency and a depth of exploration with probing follow-up questions
(Hanson et al., 2011). The stringent interview protocol, qualitative content flow, and
systematic analytical framework enable other researchers to follow the same study
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methodology and facilitates their ability to confirm the results. Confirmability was
bolstered by archiving verbatim transcripts and coded spreadsheets based on propositions
derived from the literature review (Petty et al., 2012). Verbatim transcripts provide
quality objective evidence for independent confirmation.
Swat Valley Case Study Overview
In 2009, the stability of Pakistan was significantly threatened by the deteriorating
security situation in the Khyber Province. The Swat Valley within the Malakand Division
became the focus of Pakistan’s struggle against Islamist inspired militancy. The regional
terrorist group, Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), and elements of the
broader Pakistani Taliban group, Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP), converged in the Swat Valley
and collaborated with religious extremist elements to exert political influence through
intimidation and violence. The Taliban goal was to supplant regional civil authorities and
institute Sharia law in keeping with their radical worldview.
The militants openly showed contempt for the Pakistani Constitution and directly
challenged government authority by gaining complete political and social control of the
Swati Pashtun. The militants called for the overthrow of the Pakistani government and
the imposition of Sharia law under their terms. Violence in the region erupted between
the militants, the police constabulary, and the tribesmen who resisted the Taliban
authority. The Pakistani military attempted to augment the regional police, but the
militant infiltration was overwhelming. The Pakistani Army reported 142 soldiers and
230 security personnel killed from August 2008 to December 2008 (Pakistan Operations
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in PATA and SWAT, 2009). One participant reported that the military was losing more
soldiers to violence per day that in any other period in the decade long campaign. By
April 2009, the militants had control over most of the Malakand region. The international
media portrayed the Taliban encroachment as a direct threat to the national capital of
Islamabad. The Taliban-led insurgency had the initiative and the Swatis began a period of
enormous deprivation, persecution, and suffering.
The escalating violence triggered an unprecedented national response, supported
by a rare all-party political consensus, to subdue the militant violence and reestablish the
provincial government authority. Pakistani religious leaders from all denominations
united against the violence that was inspired by a rogue Islamist faction. After a collapse
of government negotiations concerning the implementation of Sharia, the militants
launched a brutal offensive against government officials, security forces, educators, and
the media. They engaged in violent demonstrations, launched suicide attacks against
innocents, and destroyed government property. The Taliban banned the media and killed
several reporters. Many foreign aid workers were kidnapped or killed. Militants targeted
hotels and restaurants, police stations, intelligence agencies, and military check points.
Popular support for government intervention grew as the violence escalated. During this
period, the International Republican Institute (2009) reported that the concern among the
general population of Islamist militancy reached a three-year peak at over 74%.
Islamabad responded with an aggressive national countermilitancy operation
named Rah-e-Rast or Right Path to restore order and reassert the writ of government in
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the Swat. With widespread support from the Parliament and the populace, the Pakistani
Army reasserted the government authority and subdued militant violence throughout the
region. Within eleven weeks (April 26, 2009 – July 15, 2009), Pakistani forces regained
control of the Swat Valley and killed or captured over 1700 militants, dismantled their
support network, eliminated their camps and sanctuaries, and recovered huge weapon
caches. However, the fighting displaced over two million Swatis.
The military operation created a humanitarian crisis not seen since the mass
exodus experienced during the partition of India in 1947. Care and protection of the
displaced persons overwhelmed national resources, but multiministry collaboration and
coordination showed promise and ultimately the ministries provided sufficient life
services. On June 12, 2009, President Asif Ali Zardari announced victory and ordered a
military cantonment (garrison) to foster an enduring popular trust and confidence in
government at all levels. Rah-e-Rast represents a key milestone in the continuum of
countermilitancy operations that showcases the planning nexus between governance and
military action.
The Rah-e-Rast operation provides an ideal case to achieve the study purpose: to
determine the most effective integration of governance to subdue Islamist militancy by
analyzing the Pakistani operational planning process. The planning and implementation
of the operation occurred at a critical juncture, representing a pivotal swing in strategy
from a military dominant antiterrorism approach to an interministry counterinsurgency
approach. Pakistan’s new strategy embraced many of the doctrinal elements of the neo-
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Clausewitzian theoretical construct, and shaped the associated civil-military planning
process as a component of the overall military planning effort.
Case Study Results
Introduction
The results answer the research question; how were governance activities
integrated with military operations during the implementation of Operation Rah-e-Rast?
Tables 2 through 15 provide a synopsis of the participants’ perspectives and approaches
to key governance attributes, expressed in contextual themes, and assessed through an
analytical framework. The tables document first-hand insights into the planning process:
factors considered, approaches applied, and barriers encountered. The participants also
describe planning successes, shortcomings, and failures.
The results section begins with the participants’ interpretations of the national
policy and guidance concerning the operation. These interpretations are reflected in the
planning approaches pursued by each participant. Individual approaches often differed
based on personal biases and experiences. The participants’ assessments of the real world
contextual environment provides insights into planning priorities—or lack thereof—and
the adequacy of the process to identify the most important governance activities to apply.
Results of the integration of governance within the operation are described in detail to
determine if the planning process efficiently and effectively achieved the right balance to
achieve success. The last three sections focus on the postconflict planning effort to
resettle, reintegrate, and reconcile with the Swatis and foster an enduring peace. In
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summary, the results section follows the planning process from inception, through the
military operations phase, culminating with the postconflict stabilization period.
Pakistani Governance Policy
Government documentary evidence reaffirms that the Pakistani government
considered the deteriorating security situation in the Swat Valley as a significant threat to
the State. Pakistan’s 13th National Assembly of Parliament (2008) convened an All
Parties Conference (APC) in October 2008 to address the immediacy of the rising
violence in Swat. The APC, in a rare display of multiparty solidarity, issued a consensus
resolution that was adopted on May 19, 2009. The resolution stated that militancy and the
manifestations of terrorism posed a grave danger to the stability and integrity of the
Pakistani nation-state. The APC avowed that Pakistan stands united against any militant
incursions of the Malakand, and called upon all government ministries and the military to
immediately address the threat (Haq & Malik, 2009).
The resolution provided the operational framework for planning Rah-e-Rast. The
national policy objectives were to subdue violence, discredit the Taliban influence with
the Swatis, and regain the writ of the State. Specific tasks included the re-establishment
of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, restoration of peace, rehabilitation of
internally displaced persons, and implementation of economic development. The
objectives were consistent with Pakistan’s overarching countermilitancy strategy to
alleviate root grievances stemming from poverty and widespread unemployment
(Pakistan Strategy for Countermilitancy, 2009). Pakistani policymakers envisioned a
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collaborative approach by the Foreign, Defense, and Interior Ministries to lead an
interministry effort to decisively combat Islamist militancy and counter extremist
ideology.
National planning guidance. The National Assembly Standing Committee of
Defense provided strategic guidance and oversight for the operation. The
countermilitancy strategy evolved to what planners commonly refer to as a 3-D approach
of deterrence, development, and dialogue. Pakistan Operations in PATA and SWAT
(2009), a key planning directive, describes the convergence of military and political
components to subdue and deter violence, conduct economic development, and establish
a meaningful dialogue with the militants. At the provincial level, Pakistan Government of
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (2010) reaffirmed that all elements of national power, political,
socioeconomic, and military may be applied to eliminate the Taliban menace.
The Defense Committee was successful in gaining broad political support for the
operation, and emphasized the importance of sustaining popular support of the military
during the campaign. To achieve this, all participants recognized the importance of the
provincial government to be synchronized with the national effort to fully support the
aggressive military maneuver against the Taliban. Table 2 provides a synopsis of the
participants’ perspectives on the overarching planning construct for Operation Rah-eRast. The data were derived from interview Question 2: What was your overarching
national policy guidance? A follow-up question was included in the analysis: How was
policy guidance integrated into the campaign plan?
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Table 2
Interpretations of the National Planning Guidance
Participant

Interpretations of operation Rah-e-Rast planning guidance

MILA1

Promote District governance and reassert the writ of the State by
reinstating the traditional tribal hierarchy, establishing the rule of
law, and empowering the elders with resources.

MILO2

Reconnect Swatis to the government by protecting them, then show
immediate signs of social investment. Launch an evenhanded
military operation and regain popular confidence through
development.

MILI3

Disperse the militants and separate them from the population, then
re-establish a legitimate local authority. Employ a divide and rule
approach to win hearts and minds with a hybrid strategy to
integrate the military campaign with the political dimension.

MILN4

Conduct a comprehensive civil-military effort to contain the
insurgency and address the root causes of militancy. Efforts to be
coordinated functionally through political, economic, security,
information, funding, and transnational dynamics.

MILO5

Multiministry effort with a sustained military engagement
supported by strategic messaging. Convince Swatis that it is better
to a loyal subject than to support militants.

CIV6

Apply political measures that foster a meaningful dialogue with
the Swatis, supported by real socioeconomic development.
Promote an enduring confidence in the local civil administration.

National guidance finding. All planners understood the National Assembly
policy directive and strategic framework, but their approaches varied based on individual
biases and different policy interpretations. The planning process did not adequately
translate national policy to specific governance tasks or activities.
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All participants understood the concept of a multiministry approach; however, the
priorities and methods to develop a joint action plan were left to the discretion of the
planners. Some respondents focused on district level actions and politics while others
approached the problem from a national perspective. Some planners stressed the
importance of governance and others focused on improving national institutions. The
interpretation differences were largely due to a lack of governance priorities, and a varied
perspective on the most significant social problems. At the onset of planning, the causes
of militancy were conjecture, and the activities to address grievances were merely
anecdotal. Consistent with current planning doctrine, a comprehensive study of the social
environment was necessary to gain a common understanding of the militancy problem.
Operational approaches and methodology. The planners’ assessment of the
Swati social conditions revealed that planning was focused on protecting the population,
building trust and confidence in government, reforming the legal system from detention
to prosecution, and investing in economic development. The planning challenge was to
prioritize potential activities and determine the best value in terms of time and money,
and both were limited. Table 3 provides a synopsis of the approaches and priorities of
each respondent as they commenced detailed operational planning. The data were derived
from interview Question 7: What was your involvement with and perspective on the joint
civil-military planning process?
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Table 3
Perspectives on the Operational Planning Approach
Participant

Operational approach

Planning priority

MILA1

Collaborative multiministry
approach with strategic
patience to influence social
environment.

Foster relationships and build
confidence with elders and create
progovernment militias that deter
violence.

MILO2

Countermilitancy approach
(focusing on people) through a
sustained multiministry
campaign.

Use military and police to set the
security conditions for social
reform and investment.

MILI3

Hybrid civil-military approach
to disperse militants by
isolating them politically, then
reconnect with tribes.

Re-establish the rule of law, and
win support through a military
campaign supported by strategic
communications.

MILN4

Comprehensive civil-military
effort to contain the violence
and address the root causes of
militancy.

Coordinate within ministries to
apply political, economic,
security, information, funding,
and transnational dynamics.

MILO5

Comprehensive interministry
response across all agencies
supported by the international
community.

Seal borders with international
help, contain and crush the
militants, and protect the people.
Conduct economic development
to regain popular support.

CIV6

Apply soft power (diplomacy
and political reform).

Focus on Pashtun culture
(Paktunwali) to devise activities
that resonate with the people.

Operational approach finding. The government policy to apply a civil-military
approach that included all ministries was understood, but each respondent had a different
view on ministry roles, responsibilities, and priorities. The government had no formal
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venue or forum to plan or coordinate interministry activities. A comprehensive analysis
of the social environment was necessary to determine ministry priorities and coordinate
government capabilities within a fiscally constrained environment.
The participants had significantly different perspectives on how to implement the
civil-military approach. Each participant stressed the importance of connecting with the
Pashtun people; however, the precise role of each ministry working in coordination with
the military was not clear. Some respondents focused on establishing physical security,
such as border security, while others focused on institutional reforms to gain a public
trust. Other participants placed a greater emphasis on diplomacy and public affairs while
others focused on infrastructure development.
The respondents unanimously agreed that a synergy could be achieved with a
balanced civil-military effort. Each participant realized that the problem required the
conduct of both military and governance activities to destroy the militants and regain a
public trust. Most respondents conceded that a further exploration and understanding of
the social environment was warranted. A comprehensive social assessment would reveal
the actual contextual conditions that would drive the planning process.
Real World Contextual Conditions
The government initiated Rah-e-Rast operational planning within weeks of the
conclusion of the National Assembly’s All Parties Conference in October 2008. During
the initial planning, the participants received daily reports of escalating militant violence.
Militants raided coalition convoys and marauded check points. Suicide bombers, inspired
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by religious zealots, killed hundreds of soldiers, police, and innocent bystanders. The
participants explained that the violence created an urgency to quickly plan an aggressive
move in the Swat. Planners had little time to frame the problem during this phase.
The planners quickly, albeit methodically, assessed the social environment in the
Swat District. Planners needed a comprehensive analysis to outline the root causes of
government dissatisfaction. Each respondent reviewed the social conditions to gain a
deeper understanding of the most pressing problems. Axial coding of the interview data
revealed that the Swati social problems were framed within five themes that link directly
to grievances: a predominant mistrust of government, a dangerous security environment,
a malicious radical ideology, a lawless society and unfair judicial system, and widespread
social injustice. All participants recognized the importance of establishing priorities
within these themes to properly allocate limited fiscal resources and manpower to achieve
the greatest political and social gains.
Government trust deficit. The Pakistani National Assembly (2009) reaffirmed
that the state shall reestablish its authority by instituting confidence building mechanisms
with customary communities, such as the elder council or jirga. Pakistan SWAT
Campaign Strategy (2011) also characterized government legitimacy as a major policy
objective. These directives were consistent with the neo-Clausewitzian theoretical
construct that emphasizes a strong relationship between the people and their government
to mitigate the influence of radical elements. The planners understood that the Taliban
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effectively exploited government weaknesses to exert their influence, and saw an
opportunity to reverse the trend.
The participants sought to identify institutional weaknesses that could be bolstered
to gain favor with the Swatis. In May 2009, the Pakistani Minister of Defense conceded
that militant antistate activities were paralyzing the civil authorities in Swat. Gallup Poll
(2011) survey of June 2008 supports this assertion by reporting a three year low of only
33% public confidence in government. The lack of Swati trust in government was
indisputable; however, there were notable differences in interpretation concerning the
aspects of governance that would regain trust. Table 4 describes the participants’
interpretations of the trust deficit and their considerations in planning governance
activities to promote trust. The data were derived from the responses to interview
Question 3: Please share your views on the causes and effects of the Islamist militancy
problem.
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Table 4
Perspectives on the Popular Trust Deficit With Government
Participant

Causes of trust deficit

Planning considerations

MILA1

Government not providing
security and quality of life is
below national standards.

Complement military capabilities with
economic strength to protect and
provide for the people.

MILO2

Destitute and illegitimate
government with history of
broken promises…and unequal
distribution of assistance.

Conduct political reform to eliminate
corrupt system and gain an allegiance
through military enabled economic
development.

MILI3

Political parties were
disorganized and corrupted by
family oligarchies who seek
power without purpose.

Offer Pashtun representation and
participation in governance.
Devolution of government to empower
provincial and local authorities.

MILN4

Poor quality of life, lack of
security and legitimacy due to
disenfranchised tribal elders.

Protect and resettle the internally
displaced people. Promote political
legitimacy through tribal jirgas.

MILO5

Poor governance. Institutional
neglect empower the Taliban.
Passive Pashtun were
disenfranchised.

Form an inclusive government and
counter the militant call for jihad.
Improve Pashtun quality of life to
prove a viable alternative.

CIV6

No popular confidence in
security forces or the civil
administration.

Restore popular trust in security
forces by reforming security teams.

Trust in government finding. The planning process adequately identified causes
of popular mistrust in government, but the planning protocol was insufficient to develop a
coherent confidence building strategy. Political corruption and popular
disenfranchisement were identified as major grievances, but the participants differed on
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the manifestation of these issues. Some respondents suggested that an inept and
untrustworthy government created a leadership void for the militants to assume, while
others believed that it promoted social instability that encouraged violence. The
difference in perceptions would lead to differing governance solutions, and the planning
process did not sufficiently link potential solutions with root causes.
Most respondents suggested that the political mistrust was systemic and a
significant barrier to reassert national authority in the region. Some participants favored
economic investment, while others pursued legal or political reform. All agreed that
stemming political corruption would foster trust, but only if it resulted in positive social
change and real development within the villages, and this would take time to achieve.
The participants generally understood that pursuing government reform to bridge the trust
deficit, such as eliminating corruption or offering inclusive representation, required a
long-term strategy beyond the scope of the forthcoming operation. Therefore, most of the
planning effort focused on regaining confidence at the District level by reestablishing the
traditional tribal jirga system and affording the Swatis a voice in government.
The Taliban’s brutal methods of governing and draconian enforcement of Sharia
law offered a strategic opportunity. During the time of the operation, despite the
widespread mistrust of politicians, a World Public Opinion survey reported that 70 % of
Swatis preferred national government, and only 5% preferred the Taliban (World Public
Opinion in Ramsay, Kull, Weber, & Lewis, 2009). The planners leveraged the Swati
cynicism toward the Taliban by devising actions that offered immediate protection from
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their brutality. This included a greater presence of police and military security forces and
the temporary resettlement of the people in well-resourced displacement camps until the
operation was completed. Offering the Swatis a measure of near-term security would go
far to pull them away from the militants.
Security environment. In April, 2009, a vicious cycle of violence ensued in the
Swat Valley after the collapse of the government negotiations with the militants. The
Taliban began a spree of criminal activities, such as stealing livestock, berating men
without beards, and impressing teen males into their ranks. They also stole vehicles
belonging to government officials and ransacked the offices of local nongovernment
organizations. Police withdrew to their stations, and the militants began patrolling the
villages to assert their authority and enforce Sharia law. In response, government troops
in and around the Malakand poised for a major offensive. New American Foundation in
Tankel (2010) reported that 69% of the tribesmen perceived a lack of security as the most
important factor in undermining government authority.
In contemporary doctrine, establishing a safe and secure environment is a vital
precondition to exercising any governance activities. Interministry efforts and activities
can only be pursued and sustained in a relatively benign environment. Pakistan 13th
National Assembly of Parliament (2008) reaffirmed that the safety of civilians was
paramount and operations may include provisions to minimize harm to the noncombatant
population. Table 5 provides a synopsis of the participants’ perspectives on the security
situation prior to operations and the linkage of violence to the planning effort. This data
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were derived from Interview Question 4: How did you coordinate the government’s civilmilitary ability to counter militants operating in Swat Valley?
Table 5
Perspectives on the Swat Valley Security Situation
Participant

Security Situation

Planning Considerations

MILA1

Lack of security. Tribesmen
traumatized by militant intimidation
by illegally occupying government
buildings…and attacking police.

Coordinate police constabulary
and military effort to prevent
innocent deaths and protect
schools.

MILO2

Persistent violence created social
instability and a psychological
strain. People suffering from trauma
– most pronounced with children.

Establish secure environment
with capable security teams and
provide adequate healthcare
resources to reduce stress.

MILI3

Militants rendered government
ineffective by intimidating or killing
elders and threatening politicians.
Warlords escalate violence to divide
the tribal hierarchy.

Reduce fear among public to
disable the militant authority.
Reinvigorate local administrative
structure and government
institutions.

MILN4

People grieving the martyrdom of
security personnel and family.
Maintaining the safety and security
of civilians is the first priority.

Protect the people and eliminate
militant infrastructure and
leadership before pursuing
economic development.

MILO5

Militants pursued targeted killings,
the destruction of government
buildings, and attacks on police
posts. Islamabad responded with
massive bombing and shelling that
posed a risk in itself.

Change perceptions. People were
torn. Brutal militant actions
generate resentment and
disproportionate government
actions portray military as an
occupier rather than protector.

CIV6

Militant brutality and coercion
against innocents was significant,
but Swatis were disenchanted with
the Taliban because of brutality.

Leverage popular mistrust with
militants by offering improved
government services to draw the
people away from the violence.
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Security finding. The planners were adept in determining the proper balance
between using a force of arms and applying governance activities to subdue the militant
threat. Some respondents cautioned that an overambitious military response risks
inducing unwarranted fear. This portends the selective and judicious use of military force,
and the integration of local militias, to plan a balanced and proportional response. The
planning success of integrating a measured military response with governance activities
that afforded protection and life quality services was particularly noteworthy.
The Swatis became disillusioned with the militants who exercised a brutal and
unjustified use of violence. The Taliban fostered a dangerous security environment and
most Swatis feared for their lives. Tribal elders attempted to reassert their authority by
organizing lashkars (private militia loyal to tribal elders) to counter the Taliban savagery.
The lashkars began torching the houses of Taliban commanders and vowed to fight them
until they were expelled. Several tribal elders proclaimed that anyone found sheltering
militants would be fined and their homes would be destroyed. The violence escalated and
clashes erupted between the Taliban and a growing number of progovernment factions.
Many civilians were killed or displaced in the crossfire, creating over two million
displaced Swatis who emerged from the valley to escape the Taliban brutality.
The opportunity to leverage the Taliban brutality against them became a primary
focus of the planners. One respondent explained that the people blame the Taliban twice
as much as they criticize the generals. During this period, 86% of all Pakistanis agreed
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that the Taliban militants posed the most serious threat to the country—not India
(International Republican Institute, 2009). This was the highest level ever surveyed. The
planners considered the dangerous security situation to be the most significant challenge
for the police constabulary and military. However, some participants suggested that this
offered an opportunity to bolster popular confidence by protecting the vulnerable
population in crisis. Capable civil-military teams established checkpoints, enforced
curfews, and targeted suicide terrorists. The military working with their civilian
counterparts exploited the Taliban atrocities through strategic communications via social
and conventional media. The objective was to characterize the Taliban as villains, and
characterize the police and the military supporting them, as saviors.
Foreign military integration finding. The planning process did not adequately
integrate foreign military assistance. Most participants reported that external support
from the United States merely complicated the situation, and joint planning coordination
was necessary to prevent mutual interference. Advances in Pakistani government
credibility with their people were often undermined by violations of territorial integrity
from Allied strikes within Pakistan’s borders.
The participants generally considered foreign intervention as a barrier to regaining
popular support. Throughout this period, the United States and their Allies conducted
several military ground and air raids (mostly drone attacks) against key Taliban leaders
and militant strongholds throughout the region. Some respondents reported that military
gains were often negated by unilateral U.S. attacks that compromised Pakistani

122
sovereignty. To appease an incensed population, Islamabad provided tacit approval for
the attacks, but openly scorned the U.S. for violating its sovereignty. Pakistanis generally
believed that the government was not doing enough to protect its sovereignty. World
Public Opinion in Ramsay, Kull, Weber, & Lewis (2009) reported that during this period,
82% of Pakistanis believed drone attacks to be unjustified and not in their national
interest, and 79% felt that the Allied bombing of Taliban elements within Pakistan was
not justified. Some participants cautioned U.S. advisors that a close coordination was
necessary to prevent strikes from derailing the government efforts.
Radical Islamic influence. The militants effectively used radical religious
ideology as a call to mobilize against the government and foreign invaders (U.S. and their
Allies). Pew Research Global Attitudes Project (2009b) survey in early 2009 reported
that 76% of Pakistanis were concerned or somewhat concerned with Islamic radicalism
and only 12% were not concerned. The militants invested in madrassas that professed
radical doctrine that inspired violence against established institutions. Table 6 provides
the participants’ insights into the role of radical ideology in the militancy situation. The
data were derived from the responses to interview Question 3: Please share your views
on the causes and effects of the Islamist militancy problem.
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Table 6
Perspectives on the Social Impact of Radical Ideology
Participant

Impact of Radical Ideology

Planning Considerations

MILA1

Militants use ideology to recruit young
warriors. Radio and social media used
to inspire young men to clash with
security forces.

Requires constant rhythm of
strategic messaging to counter
the ideological view.

MILO2

Radical ideology is center of gravity of
the social environment. Although the
Swatis are moderate, radicalism was
used as a rallying cry for militancy.

Address and reform madrassas
by strangling financial resources.
Invest in conventional schools.

MILI3

Militants appealed to popular religious
sentiments by proclaiming a “foreign
intrusion” that is forcing conflict
between infidels and Islam.

Use strategic messaging to
profess that this is not a war with
the West, but an internal struggle
for legitimacy.

MILN4

Militants infiltrated the military and
promoted killings in the name of Islam
to inspire sectarian violence within our
ranks to weaken us. Madrassas were
important recruitment areas that
provide venues for militant planning.

Prevent zealots from leveraging
the distorted ideological view.
Eliminate radical scholarship.
Draw a wedge between militants
and moderate religionists.

MILO5

Militant leaders used radical ideology
to malign the government that they
claim supports an un-Islamic legal
system and only seeks power.

Promote legal and political
reform to counter the misguided
ideological message.

CIV6

Madrassas were centers of hate where
religious scholars control students
through coercion. Radical teachers
were unable to articulate a coherent
vision or exercise leadership.

Counter with a positive message
that leverages the conservative
majority that rejected most of the
radical ideology.
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Radical ideology finding. The Taliban effectively recruited militants using radical
ideology as a rallying cry. The planners identified ideology as a major factor, but the
planning process was ineffective in devising activities to neutralize its impact on
influential young tribesmen. Participants disagreed on whether radicalization stems from
the madrassas or from multimedia messaging, but the recruiting impact was clear. This
resulted in actions to block radical messaging and invest in traditional education.
Conversely, the government was uncertain concerning madrassa radicalization, and
reform became a controversial topic.
All respondents agreed that a long-term strategic messaging campaign and
educational reform initiative to counter the radical ideology was necessary. Some
planners focused on the media to counter the radical messaging in real time, while others
focused on a longer term approach to invest in traditional education as a preferred
alternative to madrassas. However, madrassa reform remained elusive. Three respondents
were adamant that the madrassa influence was not a significant factor. Despite the true
role of madrassas in radicalization, most participants agreed that the government
education system had failed, and a renewed investment in schools would be a significant
enabler in the overall effort. Strategic messaging and education reform would both
become significant lines of effort during the Swat campaign.
Pakistani jurisprudence. The absence of a fair and impartial legal system
undermined the national and provincial governance in the region. Pakistan’s
constitutional judicial system did not meet the Pashtun expectations. Since the golden
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days of the Swat Wali, or traditional governor, the Swatis place the utmost value on the
rule of law and a swift and just legal system. The Wali had established an effective
network of Qazi courts administered by a religious scholar and based in sharia law known
as Dasturul Amal. The antiquated Federal Crimes Regulations (FCR) established by the
British and based on common law (foreign to the Swatis) during the time of the British
Raj is inconsistent with their Paktunwali customs. In a December 2008 survey, Gallup
Poll (2011) reported that only 39% of Swatis had confidence in the national judicial
system. Many Swatis turned to the Taliban that offered a swift form of justice (Sharia) to
alleviate disputes and deter criminal elements. Most lawmakers recognized that legal
reform would bolster public confidence and perhaps disable the militant cause.
The government attempted to rectify the lack of law and order by issuing the
Nizam-e-Adl Regulation on March 15, 2009. Planners attempted to create what the
Pakistani military calls “social space” to gain operational planning and preparation time
by appeasing the militants. The regulation imposed Sharia in the Malakand and ceded
control of large swathes of land to the Taliban. The Taliban controlled courts were
allowed to decide all cases. The government agreed to release captured militants, even
those responsible for public executions and rape. In return, the militants pledged to end
the violence. The government thought that appeasing the Taliban in exchange for a
pledge of peace would be successful. Table 7 provides s synopsis of the planner’s view of
the lawless situation and planning considerations to redefine the legal system. The data
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were derived from interview Question 3: Please share your views on the causes and
effects of the Islamist militancy problem.
Table 7
Perspectives on Jurisprudence System in the Swat Valley
Participant

Causes of Lawlessness

Planning Considerations

MILA1

Unwarranted search and seizure.
Police stop citizens without warrant
or probable cause, but elites never
see court room.

Reform system from police
apprehension and detention to
prosecution. Provide resources,
proper training and equipment.

MILO2

No access to speedy justice. Lack of Resource and reform legal system
a professional cadre of lawyers and consistent with Pashtun cultural
judges to administer justice.
and religious values - Paktunwali.

MILI3

No political accountability for legal
proceedings that were poorly
executed. Chaos absent a fair
justice system…and Swatis turned
to sharia system for law and order.

Reform political and legal systems
and discredit militant authority…
a long-term proposition.

MILN4

Slow and corrupt Federal courts.
Swatis perceive Taliban justice as
superior to slow and corrupt
Federal courts.

Reform legal systems and discredit
militant authority.

MILO5

Judicial system inefficient. Many
Swatis yearn for return of the Wali,
whose rule was renowned for equal
justice.

Legal system reform and
incorporate best elements of the
Wali system that resonate with
tribesmen.

CIV6

Timely justice elusive. Cases may
take years, even decades, which
empowers militants that promise
swift Sharia justice.

Expedite due process and
incorporate elements of Sharia to
gain Pashtun tribal support.
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Federal jurisprudence finding. Swati confidence in the national legal system was
low due to corruption, lack of accountability, inefficiency, and inequity. The ineffective
judicial system was a valid grievance, and may be reformed by competent officials
backed by adequate resources. Legal reform fell short of the national goal, creating a
missed opportunity to bridge the government trust gap.
The government attempt to reform the antiquated Federal Crimes Regulations by
implementing the Nizam-e-Adl regulation was an indisputable failure. The deal
unraveled when confidence in the newly founded Sharia system wavered. Militant leaders
rejected the Islamic courts outright, placing the blame on corrupt government-appointed
judges. In addition, the militants violated the agreement by refusing to lay down their
arms. One respondent reported that the “hope of peace and order” among the people was
shattered when the Taliban enforced their distorted view of Sharia. Swatis were horrified
when a videotape surfaced showing Taliban enforcers publicly whipping a 17-year-old
girl accused of adultery. The girl had not committed any offense, but was flogged simply
because she refused her family's demand to marry someone of their choosing. The public
flogging of this young girl created a severe uproar in Pakistan and inspired a worldwide
condemnation of Taliban inhumanity. All participants agreed that the failure of Nizam-eAdl and the subsequent Taliban atrocities provided enough justification for the military to
execute Rah-e-Rast and commence an all-out campaign to neutralize them.
The Nizam-e-Adl failure created a significant opportunity for the planners. The
subsequent Taliban atrocities weakened militant popular support and initiated a vicious
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cycle of animosity among the tribes. The government could leverage that animosity.
Before the Swat operation, International Republican Institute (2009) found most Swatis
(72%) supported the Nizam-e-Adl peace deal with the extremists. After an extended
period of militant violence and brutality, popular support of the agreement flipped. By
April 2009, the World Public Opinion in Ramsay, Kull, Weber, & Lewis (2009) reported
that only 21% of Swatis approve and 63% disapprove of Nizam-e-Adl. The Swatis were
convinced that the militants could not be trusted to keep their word, and this presented an
opportunity to bridge the trust gap. Since comprehensive judicial reform would take time
and significant resources, the planners generally considered the effort to be beyond the
scope of Rah-e-Rast. However, the planners agreed that a long-term investment in the
legal system would yield enduring returns in trust and confidence.
Social injustice and inequities. Poor social and economic conditions were major
tribal grievances. Promises of social investment and development often resulted in little
real activity. Pakistan Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (2010) reported that the
Khyber Province experiences the highest incidence of poverty in Pakistan with 39.2% of
the population characterized as poverty stricken, 41.1% in rural areas. Broken promises
resulted in Swati cynicism in government. New American Foundation in Tankel (2010)
reported that the Pashtun believe the greatest social problems in Khyber province include:
lack of jobs (82% very important), lack of schools/education (73% very important), lack
of good roads and transportation (82% very important), and poor healthcare (92% very
important). Table 8 provides a synopsis of the participant’s perspectives on the social
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environment. The data were derived from interview Question 3: Please share your views
on the causes and effects of the Islamist militancy problem.
Table 8
Perspectives on Social Injustice and Militancy
Participant

Social Injustices

Planning Considerations

MILA1

Poor education. Swatis value
education and do not have access
to quality schools.

Rebuild destroyed schools and afford
access to all children…particularly
young girls.

MILO2

Social inequality. Society elites
have access to a high living
standard within secure residential
areas. Common people do not
have such access.

International investment by NGO
donors such as USAID, UK department
of international development, UNICEF
and the World Bank. Use military to run
the programs.

MILI3

Poverty. Absence of economic
opportunity discourages younger
generation, making them
susceptible to radicalization.

Investment in social reform to
demonstrate that the government
provide for the future.

MILN4

Social neglect. Tribal tension and
a poor economy enable militants
to operate. Severe social neglect
fuels radicalization.

Socioeconomic and human resource
development, creation of equal
opportunities and optimal utilization of
resources in a sustainable manner.

MILO5

Unemployment and lack of
education create militants. Most
militants were unemployed,
uneducated, and landless tenants.

Rebuild the educational system by
reopening the Swat University with
programs in agriculture, politics,
forestry, and conflict resolution.

CIV6

Economic disparity. Sense of
deprivation seduces new recruits
and inspires violence as a means
to force social change.

Ministry of Finance accelerate
economic growth and poverty
reduction. Improve accountability
through tax and financial reform.
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Social impact finding. The planning process readily identified infrastructure
development opportunities, but did not prioritize or adequately fund economic
development. Social inequities and poverty directly correlated to the popular support of
the Taliban who promised hope for the desperate. The opportunity to invest in
socioeconomic development to gain a popular trust was hindered by inadequate
interministry planning and insufficient fiscal resources.
All respondents believed an investment in economic development was crucial to
shifting popular support to government, but this was problematic for a poor nation. Some
participants realized that international community assistance was required to augment
meager national resources. This required an international coordination effort where aid
and assistance would be solicited from government or nongovernment organizations and
then fairly distributed to high priority projects. Most respondents reported that
establishing project priorities was elusive and political corruption prevented aid from
reaching those who could make a difference. Some respondents suggested that resource
allocation and oversight should reside with the military, considered the most trustworthy
federal institution. An improved aid distribution process supported with accountability
would promote positive results.
Governance and Military Integration
Pakistan SWAT Campaign Strategy (2011) presented an overarching civilmilitary strategy based in intelligence gathering to achieve the national policy objectives.
The strategy involved the deployment of military forces while simultaneously conducting
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select governance activities to support the military maneuver. The military campaign was
extensive and involved an unprecedented three Pakistani Army Divisions. Given the
disparity of focus and methods as previously described, the planners adopted an
evolutionary operational term to describe the planning approach, called Targeted
Intelligence Based Operations. The concept was based on establishing an extensive
intelligence network within the region to identify and find the militants, protect the
Swatis, and apply smart political reform and economic development to gain the enduring
allegiance. Intelligence gathering was the key to success.
The integration plan included three main phases with subcomponents. The first
phase consisted of a civil-military campaign that was designed to destroy the militant
capacity to wage war, establish security, and protect the Swatis during the operation. This
included two military lines of effort: to provide an extensive relief effort to relocate the
Swatis in well-provisioned displacement camps, while the Pakistani Army pursues a
direct military assault against the militants. The second phase consisted of a Swati
rehabilitation and reintegration campaign to return the displaced persons to their homes
and reconnect the tribal society with the mainstream government through political reform
and socioeconomic development. The third phase consisted of a long-term Taliban
reconciliation and de-radicalization campaign to address root grievances and draw the
younger Pashtun generation away from the extremists by countering the radical ideology.
Synopsis of the military operation (April-June, 2009). This study focuses on
the planning process rather than military maneuver; however, a brief synopsis of the
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military operation is provided for context. Operation Rah-e-Rast began on April 26, 2009
when paramilitary troops and helicopter gunships bombed Taliban strongholds. The
military offensive would be executed in force involving over 30,000 soldiers. The
operational objective was to kill or capture an estimated 5,000-7,000 Taliban in the Swat
Valley. By connecting with progovernment Swatis, the military gained valuable
intelligence before the general forces began operations. Prime ambush locations were
scouted well in advance, and military conducted maneuver in large formations to deter
ambushes. On April 29, Army forces advanced into adjacent districts to secure a critical
line of communication into Swat. The Taliban quickly recognized that a large number of
special operating forces and airborne troops were attacking, and started a collapsing
defense into the Swat Valley. On May 3, the rapidly advancing Pakistani military
assembled at the main entrance to the valley.
The Army conducted a massive three-pronged air and ground offensive on May 7,
2009. Swat’s emerald mines were secured by the 50th Airborne Division as the militants
retreated to the hills and the capital city, Mingora. The Pakistani 19th Division/10 Corps
supported by the insertion of Navy Seals advanced from the northeast into the Shangla
Valley. Special Services Group (SSG) commandos were inserted by helicopter from the
Northwest into the adjacent Peochar Valley to conduct seek-and-destroy missions. The
XI Corps would advance from the Southwest to secure Mingora, and then advance
through the valley. Soldiers approaching from three directions surrounded the militants to
eliminate the possibility of escape. The combined forces then delivered a crushing blow.
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Pakistan Operations in PATA and SWAT (2009) reported that fighting was
particularly fierce since the Taliban recognized the unusual determination of the massive
offensive. Surprising to the Army, the Taliban resorted to conventional frontline warfare
rather than guerilla tactics. The military conducted extensive air strikes, artillery
bombardment, and rocket attacks by helicopter gunships. Commandos were continuously
inserted into known militant strongholds—and some were captured and beheaded. The
Taliban prepared for a bloody urban battle against airborne forces by concentrating forces
in Mingora—digging trenches, laying mines and taking positions on rooftops. Special
Forces engaged in fierce urban fighting where the Taliban made fortresses of government
buildings and hotels. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that
over 2.5 million fled in panic causing a significant humanitarian crisis (United Nations
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2009).
The Pakistani military regained control of Swat and declared the offensive over
on June 14, 2009. Key cities, such as Mingora, were retaken in a week and only sporadic
fighting occurred in the outskirts. According to Pakistan Operations in PATA and SWAT
(2009), more than 1,700 Taliban militants were killed with a loss of more than 800
soldiers killed and about 3000 wounded during the operation. At least 37 of the militants
killed were Libyan, Uzbek, and Saudis linked to al-Qaeda. The military subdued the
remaining small pockets of resistance.
Swati assistance in identifying plain clothed militants during the final stages of
the operation proved extremely effective. The tribesmen heralded the Army and they
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helped them distinguish between reconcilable insurgents and those who were relentlessly
dedicated to jihad; however, some militants escaped. The military reported an insufficient
capacity of helicopters to guard valley approaches, and many Taliban repositioned to
adjacent safe havens (Haq & Malik, 2009). Security forces bombed and destroyed the
headquarters of the Taliban leader, Maulana Fazlullah, but he evaded capture due to gaps
in intelligence (Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi, 2009).
Intelligence based military operations. The civil-military support planning
would focus on gaining intelligence to identify the militants and protect the Swatis.
Progovernment lashkar militias and the Frontier Corps were integrated with the military
to solicit assistance and information from the Swatis, tired of the Taliban brutality. The
planners segmented this phase into three main subcomponents: use of intelligence to gain
a strategic advantage, strategic communications, and protection of displaced persons.
First, a robust intelligence network was crucial to minimize collateral damage to persons
and property. Second, the planners implemented a national strategic communication plan
to inform the people of the government’s intentions, and alleviate their fears by providing
detailed instructions for their safe transit away from the fighting. Third, the planners
planned and organized humanitarian assistance for displaced persons well in advance.
Every effort to protect the population would be taken. Table 9 provides a synopsis of the
operational construct and individual efforts. The data were derived from interview
Question 8: Is Pakistan’s countermilitancy doctrine adequate, or could it be improved to
leverage the government interministries?
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Table 9
Approach to the Military Operational Campaign
Participant

First line of effort

Second line of effort

Third line of effort

MILA1

Border control
measures to isolate,
and weaken militants.
Push militants out of
strong positions and
away from population.

Identify and destroy
militant enabling
hubs. Daylight Air
campaign with precise
targeting to minimize
collateral damage.

Establish security
checkpoints to prevent
militant movements and
isolate and protect the
Swatis.

MILO2

Special Forces connect
with local leaders to
gain intelligence on
militant strongholds.

Frontier Corps recruit
lashkar militias to
directly assist ground
forces.

Isolate Valley by
containing militants and
draw them away from
urban areas.

MILI3

Established joint
border bases. Protect
important logistics
nodes.

Mobilize the tribes
and reform lashkar
militia who would
join the govt. fight.

Selective air and ground
offensive targeting
leadership with minimal
collateral damage.

MILN4

Encircle militants with
blocking forces.
Isolate foreign
interference.

Special Forces
integrate lashkars.
Quick snap actions to
nab high value targets.

Counter narcotics effort.
Identify routes, destroy labs
and remove traffickers
from influential positions.

MILO5

Seal the borders. Trap
militants. Establish nogo areas to buffer the
militants from people.

Disrupt militant
support lines. Reform
and coordinate
w/local security to
disable infrastructure.

Eliminate militant
sanctuaries. No safe harbor
to fight another day.

CIV6

Eliminate cross border
smuggling. Destroy
caches of arms and
ammunition.

Unleash major
counterinsurgency
assault to dislodge the
militants… limit
collateral damage.

Eliminate militant cash
crop–drugs. Alternate crop
development a long-term
strategy.
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Campaign approach finding. The planning approach to the military campaign
was varied and multifaceted. Although the Pakistani military was guided by the general
counterinsurgency principle of isolating the people from the militants and then destroying
their capacity to fight, the approaches differed among the planners. Some respondents
leveraged the use of lashkar militias, while others focused on the deployment of regular
troops. The conceptual method to isolate the valley varied from a network of checkpoints,
blocking remote trails, to only guarding main entrance and exit points. Both direct action
and indirect action was aimed at destroying a myriad of militant enabling nodes such as
key leadership, cash crops, and arms caches. During the operation, the operation was so
massive that all the aforementioned approaches and methods were applied. The most
common theme for success was the effective use of intelligence.
Use of intelligence. Pakistan Operations in PATA and SWAT (2009) directed
the exploitation of intelligence to identify and destroy the militants. Since the militants
were irregular forces without uniforms or other identifying features, determining their
strength or whereabouts was problematic. Protecting the Swatis, isolating the militants,
and destroying their capacity to wage war would require a constant flow of information
from insiders, or human contact, combined with remote sensor or signals data to
corroborate the enemy disposition. Table 10 provides a synopsis of the critical elements
of intelligence, and their preferred collection methods. The data were derived primarily
from interview Question 9: How did the joint planning team shape the social
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environment in Swat Valley to augment or enable military operations against the Islamist
militants?
Table 10
Approach to Gathering and Using Intelligence
Participant

Critical Elements of Intelligence

Gathering Method

MILA1

Conduct intelligence sharing
between Ministries to infiltrate
militant ranks and determine
enabling capabilities.

Connect with local lashkar
militia to identify who was
friend and who was foe.

MILO2

Prevent militant recruitment and
identify militants within displaced
person camps.

Use Special Forces to infiltrate
camps, deter recruitment, and
identify enemy.

MILI3

Gain popular trust in local
government by connecting with
elders and Pashtun at large. Trusted
officials were scarce.

Use Frontier Corps to infiltrate
valley to gain trusted Pashtun
agents.

MILN4

Reestablish confidence in security
establishment by identifying
criminals. Criminal and militant
elements operate with impunity.

Infiltrate and reform security
institutions to alleviate
corruption and regain popular
support.

MILO5

Distinguish friend from enemy.
Empower tribal leaders to
Distinguish irreconcilable militants
influence potential recruits by
from those who will turn was vital to fostering a renewed hope.
reconciliation effort.

CIV6

Foster a positive public opinion and
by identifying threats. Protect
operating forces by determining
ambush locations in advance.

Build trust with lashkar militias
to promote communication.
Train lashkars to protect the
lines of logistical support.
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Intelligence impact finding. Intelligence significantly contributed to assuring
public safety and minimizing collateral damage, but fell short of locating and detaining
top militant leaders. Special Forces leveraged intelligence to receive valuable targeting
information for precision munitions. General purpose forces swept the valley and
eliminated subordinate militant leaders with the help of lashkar militia and tribal elders,
but many top leaders escaped. There was some evidence of intelligence-sharing between
government agencies and departments; however, the efficacy of an intelligence planning
cell and extent of collaboration cannot be fully assessed.
The effective use of intelligence improved Swati confidence in military
operations, a key neo-Clausewitzian tenet. Taliban atrocities created a convergence of
popular opposition to militant rule that created an opportune set of enabling conditions to
undermine and destroy them. Intelligence flowed from disgruntled Swatis who revealed
militant strongholds and dispositions. Pew Research Global Attitudes Project (2009b)
reported that during Rah-e-Rast, there was a complete reversal in Pakistani attitudes
toward the use of military with 53% in support and only 24% in opposition. By the end of
the operation, favorable ratings of the military escalated to 89% and an unfavorable
military view dropped further to 12%. The Army’s favorable conduct of the operation set
the conditions for a successful implementation of governance.
Strategic communications. The use of strategic messaging to counter the radical
ideology and provide a viable alternative was an important component of the operational
plan. On June 1, 2009, President Zardari emphasized that the war against militancy was a
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total war and each section of society may, “defeat the mindset that nurtures militancy”
(Associated Press in Haq & Malik, 2009, p. 53). Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public
Relation (ISPR) communicated a unified government message to confront “Pakistan’s
war” rather than “America’s War” by effectively broadcasting via electronic media, cell
phones, and radio to promote tribal support. Some participants emphasized that social
media progressed rapidly, and success largely depended on delivering information
quickly and accurately.
Pakistan Operations in PATA and SWAT (2009) provided planning guidance that
supported local media and regional broadcasting, protected radio towers, and
disseminated meaningful information. The messaging focused on popular grievances and
exposed militant atrocities. All participants agreed that accurate messaging was important
to eliminate the government “say-do” gap, meaning that the military actions on the
ground had to match government promises. Table 11 provides a synopsis of the different
messaging objectives and the broadcasting methods. The data were derived from
interview Question 9: How did the joint planning team shape the social environment in
Swat Valley to augment or enable military operations against the Islamist militants?
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Table 11
Perspectives on Strategic Communications
Participant

Strategic Message

Delivery Method

MILA1

Militants were violent and
government will protect you. Swatis
advised to leave valley before
military operations to reduce
potential casualties.

Leverage technology by using
social media to communicate
with the tribes. Engage with
decisive military when militants
pursue extreme violence.

MILO2

Islamabad will provide for you and
for a better future. Approach the
youth through media to counter the
extremist ideology.
Military engaging to protect you
and the land. Synchronize ground
operations with strategic messaging.

Use Inter-Services Public
Relations press releases to
alleviate fears by providing
detailed safety instructions
Conduct media campaign to
discredit militant leaders. Block
militant FM broadcasts.

MILN4

Militant leader Fazlullah does not
share Pashtun values. Counter
militant radio announcements that
intimidate teachers and school girls.

Use psychological operationsleaflets to warn tribes of the false
hopes, misguided path, and illconceived jihad.

MILO5

Militants were harming your women
and families. Taliban reduced the
social status of women by beating
girls and closing schools. Use that
information to our advantage.

Reach disparate Swatis through
word of mouth in the villages.
Reach influential Swatis
connected to the global economy
by cell phones/computers.

CIV6

Promote and enhance the true
Islamic faith and condemn the
perversion of Islam. Soldier’s
actions must match the rhetoric.

Exploit radio networks that reach
the most remote locations.
Military action must not conflict
with the broadcasted information.

MILI3

Strategic communications finding. The planning process adequately
synchronized positive national messaging from multiple sources and at all levels:
strategic, operational, and tactical. The military emphasized training the rank-in-file to
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understand the messaging, and to ensure that actions on the ground were consistent with
the government dispatches. The planners developed and implemented innovative ideas to
broadcast a positive message. Participants reported that communication methods ranged
from using social media (where available), exploiting cellular telephone messaging, using
conventional radio and television, and even leveraging the word of mouth from village to
village.
National messaging to promote government legitimacy and enhance public safety
was effective. The Swatis responded favorably to a government appeal to recognize the
tremendous sacrifices of the nation, economically and politically, to defeat the extremist
threat. The Ministry of Religious Affairs rallied religious scholars and educators to
promote tenets of the true Islamic faith that embraces education and the arts (Government
of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 2013). At the District level, tactical messaging enhanced safety
by providing specific transit instructions and life sustenance information for displaced
persons. The military rank-in-file were familiar with the transit instructions and
effectively implemented the plan. Public Opinion in Ramsay, Kull, Weber, & Lewis
(2009) reports that during Rah-e-Rast, 72% of Swatis were confident in the way the
government was dealing with the situation.
Countermessaging finding. National messaging to uncover the harmful effects
of the radical ideology effectively isolated the militants from the tribe. Taliban
unfavorable ratings increased from 33% to 70% during the operation (Pew Research
Global Attitudes Project (2009 a, b). Strategic messaging revealed the moral bankruptcy
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of the radical worldview. National broadcasts exposed the militant intransigence in an
attempt to undermine their support base. Video broadcasts of teenage girls being flogged
by Taliban leaders for going to school or committing trivial violations against Sharia
tenets were uncovered. Broadcasts showed the militants destroying ancient statues of
Buddha and prehistoric rock carvings, calling these antiquities un-Islamic. The militants
prohibited vaccinations, and the government exposed the health risks associated with the
misguided message (Mohammad, 2009). The Taliban purged everything considered to be
evils including dancing, music, and female education. To gain esteem, the government
exposed these draconian dictates. The Swatis, who value education for all children,
became disillusioned with the militant rhetoric and responded by publicly opposing
Taliban authority. Public opinion decisively turned against the militants.
Information operations finding. Information operations to block Taliban radical
messaging were partially effective. Militant use of widespread FM radio communications
were blocked, especially the viral broadcasts of militant leader Maulana Fazlullah called
“the radio mullah.” Two participants reported that the Taliban use of FM channels was
largely rendered ineffective by army special forces who took control of key radio and
television nodes. Many Swatis rallied to his cause by gaining inspiration from occasional
FM radio sermons from highly mobile, low-cost and low-tech transmission sites. Some
participants attribute the collapse of the Fazlullah’s support base to the destruction of his
messaging outlets. Government dominance of all Taliban communications was
unachievable, but controlling most enemy messaging outlets proved decisive.
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Swati resettlement and rehabilitation campaign. The second phase of the
campaign consisted of a plan to safely transit and protect the Swatis in well provisioned
camps, and then return them to their homes after the operation. In April 2009, the
Ministry of the Interior encouraged all Swatis to evacuate the valley with all that they
could carry, sending approximately 2 million Swatis fleeing south into established camps
or to join with relatives. The volume of displaced persons overwhelmed the capacity of
the government.
The military formed a Special Support Group (SSG) on May12, 2009 to directly
support the rehabilitation effort. The ad-hoc military led group was an interservice unit
that coordinated the efforts of military engineers and logisticians, civil government, and
international donors to systematically care for and safely return the displaced Swatis. The
SSG was severely under resourced, but achieved some success in synchronizing
international assistance. The provincial government proved to be of minimal help, and the
pervasive political corruption at all levels diverted badly needed resources away from the
rehabilitation effort. Despite the barriers, the planners worked diligently to coordinate
and restore life quality services. By July, the Interior Ministry announced that all the
displaced persons could return home.
Resettlement of the Swatis. Planners designed the resettlement program to
provide life services and protection with capable and well-trained security forces within
well-provisioned camps. Participants explained that the Taliban atrocities, that became
the most significant catalyst for change in support against them, could be reinforced with
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a cogent resettlement plan. The plan highlighted safety with a goal to relocate, protect,
and resettle Swatis quickly and efficiently. Local lashkar militias would be constituted to
provide valuable threat intelligence and guard vulnerable travelers. Securing the lines of
communication in and out of the valley would ensure a safe exodus of innocents, while
preventing the militants from escaping to adjacent regions. The military considered it a
significant challenge to secure all the transit routes in and around the valley, especially
with insufficient helicopter surveillance capability. The participants recognized that safe
movement of over two million IDPs was extremely risky, but the success of the entire
operation hinged on their safety.
The quick and safe return of the Swatis was a national imperative. President
Zardari explained to all Pakistanis, “We have been emphasizing upon the world that
rehabilitation of the internally displaced people is the most critical element of the fight
against militancy” (“Rehabilitation of IDPs”, 2009, para. 19). The preponderance of
media reports claimed that the militants had melted away, at least from the urban areas,
but they were still a formidable force in rural districts. The mayor of Swat, Jamal Nasir,
was concerned that remaining militants still posed a dangerous threat, especially to
landowners who were vulnerable to Talban intimidation and outside the reach of security
forces. The mayor called for a significant military presence to protect returning Swatis.
All participants reported that this became the most significant part of operation. One
participant referred to it as, “the nations’ greatest-ever humanitarian challenge.”
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Rehabilitation of the Swatis. The combined government and international
community effort to care for the displaced persons was massive and the resettlement
created a significant humanitarian crisis. President Zardari remarked, “The issue of
rehabilitation of displaced persons was a huge challenge before the nation which should
be met through the collective effort of the people, the government, and the international
community” (“Rehabilitation of IDPs”, 2009, para 7). Some participants expressed
concern that local security forces had to be in place before sending Swatis home or else
the gains of popular confidence achieved in rehabilitation would be squandered.
Although the military reported that the valley was cleared of militants, many Swatis did
not translate “clear of militants” to “safe for civilians.” Some participants reported that
during the initial phase, the persistent mistrust in government created skepticism and a
reluctance for many to return home. Consistent with neo-Clausewitzian thought, it was
the military’s job to convince the Swatis that it was better to be a Pakistani citizen than a
Taliban supporter—and to accomplish this, they may conduct actions to promote their
popular perception as a protector. The safe passage of Swatis to their homes was a test
that offered a great opportunity. Table 12 depicts the guiding principles to ensure public
safety. The data were derived from interview Question 5: Do you believe that government
policy adequately addresses Pakistan’s integration of governance with military
operations to subdue the militancy problem?

146
Table 12
Approach to Resettle, Protect, and Repatriate the Swatis
Participant

Resettlement

Protection

Rehabilitation

MILA1

Protect the Swatis by
safely by relocating to
well provisioned and
protected camps.

Garrison the valley to
supervise development
and establish long-term
relationships.

Safely return Swatis
Increase military
presence with
Frontier Corps.

MILO2

Create camps
supported by
ministries. IGOs and
NGOs augment food,
shelter, and water.

Prevent militant
infiltration into camps.
Lessen risk of uprising
or recruitment through
intelligence.

Leverage NGOs to
provide direct
support during
migration in
Islamabad’s behest.

MILI3

Establish 35 camps
managed by the Army
with consideration for
cultural sensitivities.

Provide Humanitarian
Assistance. Coordinate
with NGOs and USAID
to provide basic needs.

Coordinate
multiministry effort
to repatriate and
sustain the Swatis.

MILN4

Special Support
Groups coordinate
with Finance Ministry
to resettle tribe:
ensuring safety and
rehabilitation.

Garrison to build
relationships, including
ex-Taliban. Military
start infrastructure
projects, protected from
militant interference.

Return the displaced
persons safely to
their homes… and
protect them during
journey. Build trust
through military.

MILO5

Sustained care for the
IDPs. Quick response
needed to maintain
public confidence.

Garrison capital of
Mingora with Army to
provide extended local
security.

Manage NGO
investment: USAID,
UNICEF, and the
World Bank.

CIV6

Protect Swatis by
migrating to secure
camps. Move quickly
to resettle families.

Military get out among
the people. Garrison
with checkpoints to
isolate and protect.

Provide financial
assistance. Leverage
US/international
monies.
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Rehabilitation impact finding. Superb planning for the resettlement and
rehabilitation of millions of Swatis was a crowning achievement. The sustained allgovernment effort included a safe resettlement provided by the military and life services
(rehabilitation) provided by the ministries working with nongovernment organizations.
Some participants reported that bureaucratic processing, persistent shortages of supplies,
and political bickering were significant hurdles; however, the overall effort was
successful due to international assistance. Haq and Malik (2009) reported that the U.S.
government (USAID) worked directly in support of Pakistani Special Forces to distribute
aid to the temporary camps. The U.S. provided nearly $246 million in humanitarian aid
including nearly $82 million in USAID-Office of Disaster Assistance (OFDA) funding.
The European Union and Japan joined the effort and pledged $150 million more. Despite
the inflow of international investment, supplies were sometimes scarce and sanitation
poor. Although weaknesses in bureaucratic processes resulted in inefficiencies, the safe
passage of displaced families promoted confidence and greatly facilitated postconflict
stabilization programs.
The combined government and international community resettlement effort made
a significant impact on the lives of the Swatis. Over two million displaced persons were
resettled in 35 camps or vacated schools for protection and sustenance, and many others
sought refuge with family or friends. By August 2009, only 3 months after the operation
commenced, over 70% of the displaced families had returned to their homes in the Swat
(United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2009). The Army
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and their auxiliary Frontier Corps managed to effectively protect and care for the people
with few deaths or injury. Most participants reported that the return of the displaced
persons was safe and orderly.
Despite a successful resettlement, some respondents expressed a significant
concern of a tribal backlash. A vocal minority of Swatis perceived the national response
to be lethargic, and the massive international effort risks undermining government
credibility. Deploying too many government troops might generate excessive collateral
damage that could tip the balance of support to the militants. An overaggressive military
presence might fracture fragile agreements with neutral Taliban affiliates. Some
participants reported that coercive sorting and favoritism toward politically connected
Swatis turned many against the government and promoted militant recruitment. Militant
infiltration into the camps was prevalent, and the threat of an uprising was ever-present.
The government planners attempted to counter these second order effects.
Intelligence impact finding. Intelligence was effectively used to prevent militant
recruitment and disable influence within the internally displaced person camps. Most
participants described the importance of intelligence to prevent militant infiltration,
influence, or recruitment. Lashkar soldiers were embedded in the camps and used as
informants. The operation was designed to draw the militants away from the camps and
into urban areas (away from built-up-areas or BUAs) where precision strikes would
effectively target militants, but preserve innocent lives and property. To protect Swati
families with serving soldiers, Pashtun servicemen with a tribal attachments were
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excused from duties. If elders discovered that these soldiers took up arms against fellow
tribesmen, the entire family was at risk of death or injury. The military largely met the
people’s expectation for safety and protection, and the aforementioned negative effects
were never realized to any great extent.
Post conflict surveys showed a significant rise in support of the Pakistani military
due to the success in eliminating the Taliban threat while protecting the Swatis. Some
participants reported incidents where tribesmen sought retribution against the militants: a
positive sign that the military was gaining the trust of the tribe. In October, 2009, the
International Republican Institute (2009) reported that 79% of Swatis desire the military
to govern them and 70% support pursuing Taliban fighters in all tribal areas. Pew
research data showed a consistent trend reporting a 60% support for the military during
the postconflict phase, a significant increase in support previously reported to be 43%
before the operation (Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, 2009a). After the Swatis
returned home, and with government popular support on the rise, all respondents
acknowledged the great opportunity to reintegrate the Swatis into Pakistani society.
Swati reintegration campaign. Pakistan Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
(2010) emphasized reintegration through the attainment of a secure, just, and prosperous
society by way of socioeconomic and human resource development. The government-run
Khyber Development Authority was formed to expedite the development of human and
natural resources, and develop reconstruction opportunity zones to promote commerce.
The strategy included Public-Private Partnerships to establish industry, promote
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agriculture, and develop natural resources. At the strategic level, the main effort was a
restoration of fundamental rights of the Swati citizens via a just legal system, equal
opportunity employment, and equal access to services (Pakistan 13th National Assembly
of Parliament, 2009). At the operational level, the critical elements of the plan included
investments in education, health, agriculture, urban development, trade, and energy.
The aggressive reintegration plan would require a whole-of-government
approach, and all respondents recognized that the resource intensive effort would be
long-term. Data analysis revealed three main investment venues to bolster public
confidence in government: an immediate investment in public education, improvements
in healthcare, and long-term investment in life quality infrastructure and services. Table
13 depicts the reintegration initiatives and the data were derived from interview Question
6: How did you apply and integrate governance principles with military activity?
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Table 13
Approach to Reintegrate the Swatis into Pakistani Society
Participant

Education

Healthcare

Economic
Development

MILA1

Education reform.
Rebuild destroyed
schools and afford
unlimited access.

Reopen hospitals and
improve infant mortality
and reduce disease.

Build local
governance
framework.

MILO2

No comments.

Invest in healthcare,
Swatis value health and
modern medicine.

Limit international
contributors to
prevent undermining
govt. authority.

MILI3

Education
investment by
reopening schools
destroyed or closed
by the militants.

No comments.

Conduct economic
Development to
demonstrate govt.
commitment and
dedication.

MILN4

Support Education
Ministry during
reconstruction.

Counter the Taliban
degradation of health
services. Afford access
to female doctors and
promote dignity.

Socioeconomic
development to
complement military.
High visibility hydroelectric investment.

MILO5

Rebuild the
educational system
by reopening the
Swat University.
Focus on conflict
resolution.

Rebuild healthcare
infrastructure destroyed
by the militants.

Expedite development
of human and natural
resources. PublicPrivate Partnerships to
promote industry and
agriculture.

CIV6

Institute National
Action Plan for
Madrassa reform.

No comments.

Conduct economic
stimulation. Invest in
the national power
grid.
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Reintegration impact finding. The planning process did not adequately establish
social development priorities or match infrastructure projects with the most pressing life
quality issues. The Swati reintegration plans were noble, but under resourced and beyond
the financial capacity at the provincial or national levels. Despite the meager investment,
the infrastructure projects positively influenced public opinion.
All participants suggested that the reconciliation plan was a good one; however,
the resources to carry out such a strategy were lacking. Planners worked with the
ministries to quickly allocate and implement the funds, although all participants
recognized that return on these investments would not be seen for several years. Pakistan
Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (2010) reported the annual Swat Valley
expenditures included 11 billion Rs. (110 million US dollars) on security, 26 billion Rs.
(260 million US dollars) on education, 4 billion Rs, (40 million US dollars) on health,
and 3 billion Rs. (30 million US dollars), on roads, water, agriculture, and industry
combined. Most participants agreed that the expenditures were not enough to adequately
provide services to the national standard. All respondents expressed concern that the
investments would be short-lived, but conceded that they were making a difference in the
short-term. A post operation poll conducted by World Public Opinion in Ramsay, Kull,
Weber, & Lewis (2009) showed that over 70% of Swatis were confident in the
government’s revitalization effort, and only 7% support the Taliban return.
Education infrastructure. The government seized an opportunity to leverage the
strong desire of the Swatis to educate their children. In January 2009, the Taliban
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announced that the Pashtun had to stop sending girls to schools. They threatened tribal
leaders who refused to heed the warning, announcing that schools would be bombed and
girls that attended schools would be killed. The militants proclaimed that female
education was against Islamic teachings and spreads vulgarity in society. Hundreds of
schools were destroyed, and thousands of teachers lost their jobs—over 80 thousand
children were left without a school.
Education impact finding. Investments in public education were limited by fiscal
constraints, but the achievements resonated with the Swatis. The Swatis value education,
perhaps above all other institutions, therefore rebuilding the degraded educational system
provided a valuable opportunity to reconnect government with the tribes. Public Opinion
in Pakistan's Tribal Region (2010) reports that 73% of Swatis believed education to be
the most important governance issue. The Ministry of Education reversed the school
closings and worked with security forces to protect the remaining infrastructure. Over
350 schools and colleges were rebuilt, but many remained decrepit, forcing children to
study in open fields. The provincial authorities built temporary classrooms during the
interim period. The Khyber Education Minister also directed teachers to resume their
duties. Over 21,000 students, including girls, were enrolled in makeshift schools within
the displaced population. Education standards in the Malakand improved markedly,
literacy increasing from 37% to 47% in the year of the operation (Pakistan Government
of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 2013).
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Healthcare infrastructure. Taliban harassment and degradation of the primary
healthcare centers afforded another opportunity to defame the militants and shore up
public confidence. The militants prohibited polio vaccination campaigns for children, and
many women healthcare workers were targeted and killed (Din, Mumtaz, and
Ataullahjan, 2012). Women were forced to deliver family planning and health services at
the home since extremist ideology restricted their ability to work openly in public. Din
estimates that 29% of health facilities in the Swat District were destroyed. Health workers
were systematically killed as they worked to save wounded tribesmen loyal to the
government. The Taliban shamed female workers on radio broadcasts and subjected them
to forced marriages, kidnappings, and death. All respondents reported that the militants
applied a combination of fatwas (religious decrees), threats, and physical assaults that
extended even to their children. One fatwa stipulated that it was a Muslim’s duty to
kidnap female workers, to marry them forcibly or abuse them as sexual slaves.
Healthcare impact finding. Investments in healthcare bolstered public confidence
in government and discredited the Taliban. The Provincial Reconstruction, Rehabilitation
and Settlement Authority, working with the military and District Commissioner,
instituted a plan to reopen and upgrade health care facilities as security improved
(Pakistan Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 2013). Working with nongovernmental
organizations such as UNICEF, the provincial authorities reinstituted quality health
services. Large percentages of children received vaccinations and psychological
counseling. Thousands of expectant mothers were provided delivery kits and direct
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assistance. The government offered free medical care to the poor and significant
improvements were made in emergency response capacity. Public Opinion in Pakistan's
Tribal Region (2010) reported that 91% of Swatis believe that improving healthcare was
the most important governance achievement. To this end, the military worked diligently
with the private and public institutions to normalize the regional healthcare institutions.
Physical infrastructure. The government created a Provincial Reconstruction,
Rehabilitation and Settlement Authority (PaRRSA) to coordinate the multiministry
rebuilding effort. The Authority developed an effective Malakand Comprehensive
Stabilization and Socioeconomic Development Strategy that sought to address the
underlying grievances fueling the unrest and to provide equal access to resources through
partnerships between the government, civil society and the private sector (Pakistan
Senate Committee on Defence and Defence Production, 2012). The Khyber rehabilitation
plan focused on three main investment sectors: hydro-electric power, water distribution,
and road development (Pakistan Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 2013). Enhancing
the power grid throughout the Malakand was considered a key enabler and included a
multiyear plan to invest in two power plants at Machai and Ranolia. The plants added 20
megawatt electricity to the national grid and reduced power rates. The Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa Oil & Gas Company was established to oversee the national effort to
construct three new major hydro-electric projects. One participant reiterated the benefit of
large visible project with considerable social impact over several small village projects
that have limited benefit and are soon forgotten.
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Infrastructure impact finding. The military working with the District
Commissioner facilitated highly visible private-public projects provided a dual benefit of
creating employment and fostering public confidence. Economic development had the
combined effect of regaining popular confidence by improving life quality, and
preventing radicalization by offering desperately needed employment opportunities.
Power grid and flood control investments had an immediate impact. The construction of
agricultural water channels and new dams solved a persistent regional water management
problem. New dams helped manage annual rains to increase the regional water supply for
potable water, sanitation, and irrigation. The provincial government pursued the
development of agriculture for food production with an emphasis on aid to small farmers.
Pakistan Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (2010) reported that about 75% of the
province was dependent on agriculture, especially the poorest households.
The government enhanced regional economic prosperity by improving the
transportation nodes. The Khyber province created a special Urban Policy Unit to assist
in provincial transportation planning and facilitate interprovincial coordination to gain
synergy among investors. Pakistan Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (2010) reported
that 44% of provincial roads and 78% of Swat roads were in poor or bad condition after
the operation. A concerted effort to improve existing road conditions by repairing
damaged roads, constructing new links, and upgrading current transportation grids
boosted commerce within the Malakand. As a result, 478 kilometers of roads and 11
bridges were constructed, but the demand for road transport expanded at a faster rate than

157
economic development. Two participants reported that the military worked with Swati
business leaders to secure and upgrade the most vital transportation nodes to prevent the
militants from disrupting vital commercial hubs.
Swati reconciliation and de-radicalization. The objective of this phase of Rahe-Rast was to reconcile with the Pashtun, de-radicalize the militants, and promote an
enduring national allegiance from the reformed militants. To accomplish this, the
Provincial Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Settlement Authority pursued a dialogue
with tribal elders to address root grievances, and a de-radicalization plan was initiated to
change perceptions. The government restored the traditional tribal hierarchy to empower
the elder leaders (Maliks), and marginalize the Taliban-backed holy men (Imams). Once
the government stabilized the tribal system, a series of negotiations addressed the
longstanding causes of dissatisfaction. In parallel, rehabilitation centers reformed active
militants by changing their radical worldview, especially among young men.
Tribal reconciliation. Pakistan’s 13th National Assembly of Parliament (2008)
promoted reconciliation to address grievances with Swatis who pledged support for the
Pakistan Constitution. The tribesmen often found themselves caught between an
oppressive Taliban who demanded allegiance through coercion and the provincial
government that required allegiance, but provided poor services. Most respondents
reported that the Taliban tactic of coercion and intimidation provided an opportunity to
reconcile. Pakistan SWAT Campaign Strategy (2011) outlined a plan to dialogue with the
elders, backed by investment to promote credibility. As a guiding principle for
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negotiations, the National Assembly espoused the rights of Swati citizens as equivalent to
those of the Pakistani majority. Table 14 depicts the participant’s planning construct. The
data were derived from interview Question 6: How did you apply and integrate
governance principles with military activity in the execution of Swat operations?
Table 14
Approach to Reconcile with the Swatis
Participant

First line of effort

Second line of effort

MILA1

Restore the tribal hierarchy.
Empower elders and marginalize
the Taliban backed Imams.

Countermilitancy training to
observe Paktunwali to gain hearts
and minds of the moderate sector.

MILO2

Isolate tribe from foreign
radicalized elements. Spill-over of
foreign fighters promotes a Jihadi
culture.

Form small unit bases manned by
well-trained security forces,
enforcing curfews and connecting
with the people to gain confidence.

MILI3

Realize human rights for the most
vulnerable through partnerships
between the government and
private sector.

Educate and train jawans (junior
soldiers) in nation building to win
the popular hearts and minds.

MILN4

Empower Maliks and marginalize
Imams. Reestablish the tribal jirga
system and start a dialogue.

Respect human rights and political
inclusion to enable reconciliation.
Government build relationship
with reconcilable militants.

MILO5

Protect Swatis with a minimal
force of arms. Prevent widespread
arrests, targeted assassinations, and
aggravated militant massacres.

Reform resource allocation and
tax policy to gain confidence.
Prevent collusion between citizens
and tax officials who erode trust.

CIV6

Institute National Action Plan to
implement confidence building
measures.

Restore and reactivate the tribal
jirga to replace the Taliban
governance system.
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Reconciliation impact finding. The Army and Frontier Corps, working with the
Provincial Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Settlement Authority, effectively
implemented near-term tribal confidence building measures and reconciliation activities.
In the void of leadership created by the militant defeat, the government was able to
reconstitute the traditional tribal jirga system. The provincial government reasserted tribal
control under their oversight within one year of the operation.
The Pakistan SWAT Campaign Strategy (2011) directed that the Pakistani Army
occupy the valley for one year, then cede control back to the Swatis supervised by the
provincial authorities. Senior officials formed a provincial APEX committee (civilmilitary coordination cell) to coordinate military security operations, empower the tribal
hierarchy, and reform the judicial system. The government reactivated the tribal jirga to
supplant the Taliban shadow governance system. The committee frequently consulted the
maliks on policy and transferred governance from the military back to tribal control.
The provincial government planned the orderly transfer of power from the
military to the tribal jirga. Pakistan Current Countermilitancy Operations (2015)
emphasized a strict observance and respect for culture and traditions. Soldiers attended
familiarization training in Paktunwali. Soldiers ensured that government directives and
activities were consistent with tribal customs. The police protected places of worship and
tribal meeting areas from militant attacks. Some respondents reported that soldiers were
previously perceived as foreigners to the Swatis, but cultural awareness training paid off.
All participants reported that the soldiers were well-versed in Paktunwali, and they
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adhered to stringent rules of engagement that afforded protection. Troops were locally
garrisoned to build relationships and provide responsive security. Some respondents
reported that tribal relationships provided a social buffer to militant influence.
Militant de-radicalization. To complement reconciliation, the Provincial
Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Settlement Authority initiated an aggressive deradicalization program. The program had two main components, a continuing dialogue to
address grievances and a retraining program for young active militants. Pakistan SWAT
Campaign Strategy (2011) prescribed an inclusive negotiation process that emphasized a
national dialogue condemning extremism. The document outlined the importance of
using persuasion rather than coercion to reconnect to the people. In conjunction with
negotiations, de-radicalization schools were established for vulnerable youth.
The Pakistani Ministry of Social Welfare and Special Education focused on
rehabilitating young militants. The government established a joint venture between the
Pakistani Army, private foundations, and UNICEF to care for juveniles who were rescued
by security forces. Most of the candidates were recruited from families who were unable
to pay Taliban tax levies, and became paid suicide bombers. About one-third of the
children were turned in by their parents, one-third were apprehended by security forces,
and one-third surrendered themselves. The students were lodged in rehabilitation centers
located in Mingora, locally called Sabawoon, and in Bara Tehsil. In-resident students
received quality education in ethics, patriotism, and the true meanings of Islam. Medical
professionals, especially psychologists and psychiatrists, worked alongside social
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workers to reintegrate them back into mainstream society. Table 15 provides a synopsis
of the respondents’ expectations concerning de-radicalization. The data were derived
from interview Question 6: How did you apply and integrate governance principles with
military activity in the execution of Swat operations?
Table 15
Approach to De-radicalize Active Militants
Participant

First line of effort

Second line of effort

MILA1

Advanced training for police to
institute militant de-radicalization
programs and replace military to
lessen tensions.

Support de-radicalization centers
to return reconcilable militants
back into mainstream society.

MILO2

Replace Army governance with a
competent civil authority and
support de-radicalization centers.
Political dimension important.

Encourage reconciliation with
insurgents who vow to break with
extremist groups, especially
foreigners aligned with al-Qaida.

MILI3

Promote dialogue to instill
cooperation among the tribes.

Prevent the return to Taliban rule.

MILN4

Establish de-radicalization centers. Negotiate w/reconcilable militants.
Prevent human rights abuses within Release captured militants in
the centers.
return for pledge to cease violence
and surrender weapons.

MILO5

De-radicalization program to
rehabilitate young men prone to
suicide bombing. Provide
counseling and religious education.

Reunite families and provide
economic opportunity. Ministries
assist with search and unification
of divided families.

CIV6

Strength through negotiations
rather than military force. Address
root causes and provide legitimate
alternatives.

Establish a national narrative to
condemn all extremist militancy
and delegitimize the extremist
worldview.

162
De-radicalization impact finding. Planning for the establishment of joint civilmilitary de-radicalization centers was innovative; however, the effectiveness of the
overall de-radicalization program remains uncertain. De-radicalization programs were
initiated immediately after military operations concluded. Sabawoon and several centers
in Bara operated with the assistance of the Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps supported
by the privately operated Hum Pakistani Foundation and UNICEF. One participant
reported that more than 102 of a total 177 youngsters between the ages of 12 and 17 were
released from Sabawoon and over 600 at Bara after completion of their reformatory
courses. The respondent lauded the performance of the center that reintegrated the former
militants into society after receiving behavior training. However, most participants
remained skeptical of program success. Some respondents suggested that deradicalization will ultimately fail in the absence of a national narrative to condemn all
radical elements. Some participants preferred the Secretary of the Interior’s effort to
focus on madrassa reform (Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and
Transparency, 2009). Two respondents reported that madrassa reform provided a dual
benefit: to de-radicalize current students and directly prevent recruitment.
To augment the de-radicalization effort, most participants believed that the
government may redouble efforts to publicly condemn the extremist worldview. The
national government needed a meaningful dialogue to change public perceptions of the
war. Gallup poll (2011) revealed that public perceptions concerning ownership of the war
were divided, with 37 % of Swatis believing it to be Pakistan’s war, 39 % considering it
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to be America’s war, and 22 % believing both had a shared stake in the outcome.
However, a few respondents were convinced that a public condemnation of radicalism
would not change militant behavior. Hardcore militants were not willing to compromise
Sharia law, nor were they willing to concede or share governance. One respondent
reported that it is difficult to get the militants to negotiate at all. However, survey data
showed that there was hope that an ongoing discourse will promote peace. A poll by Al
Jazeera and Gallup Pakistan revealed that Swatis prefer to reconcile rather than endure an
extended military campaign (Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, 2011).
Summary of Swat Campaign Findings
The findings provide clear evidence that governance activities were productively
integrated with military operations to subdue Islamist militancy during Operation Rah-eRast in 2009. The national policy guidance to assimilate ministry activities was cogent,
but the planners faced some significant challenges. The planning process did not
ascertain governance priorities nor identify the most promising socioeconomic
investments or institutional reforms. The planners differed in their approaches to identify
the right governance activity at the right time to subdue militancy and achieve an
enduring peace. The findings provide insights into the planning barriers and suboptimal
processes that may provide a catalyst for doctrinal change.
The national policy objectives were well understood by all participants; however,
their solutions varied based on individual biases and policy interpretations. Strategic
guidance findings revealed that the planning process did not adequately address
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translating national policy to a coherent implementation of governance activities. The
planners skillfully designed a hybrid civil-military plan, but each participant had a
different view on governance priorities and methods. The national government had no
formal venue or forum to plan and coordinate interministry activities. The operational
approach findings exposed that a comprehensive analysis of the real world contextual
situation was necessary to determine priorities and coordinate limited government
capabilities to improve the social conditions within a fiscally constrained environment.
Despite a lack of ministry coordination, the application of governance significantly
contributed to subduing militant violence. The use of force findings showed that
integrating a measured military response with effective governance effectively destroyed
the enemy while fostering a trust in government. At the provincial level, the government
achieved this by affording protection and providing life quality services during the
operation. The planners were adept in finding the proper balance between using force and
exercising governance.
Participant testimony supported by government metrics reaffirmed that the
campaign instilled calm to the valley, ending the recurrent bombing of schools, police
stations, and hospitals, and the public beheading of opposition leaders. The intelligence
impact findings revealed that the planning process took full advantage of intelligence to
identify and locate the militants while minimizing collateral damage. Intelligence
planning empowered ministries to disable militant support networks, enable lashkar
militia units, and prevent militant recruitment within the displacement camps. As a result,
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the militants were effectively neutralized in the valley, and their capacity to reconstitute
was diminished.
The Swat operation reestablished peace in the valley; however, maintaining
provincial government control remains a challenge because tribal grievances were not
fully addressed. The trust in government findings confirmed that the Swatis remain
optimistic of district governance, but skeptical of national authority. The government
established tribal control with provincial oversight within one year of the operation, but
the slow progress of political reform and economic development undermined government
credibility. The military working with the District Commissioner empowered the
traditional tribal jirga to fill the void left by the militant leadership, but the establishment
of a stable political environment remains elusive. The social impact findings revealed that
the government missed an opportunity to foster public confidence by inadequately
resourcing infrastructure projects. Planners have differing perspectives of the most
pressing social issues, and the planning process failed to adjudicate the differences.
The consensus resolution goal to fully reestablish the writ of the State was
hindered by the lack of political reform and intrusive foreign intervention. The federal
jurisprudence finding showed that judicial system reform initiatives have fallen short, and
local civil governance requires military protection and oversight. The elders viewed
military intervention into tribal affairs as inconsistent with traditional values and
historical lines of authority. The foreign military integration findings revealed that public
confidence was further undermined by Islamabad’s tacit approval of foreign support,
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most notably allowing U.S. drone strikes, which caused an unnecessary loss of lives. The
planning process did not adequately address the proper synchronization of Allied military
support. Advances in Pakistani government credibility were often negated by violations
of Pakistani territorial integrity from Allied strikes.
The consensus resolution goal to use public messaging to counter radical ideology
contributed to mission success. The strategic communications findings revealed that
positive messaging to condemn Taliban brutality and solicit national support was helpful
in shifting the dialogue in favor of Islamabad. As confirmed by the reconciliation finding,
the Swati perception of the military changed from invader to protector, and laid the
foundation for reconciliation. National and regional messaging from multiple media
sources provided valuable information to the Swatis that afforded protection during the
resettlement, but changing public perceptions requires a long-term effort. The
information operations finding showed that a considerable effort was required to block
the Taliban propaganda from many media outlets. The countermessaging finding
confirmed the political benefits of exposing the Taliban atrocities; however, the planners
needed a better process to craft an enduring strategic narrative. Nationally controlled
media adequately revealed the harmful impact of the militants’ nefarious actions, but a
coherent national narrative to condemn jihad and all the radical elements was absent.
The Parliament’s goal and actions to protect and rehabilitate displaced persons
significantly reduced the public trust deficit with government. The rehabilitation impact
findings confirmed that the resettlement and reintegration over two million Swatis was a
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success. Although weaknesses in bureaucratic processes resulted in service inefficiencies,
the safe passage of displaced families was the crowning achievement of the postconflict
stabilization work. The combined Pakistan and international community endeavor to
maintain security and provide life services fostered a public confidence that enabled all
other governance efforts. The education, healthcare, and infrastructure impact findings
showed that despite limited resources, the government’s meager investment in these
services resonated with the tribes and built a basis for reconciliation.
The national goal to implement social change and economic development achieved
limited results. Positive improvements were seen in the rebuilding of educational
institutions, and the revitalization of healthcare facilities; however, the social impact
finding revealed that an under resourced economic development plan at the District level
failed to take full advantage of the opportunity to shift Swati allegiances to the
government. The reintegration impact findings exposed gaps in service delivery that were
exploited by the militants attempting to solidify their foothold. The Provincial
Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Settlement Authority was responsive and governance
processes became more transparent, but the accomplishments fell well short of alleviating
poverty, advancing human rights, or creating employment. The de-radicalization impact
finding showed that the lack of social development progress created a significant problem
for post-conflict de-radicalization programs, run by joint military-government
partnerships. Program administrators found it difficult to regain the allegiances of young
radicalized Pashtun, and the efficacy of the de-radicalization initiative is uncertain.
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Chapter 5: Discussions, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Introduction
The concurrent integration of governance activities with military actions
significantly contributed to the success of Operation Rah-e-Rast. Although there were
many barriers and shortfalls in the planning process, the operation represents Pakistan’s
first successful whole-of-government countermilitancy operation. By June 30, 2009, the
military cleared the valley of Taliban and the level of violence was subdued to levels
experienced before the Islamists intruded into the Swat District. After the operation, the
Swatis enjoyed a safe security environment, a functioning education system, and access
to healthcare, and a return to tourism and commerce.
Prior to Rah-e-Rast, the Pakistani military had a mixed record of countermilitancy
successes and failures; however, the approach to the Swat campaign diverged
significantly from contemporary military doctrine. The Pakistani Army showed an
impressive capacity to adapt emerging counterinsurgency doctrine to the militant threat.
Planners learned from previous failures, resulting in a new hybrid planning approach
incorporating neo-Clausewitzian prescriptions into the military’s traditional planning
construct. The union of the Pakistani Army, Swat District Commissioner, and the
Provincial Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Settlement Authority adequately
implemented a civil-military approach that strengthened the Pashtun confidence in
government and disabled the militant support base. Conversely, the overall planning
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process was ad-hoc and suboptimized. Improvements in planning doctrine may facilitate
future successes in the global Islamist militancy struggle.
Interpretations of the Findings
Operation Rah-e-Rast successfully reduced militant violence in the Swat District
and bolstered confidence in the mainstream government authority. The Swat campaign
achieved the two main national policy objectives: to eliminate the terrorist threat from the
Malakand and to protect the Swati people. The Rah-e-Rast planners deviated from a
traditional counterterrorism approach aimed at destroying militant leadership and support
nodes and applied a population-centered approach. The planners embraced the tenets of
neo-Clausewitzian theory by designing a campaign with governance activities that
reconnected the people to their government and to their military. However, the planning
team was not optimally postured to translate all the national policy guidance into
effective and efficient governance action. The analysis of the social environment was
inadequate, and the prioritization of governance activity supported by sufficient resources
was not realized. Governance may be methodically pursued by a team of subject matter
experts knowledgeable in government, the social sciences, and program management.
The Pakistani national and provincial authorities did not fully achieve all their
stated objectives. Political reform to afford collective tribal representation, judicial
reform to provide quick and effective justice, and educational reform remain unresolved.
The objective shortfalls were linked to the planning process that did not adequately
identify governance priorities nor properly allocate scarce resources to the most pressing

170
social problems. Policy and doctrine did not provide sufficient guidance to establish
cross-organizational venues or forums to address root grievances, prioritize governance
initiatives, and efficiently apply private and government resources in the most productive
way.
Despite an ad-hoc civil-military planning process and planning teams with limited
expertise in governance, the Rah-e-Rast planners performed well. The planners
innovatively applied strategic communications and intelligence to build meaningful
relationships between the people and their government. The relationships fostered trust,
and that trust undermined the militant support base that was tenuously sustained with
coercion and intimidation. The Swatis readily assisted the military in identifying many
militant strongholds, and the military responded by providing safe transit and a secure
environment for the Swatis. The new countermilitancy approach based in neoClausewitzian theory proved to be more effective in subduing militancy than the sole use
of direct military action. Documented and derived evidence supports the three theoretical
propositions identified in Chapter 3.
Concerning the first theoretical proposition, the findings confirmed that positive
governance interactions integrated with protective military activities promoted stability
between the government, the people, and the military. The stability promoted confidence
in the Military Commander and Swat District Commissioner that enhanced provincial
government legitimacy. The operation successfully reestablished the writ of provincial
authority and disabled the Islamic shadow governance. The military embraced neo-
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Clausewitzian tenets that emphasize protecting the people and establishing enduring
relationships with social and economic solutions rather than applying a predominant
force of arms. Pakistani survey data showed a marked improvement in government trust,
a testament that the new approach was successful in reaching the people. The
overwhelming defeat of the militants and reduction in violence provided compelling
evidence that Pakistan’s new countermilitancy strategy worked; however, shortcomings
in the planning process prevented taking full advantage of the military successes.
The study results validate Pakistan’s countermilitancy approach, but planning
effectiveness was not optimized. The National Assembly and the All Parties Conference
strategic framework provided excellent guidance; however, governance integration varied
based on individual biases and policy interpretations. The clarity of national objectives
facilitated a unity of effort and common understanding among the ministries. Conversely,
the planning process did not sufficiently identify the most important governance
attributes to pursue–and when to purse them. Governance and military activity were on
parallel paths to a peaceful end-state, but were merely mutually supporting rather than
fully integrated. The formation of a joint civilian-military partnership to rebuild destroyed
infrastructure was a collective success, but reform opportunities were squandered after
the dissolution of the Taliban authority.
The planning process did not adequately address translating national policy to
specific governance tasks. The ministries pursued governance activities that enabled the
military by happenstance or intuition rather than in an analytical way. One notable
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example was the approach to alleviate political corruption and disenfranchisement that
were identified as major grievances. The planners differed on the manifestation of the
problem. Some participants suggested that corruption fostered violence and a dangerous
security situation, while others believed that it promoted social instability. The difference
in perceptions would lead to differing solutions—one military and one sociopolitical—
and the implementation of both solutions were independent of each other.
Concerning the second theoretical proposition, the findings confirmed that the
renewed confidence in government successfully undermined the Islamist militant support
base. The findings revealed that the militants were weakened and vulnerable without a
popular support base, thus enabling a military use of arms to readily destroy them.
Effective government dissemination of information and use of local media enabled a safe
and efficient resettling of displaced persons. Public safety increased public confidence
that precipitated valuable intelligence that contributed to operational successes. The
military leveraged intelligence to pinpoint militant strongholds and facilitate precision
targeting to minimize collateral damage and reduce unwarranted deaths. Despite these
successes, durable political and social reform remains intangible and a barrier to
sustaining tribal relations. Judicial reform to implement Nizam-e-Adl (Sharia
jurisprudence) and establish a quick and just legal process fell short, political reform to
increase inclusivity did not become manifest, and the tempo of economic development
did not meet tribal expectations. Lack of political and social reform sustains an everpresent risk to government authority.
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Operational success in Swat was impeded by an incomplete analysis of the social
environment. Understanding the social dynamics within Clausewitz's trinity consisting of
the people, national government, and the military was fundamental. The planners need
social research to prioritize governance pursuits that are consistent with the cultural and
religious values of the tribe. This would signify a holistic assessment of the relationships
within the trinity and the influence of the militants on those relationships. NeoClausewitzian theorists envision that the implementation of governance is directly linked
to the ability of government to foster trust and achieve legitimacy. The military may
apply sufficient armed force to suppress militancy; then governance may be pursued
unencumbered by an unstable security environment. Political and social reform can then
be sustained after operations or the Taliban authority may reemerge.
Concerning the third theoretical proposition, the findings confirmed that
governance enabled military operations in subduing the violence. However, there was no
evidence to support that governance could fully supplant military action. The planning
process was adept in determining the right balance between using a force of arms and
applying governance, but the process was ad-hoc. Neo-Clausewitzian thought emphasizes
the application of logic and reason to properly apply all elements of national authority in
balance to counter the chaotic nature of the enemy. This portends a planning process that
analyzes the social environment and efficiently applies all instruments of national power
against the threat. The government’s winning of Swati hearts and minds kept the radical
militant threat at bay with only a discriminatory use of force; however, the fragile peace
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requires a constant tempo of governance reform. The findings revealed that Rah-e-Rast
planning did not include a formal process to assess the social dynamics and allocate
resources accordingly. As a result, near-term military tactics proved successful, but the
lack of long-term social investments failed to advance important government reform
initiatives.
Pakistani planning doctrine did not adequately provide a process to efficiently
apply an all-government approach in an austere fiscal environment. The study reveals
that a planning process that establishes governance priorities may optimize the
application of limited resources. The Pakistani strategic review astutely embraced an
interministry approach; however, in a fiscally constrained environment, determining
which governance attributes to pursue proved elusive. Absent a formal prioritization
process, the planners pursued several programs simultaneously with an unknown sense of
impact or duration. Governance pursuits were left to interpretation, and the linkage of
investment to social impact was uncertain. The de-radicalization program validates this
point. The planning for de-radicalization centers was exceptional, but the success of the
program is in jeopardy due to an uncertain commitment to resources and manpower.
The Pakistani military successfully adopted a population-centered approach to
countermilitancy; however, formal training on the approach remains ad-hoc. Provisional
training proved instrumental in achieving operational success. Soldiers were schooled on
Pashtun cultural sensitivities, and small unit formations easily operated among the
people. Conventional military doctrine advocated massive firepower—both from the air
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and with artillery—but the military applied it judiciously to minimize collateral damage.
The Army shifted focus to community protection by working with the District
Commissioner, lashkar militias, local police, and the Frontier Constabulary. These
tactical adaptations reaffirmed the neo-Clausewitzian theoretical tenets that local security
and community relations were paramount in this environment, but embedding these
tactics, techniques, and procedures into the mainstream civil-military continuum of
training and education remains elusive.
The planning process did not take full advantage of foreign economic and military
assistance. The Pakistani people frequently misinterpreted the military support from the
United States because many events were not coordinated with Pakistani ground
operations. Joint planning coordination was necessary to prevent mutual interference.
Advances in government credibility were often negated by violations of territorial
integrity by Allied forces. The Taliban effectively recruited militants using anti-American
sentiment as an enabler. Substantial American support for displaced persons mitigated the
perception problem, but the dichotomy of views concerning international aid and military
support is reconcilable within the planning process.
Limitations of the Study
The results of the qualitative study are limited by the subjective nature of
participant testimony. The study reflects a scientific objectivity of the planning process
through a faithfulness to facts provided by a cadre of Pakistani security professionals who
are protected by a stringent interview protocol. Strict adherence to the protocol
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counteracted the inherent qualitative subjectivity. Protection and anonymity of my
participants promoted objectivity, although total objectivity cannot be achieved from
national security professionals who are exceedingly dedicated to their profession—and
are employed by the Pakistani government. My role as a researcher to conduct a
subjective interpretation of Swati behavior and of the participant testimony and
observations concerning that behavior is a study weakness. However, an objective view
of governance may be achieved by analyzing the first-hand experiences of those who
planned the operation and the Swatis who experienced the effects.
A weakness inherent in qualitative research is its limited generalizability of the
findings due to the particularity of case-based data. The application and meticulous
adherence to the analytical model counteracted this qualitative study weakness. Although
hundreds of civilian and military planners were involved with the Swat campaign, the
participant pool represented subject matter experts with a broad and complete perspective
on the research problem. The study uncovered some inconsistencies in their expert
testimony, despite working on the same plan under identical circumstances. The
application of the analytical model in Appendix B uncovered undisputed facts and
common themes by triangulating data with official government documents and surveys.
The study findings are not absolute, but this single case study—albeit limited in
scope—contributes to social science discipline by validating a critical case in the
continuum of countermilitancy research. Given the time and adequate resources, a
multiple case study approach that includes several operations within a myriad of
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circumstances could legitimately be accomplished with a succession of case studies.
Multiple cases would promote transferability and data validity and may serve to validate
doctrinal recommendations. Differing sociopolitical objectives may require alternate
governance strategies, but those distinctions may be determined from the research of
multiple cases.
Implications for Social Change
This study contributes to the body of militancy research by focusing on the
integration of governance with military operations in a contemporary campaign. This
case study validated Pakistan’s new strategic approach that embraced neo-Clausewitzian
theoretical tenets. Joint operational planning process improvements may better address
the motivations of conflict inspired by Islamists and the implementation of competent
governance to prevent it. The research was unique by exploring the problem from the
viewpoint of an Islamic Republic—the State of Pakistan—rather than a Western
perspective and the impact of addressing governance on desired changes at the societal
level. Several implications for increasing effective governance in fighting Islamist
militancy emerged from the Pakistani experience within the Swat Valley of Khyber
Province.
Study Implications
Establish a permanent Joint Interministry Coordination Group to
synchronize the civilian and military countermilitancy effort. The study findings
revealed the governance promotes a public confidence that undermines militant support,
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but planning effectiveness was not optimized. This group may facilitate a unity of effort
among the ministries. A permanent body of civilian and military experts located within
the Interior Ministry may translate national policy to specific governance tasks that may
be implemented at the provincial or district level. Experts in security, justice, health, and
education may establish governance priorities, call for global resources, and allocate
resources to the most pressing social issues. A standing Special Support Group, similar to
the Provincial Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Settlement Authority that formed after
the Swat operation, could implement the national policy and distribute the resources
provided by the governing body at the ministry or provincial level. This is a similar
concept the U.S. Office of Military Affairs located within the State Department’s
USAID.
Establish a National Human Rights Board to protect human rights by
coordinating and implementing a social improvement strategy. The study findings
revealed that operational success was impeded by an incomplete analysis of the social
environment and the lack of a formal planning process resulted in a disjointed
rehabilitation, reintegration, reconciliation, and de-radicalization strategy. This board,
chartered by the Pakistani National Assembly and under Khyber Provincial oversight,
could conduct a holistic assessment of the at-risk population and devise a cogent strategy
to protect the people from Islamist influence. A national level human rights group that
embraces Pashtun cultural values may serve to sustain tribal confidence in government
and prevent the radicalization of youth to undermine the Islamist social support system.
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The board could also provide policy for judicial reform and militant rehabilitation to
further isolate the Islamists and strengthen a popular trust in government.
Establish a Regional Strategic Policy Committee to advise and implement
national policy at the regional level. The study findings showed that some local reform
opportunities were squandered after the expulsion of the Taliban. A standing joint
advisory committee within the District, codified in civil-military doctrine, could provide
policy development and implementation oversight of militancy contingencies prior to,
during, and after operations. The District Commissioner may lead a cooperative jirga
comprised of tribal or community elders, local and magistrates, and military commanders
to address regional security concerns, government reformation initiatives, and economic
development priorities. The committee could assess governance activities using existing
social assessment tools, and advise national leaders in policy implementation and the
proper allocation of resources.
Codify strategic messaging in countermilitancy doctrine. The study results
showed the positive impact of government information dissemination in enabling a safe
and efficient resettling of displaced persons. To bolster effectiveness, the message
planning process within Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relation (ISPR) organization
could be formalized to coordinate national messaging themes across all ministries. The
messaging may transcend all levels of warfare, and all information domains. The process
could leverage current technologies, establish unified themes, and synchronize
information dissemination to meet national objectives.
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Expand the Pakistani Army’s Special Services Group to enhance the
military’s capacity to expand the countermilitancy campaign to other Islamist
controlled regions. The study revealed the importance of specially trained
counterinsurgency units, supported by good intelligence, in implementing a populationcentered strategy. These forces proved invaluable to the success of Operation Rah-e-Rast.
A permanent cadre of special operating forces trained and educated in insurgency warfare
may be imbedded with general purpose forces to plan and implement countermilitancy
operations. This capability may be enhanced by instituting a formal course of instruction
for all civil-military security professionals. This course of instruction is teachable within
the Pakistani professional military education system. Government planners across all
governance disciplines should have access to foster an interministry culture. The
Pakistani National War College and subordinate staff colleges within the military domain
may be a suitable venue for this joint education.
Conclusions
The emerging global Islamist militancy threat may be countered by protecting
vulnerable populations and isolating them from the radical ideology, then reconnecting
them with the mainstream government. To accomplish this, national authorities may
integrate governance with military operations in a balanced way to directly destroy the
militant capacity to wage war. Achieving this balance requires an all-government effort
to identify address grievances, apply governance principles that resonate with the people,
and provide adequate resources to regain the “hearts and minds” of the affected
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population. National efforts to foster an interministry culture that embraces a populationcentered approach may promote a synergy that focuses limited resources on the most
important social issues to undermine the radical Islamic movement. Governance then
becomes a valuable tool for national and provincial leaders to achieve an operational
harmony that protects the people from militancy and promotes government legitimacy.
The Pakistani operations in the Swat Valley revealed valuable insights on the joint
planning process. The military sought to understand the Pashtun culture and protect their
way of life. The military commanders worked alongside the Swat District Commissioner
to build enduring relationships, founded in trust. Economic development in healthcare
and education sent a clear message that tribal values would be honored and the
government intended to stay for the long term. Although somewhat ad-hoc and under
resourced, the Pakistani Army successfully collaborated with government ministries to
foster a public confidence that challenged the Taliban and undermined their capacity to
wage war. The Swatis responded positively to the gestures of political inclusivity and
accommodation, but enduring political reform remains elusive due to the exigent nature
of merging tribal cultural norms with mainstream Pakistani political principles.
The study indicates that the Pakistani implementation of governance to counter
Islamist militancy in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province was an effective strategy in reducing
violence and restoring government control. Most of the Swat Valley remains under the
provincial authority and violence was subdued to preoccupation levels. Several years
after the operation, the Pakistani government continues social investment, relative peace
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ensues, and the Swatis generally reject Islamist influence. The theory of promoting public
confidence to enable the military and disable the Islamists was validated; moreover,
future government efforts may be enhanced by leveraging the Swat lessons.
Cogent policy from standing national and regional policy committees comprised
of government, military, and tribal representatives may empower civil-military planning
and implementation. A sound strategy, backed by sufficient resources, from rehabilitation
to de-radicalization is necessary to ensure the safety and repatriation of people suffering
the misguided brutality of radical Islamists. The study reaffirmed that direct military
action alone is not sufficient. Specially trained and educated security teams comprised of
military, paramilitary, and police may communicate and reconnect with the people to
draw them away from militant influence. A renewed public confidence in government
promotes valuable intelligence and weakens the militant support base. In addition,
doctrinal enhancements that assess the social environment, identify priorities, and design
governance activities that are directly linked to cultural values may foster a public trust in
government that undermines the Islamist cause. These operational planning
enhancements are universal, and may be transferable to other regions of the world that
are devastated by Islamist inspired violence.
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Appendix A: Interview Protocol and Interview Questions

The narrative inquiry is designed to explore the planning considerations and
implementation of governance in countermilitancy operations in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa
Province (KPK) during the Swat Valley government activities and operations of 2009.
The manner for interviews will be conducted via a secure internet or audio-teleconference
connection. The questions are meant to obtain your perspectives on Pakistan’s
countermilitancy campaign. Only audio and no video will be recorded. Digital recorders
will be used during the interview session and secured in locked containers.
No more than two interview sessions will be needed and each interview session
will not exceed 90 minutes. In addition to the audio recordings, extensive field notes may
be taken to synchronize discussion points. The field notes may contain observations
regarding body language, facial expressions, or tone of voice. In addition to obtaining a
signed consent, the full description of the study and all consents will be provided to the
participants. The interviewee will be provided the opportunity to review the transcript.
The interviewee will be reassured that the participant’s identity will be kept confidential
and all research data will remain secure.
Research Question
RQ1 - During the implementation of Pakistan’s countermilitancy campaign in
Swat Valley of the Malakand Division of Khyber Province, how were governance
activities integrated with military operations to subdue Islamist militancy?
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Interview Questions
The questions are designed to be flexible and open-ended to explore the
effectiveness of the countermilitancy planning process. The initial three questions are
directed for an establishment of personal experience (non-identifiable) that validate
participant credibility. Questions 4-6 are designed to gain and understanding of the
participant’s experience with the planning process and view of Islamist militancy in
general and the perspective of the ability of the government to deal with it. Questions 7-9
are directly related to the specific research that I have already conducted through
literature review and document analysis.
Question 1- What are your national security related duties associated with the 2009 Swat
Valley operation conducted in Khyber Province? Follow-up question - What involvement
did you have in the planning or conduct of countermilitancy operations in the Swat
Valley? Please do not share your actual position title or other data that may be specific
only to you or divulge your identity.
Question 2- Please share your experiences in planning with the different ministries to
deal with the Islamists who operated in Swat Valley. Associated follow-up questions:
What was your overarching national policy guidance? How was policy guidance
integrated into the campaign plan? Was the national policy implemented as anticipated?
Did the operation meet the desired policy end states?
Question 3- Please share your views on the causes and effects of the Islamist militancy
problem in Pakistan’s Khyber Province. Possible follow up question - Do you have any
first-hand experience with Islamist Militant activities?
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Question 4 - How did you coordinate the government’s civil-military ability to counter
militants operating in Swat Valley? Possible follow-up question-How do you view your
government’s ability to protect the Pashtun tribe from the militant threat?
Question 5- Do you believe that government policy adequately addresses Pakistan’s
integration of governance with military operations to subdue the militancy problem?
Question 6 – How did you apply and integrate governance principles with military
activity in the execution of Swat operations?
Question 7- What is your involvement with and perspective on the joint civil-military
countermilitancy planning process? Possible follow-up question - How did the militants
exploit weaknesses in the plan? Were the militants deterred by strengths in the
relationship of the military to their people and government?
Question 8 – Is Pakistan’s countermilitancy doctrine adequate, or could it be improved to
leverage the government interministries?
Question 9- How did the joint planning team shape the social environment in Swat
Valley to augment or enable military operations against the Islamist militants?
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Appendix B: Case Study Linear Analytical Model
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